Formation performance termination or contractual benefits

Brown's lawsuit stems from events that occurred at the Power and Light District in Kansas City, Missouri. After purchasing a few drinks at an outdoor bar, Brown sought to enter the bar's associated restaurant to use the bathroom. When he came out, three men told him he was trespassing and needed to leave. Brown alleges the men cursed at him, using racial slurs, and pushed Brown out of the restaurant. Brown then walked directly to two nearby police officers and stated he wanted to file a complaint. The officers detained Brown at a security guard office and eventually let him go, after giving him a ticket for trespassing.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As the judgment was issued by a Missouri court, Missouri res judicata law applies. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept. , 691 F.2d 393, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1982) ; see also Laase, 638 F.3d at 856 ("[T]he law of the forum that rendered the first judgment controls the res judicata analysis."). Under Missouri law "res judicata applies where (1) 'the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the decision was the final judgment on the merits, and (3) the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases.' " Bannum, Inc. v. City of St. Louis , 195 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Biermann v. United States , 67 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (E.D. Mo. 1999) ). Res judicata bars relitigation from the same "operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing" and applies "to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at that time." Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield , 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting King Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints , 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)).

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Brown has asserted the same cause of action against the same party in federal court that he did in the state court, which had jurisdiction and entered a final judgment. Therefore, this suit is barred by res judicata.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

count: Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; subject: count=Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer

Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chicago plant.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The original version of the statute now codified at Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. It was amended in minor respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-169, n. 8 (1976), but its basic coverage did not change prior to 1991. As first enacted, § 1981 provided in relevant part that “all persons [within the jurisdiction of the United States] shall have the same right, in every State and Territory ... to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 14 Stat. 27. We held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989), that the statutory right “to make and enforce contracts” did not protect against harassing conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract. Under that holding, it is clear that petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, and refusal to transfer claims do not state violations of the original version of §1981. In 1991, however, Congress responded to Patterson by adding a new subsection to § 1981 that defines the term “ ‘make and enforce contracts’ ” to include the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b). It is undisputed that petitioners have alleged violations of the amended statute. The critical question, then, is whether petitioners’ causes of action “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act or under § 1981 as originally enacted.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Any claim brought under § 1981, therefore, must initially identify an impaired “contractual relationship,” § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has rights. Such a contractual relationship need not already exist, because § 1981 protects the would-be contractor along with those who already have made contracts. We made this clear in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), which subjected defendants to liability under § 1981 when, for racially motivated reasons, they prevented individuals who “sought to enter into contractual relationships” from doing so, id., at 172 (emphasis added). We have never retreated from what should be obvious from reading the text of the statute: Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Nor has Congress indicated that we should. We held in Patterson that the prior version of § 1981 did “not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations.” 491 U. S., at 171. In 1991, Congress amended the statute, see 105 Stat. 1071, adding § 1981(b), which defines “make and enforce” to bring postformation conduct, including discriminatory termination, within the scope of § 1981. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004). But while Congress revised Patterson’s, exclusion of postformation conduct, it let stand Patterson’s focus upon contract obligations. In fact, it positively reinforced that element by including in the new § 1981(b) reference to a “contractual relationship.”

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)