DEFENSE · 42usc1983:statute-of-limitations
Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).
Exact element source
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redressSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [441:516] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| borrowed-state-personal-injury-period/filed-within-two-years | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — not | |
| john-doe-defendants/no-relation-back-for-unnamed-officers | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — applied/procedural |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 | Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; City of Warren; subject: party=John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; City of Warren | borrowed-state-personal-injury-period/filed-within-two-years | The incident giving rise to Mr. Dye’s complaint occurred on 11 January 2002 and Mr. Dye filed his complaints against Chief Mando-poulos, the City and John Does 1-5 on 23 December 2003.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [16215:16399] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [15288:15446] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Mr. Dye’s complaint falls within the appropriate time limit with regard to the Chief and the City, but as discussed below, not with regard to John Does 1-5.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [16416:16572] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f. |
| /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 | Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: law; party: John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; theory: no Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) relation-back for later-named "John Doe" officers; subject: party=John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; theory=no Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) relation-back for later-named "John Doe" officers | john-doe-defendants/no-relation-back-for-unnamed-officers | The John Does 1-5 remain unidentified and unserved by the plaintiff now more than three years from the date of the incident.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [46735:46859] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17838:18064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Any proposed amendment by Mr. Dye, at this late date, to change the John Does 1-5 to identified officers would amount to less than a mistake concerning identity and consequently, could not relate back to his original complaint.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [19143:19370] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.
/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005
As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [15288:15446] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).
interpretation
This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.
/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005
This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17838:18064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).
interpretation
Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.
Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [1290:1518] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).