AND · 15usc1:intent
In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.
Exact element source
shall be deemed guilty of a felonySource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [361:395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| knowing-joinder/per-se-no-proof-of-anticipated-effects | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 — rule-announced/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Criminal mens rea: knowing participation in the conspiracy or intent to restrain trade | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / meritsRule about the CONTENT of the element, not a finding: in a per se case the government need not show knowledge of probable anticompetitive effects (a proposed extra requirement rejected). The jury had in fact been instructed on the stricter standard and convicted anyway; knowing joinder is reviewed only inside the global "sufficient evidence to support the convictions" conclusion (see the agreement block), with no separate held sentence. | knowing-joinder/per-se-no-proof-of-anticipated-effects | the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracySource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22567:22702] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23032:23117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the government is not required in a per se case to show that the conspirators entered into the agreement with knowledge of its probable anti-competitive effects.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22704:22906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracySource:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22567:22702] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.
interpretation
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23032:23117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.
not-required
Proof in a criminal per se case that defendants specifically intended to produce anticompetitive effects or knew the probable anticompetitive effects (Cooperative Theatres, 845 F.2d at 1373)
No source quotation recorded.