Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence

AND · 18usc922:status.g9

Exact element source

(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec922; Unicode character offsets [17822:17906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 69d6082896652ca704d8da56c0a01daa1d10b51846206764bf1140610c756b65.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
force-element/causing-bodily-injury-entails-use-of-force0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f-supp-3d/162/1106-01 — United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — comparator/merits

predicate-offense-definition/generic-battery-conviction-with-domestic-victim-in-fact1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/us/555/0415-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01 — United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016Misdemeanor crime of domestic violencenot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
comparator / merits

claim: (g)(1); theory: Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause; subject: theory=Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause

922(g)(9) case law is used by analogy to hold that Oregon Assault III (and, by extension, Coercion) has the use of force as an element under ACCA; nobody here was charged under (g)(9). The court notes Castleman left open whether causing injury entails ACCA-level "violent force".
force-element/causing-bodily-injury-entails-use-of-force
§ 922(g)(9) prohibits anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [18585:18693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In assessing .whether a statute that prohibits causing injury meets the requirement of having as an element, the use or attempted use of force, the Court held that “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense,” and that “the knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [19560:19895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/555/0415-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009Misdemeanor crime of domestic violencesatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; claim: (g)(9)

The indictment was sufficient as charged: a generic battery conviction qualifies when the victim was in fact a spouse or other listed relation. Only the use-of-force requirement must be an element of the predicate statute; the domestic relationship is a fact the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in the 922(g)(9) prosecution itself. Whether the relationship was actually proved was not before the Court (conditional plea on the indictment's allegations).
predicate-offense-definition/generic-battery-conviction-with-domestic-victim-in-fact
The indictment identified Hayes’s predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as a 1994 conviction for battery in violation of West Virginia law.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [1542:1692] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The victim of that battery, the indictment alleged, was Hayes’s then-wife — a person who “shared a child in common” with Hayes and “who was cohabitating with ... him as a spouse.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [1693:1872] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The West Virginia statute under which he was convicted in 1994, Hayes observed, was a generic battery proscription, not a law designating a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element of the offense.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [2208:2427] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Instead, in a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, it suffices for the Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for “an offense . . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse or other domestic victim.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [4995:5215] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To obtain a conviction in a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the predicate offense was the defendant’s current or former spouse or was related to the defendant in another specified way. But that relationship, while it must be established, need not be denominated an element of the predicate offense.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [12793:13155] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In line with the large majority of the Courts of Appeals, we conclude that § 921(a)(33)(A) does not require a predicate-offense statute of that specificity.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [4838:4994] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [19171:19360] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.

/us/555/0415-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009

We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_555.jsonl#/us/555/0415-01; Unicode character offsets [758:962] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3a7a3039ef9688b8d4c2536bed0b3955aac1c4369fca644134b99ecce9c9e3a5.