Claim-specific limitations and accrual

basis: proved; count: Hostile work environment; subject: count=Hostile work environment

Jeffrey Sand fired Bryant shortly after the investigation into the email, purportedly for absenteeism. Bryant brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 on July 13, 2016, alleging a racially hostile work environment and retaliatory termination.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Bryant testified that the harassment persisted and that he continued to make complaints after May 2012. He testified about a particular incident on August 7, 2012, when Skaggs made him paint rails in the hot sun and would not allow him to come into the air-conditioned part of the barge or to access water. When Bryant attempted to get out of the sun and told Skaggs that he felt ill, Skaggs responded, "[G]o out there and paint those rails like I told your black ass to," and sent him back outside. Bryant felt lightheaded and experienced chest pains, so he went to Lambert for help. Lambert measured Bryant's blood pressure, which was very high, and convinced Skaggs to call an ambulance. It was later determined that Bryant had suffered a heart attack, and he did not return to work for two weeks.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We also conclude that Bryant's § 1981 claim was timely under the applicable four-year statute of limitations. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 383-85, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (explaining that federal statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to such claims). "[U]nder federal law one act of the hostile work environment must occur ... within the § 1981 statute of limitations period. If that requirement is met, a party may then recover for all illegal acts that made up the hostile work environment." Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 2003). The continuing violation rule applies to punitive, as well as compensatory, damages. See id. at 1060-61. Thus, in order for Bryant's claim to be timely, at least one act of the hostile work environment must have occurred after July 13, 2012-four years before Bryant filed his complaint.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Several witnesses testified that Skaggs's abuse continued into the limitations period and that Jeffrey Sand was on notice of that abuse. Bryant suffered a heart attack in August 2012 after Skaggs forced him to work in the hot sun without access to water, even after Bryant told Skaggs that he felt ill. The jury readily could have inferred-from Skaggs's own words-that this abuse was motivated by racial animus. Jeffrey Sand was on notice of Skaggs's abuse from Bryant's earlier complaints but was alerted again to the issue in January 2013 when another employee sent an anonymous email asserting that he overheard the abuse. The jury reasonably could have concluded that the company's response to this complaint was inadequate and evidenced a reckless disregard for Bryant's protected rights continuing well into the limitations period. We accordingly find no error in the district court's denial of Jeffrey Sand's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; count: Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; theory: Employer’s borrowed two-year Illinois period; subject: count=Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; theory=Employer’s borrowed two-year Illinois period

Petitioners are African-American former employees of respondent’s Chicago manufacturing division. On November 25,1996, petitioners filed this class action alleging violations of their rights under § 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act. Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chicago plant. Respondent sought summary judgment on the ground that petitioners’ claims are barred by the applicable Illinois statute of limitations because they arose more than two years before the complaint was filed.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We conclude that a cause of action “aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted” after December 1,1990 — and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations — if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment. That construction best serves Congress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations while at the same time protecting settled interests. It spares federal judges and litigants the need to identify the appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to new claims but leaves in place the “borrowed” limitations periods for pre-existing causes of action, with respect to which the difficult work already has been done.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In this case, petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act in the sense that petitioners’ causes of action were made possible by that Act.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)