AND · 18usc1341:property
Judicial construction of the statutory property/object requirement: the property target must be an object of the scheme, not merely an incidental expense of exercising regulatory power. Traditional intangible property can qualify; intangible regulatory interests and a free-standing right to control economic decisions cannot. Kousisis preserves Ciminelli and Kelly while rejecting a net-economic-loss requirement. Its holding applies to the identical mail-fraud language (605 U.S. 114, 121 n.2).
Exact element source
money or propertySource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [126:143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 3 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 3 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (3). Excluded context examples:Lustiger v. United States — 386 F.2d 132 (1967) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1967 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted United States v. Chung Lo — 231 F.3d 471 (2000) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted United States v. Boone — 628 F.3d 927 (2010) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2010 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Nijhawan v. Holder — 557 U.S. 29 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| bargained-for-exchange provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the victim is deprived of property when it received what it paid for. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| intangible-expectancy provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether an expectancy not yet vested is property. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (2). Excluded context examples:United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · background/dissent · not counted United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · background/merits · not counted |
| money-or-entitlement provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether money paid, or money legally due to the victim, is the property object of the scheme, regardless of net loss. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | United States v. Hird — 913 F.3d 332 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| regulatory-interest provisional; 3 observed cases | Whether the thing sought is "property" in the victim's hands or only the government's regulatory interest (Cleveland, Kelly). | 4 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 4; excluded context 1 | 2 | United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Cleveland v. United States — 531 U.S. 12 (2000) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 — not · law (18usc1341: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md)) · applied/merits · counted Cleveland v. United States — 531 U.S. 12 (2000) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 — not · law (18usc1341: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md)) · applied/merits · counted Southern Snow Manufacturing Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc. — 912 F. Supp. 2d 404 (2012) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · 2012 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · background/merits · not counted |
| right-to-control provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether depriving the victim of information or control over its assets is a property deprivation. | 2 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 2; excluded context 1 | 1 | United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · background/procedural · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Snow Manufacturing Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc. — 912 F. Supp. 2d 404 (2012) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · 2012 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Excluded from merits counts background / merits basis: pleaded; party: United States Patent and Trademark Office (the party deceived); theory: false statements to the USPTO to obtain patents and trademark registrations; subject: party=United States Patent and Trademark Office (the party deceived); theory=false statements to the USPTO to obtain patents and trademark registrations CLAIM ACTUALLY BROUGHT: civil RICO (18 U.S.C. 1962, private action under 1964(c)). Mail fraud is only an alleged predicate act under 1961(1), analysed jointly with wire fraud (1343) ("the same analysis applies to each"); there is no 1341 charge or claim. Case-level role is therefore background: every decided block in this file is a ruling that a RICO predicate was not pleaded, not a 1341 instance. A patent or trademark registration in the agency's hands is not government property, so lying to the USPTO to get one is not mail fraud (following the Federal Circuit's Semiconductor Energy). Bridge (no first-party reliance needed for RICO causation) does not change the property requirement. Injured competitors are the RICO plaintiffs but not the party deceived. | government-license/patent-or-trademark-registration-obtained-by-false-statements | In 2004, Sciortino applied for a patent on the ratchet linkage, allegedly listing only himself as the inventor and failing to disclose the parts’ public use and sale for more than one year before the application was filed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_912.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/912/0404-01; Unicode character offsets [6184:6406] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6eaf3112cfa04086c45f52ab5af031aa20d0fa445b4daf174c56aeda76084995.According to Plaintiffs, SnoWizard copied the flavor without authorization, used the flavor with no claim of exclusivity for approximately five years, and then applied for and received federal trademark registration in May 2004.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_912.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/912/0404-01; Unicode character offsets [8504:8732] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6eaf3112cfa04086c45f52ab5af031aa20d0fa445b4daf174c56aeda76084995.According to Plaintiffs, Defendants made numerous false representations to the USPTO in order to obtain patents and trademark registrations to which they were not entitled.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_912.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/912/0404-01; Unicode character offsets [35115:35287] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6eaf3112cfa04086c45f52ab5af031aa20d0fa445b4daf174c56aeda76084995.Even if these allegations are all true, which the Court must assume when deciding a motion to dismiss, controlling authority clearly states that “inequitable conduct before the PTO cannot qualify as an act of mail fraud or wire fraud for purposes of the predicate act requirement,” because such conduct did not “ ‘defraud’ the government of any ‘property.’”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_912.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/912/0404-01; Unicode character offsets [35909:36266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6eaf3112cfa04086c45f52ab5af031aa20d0fa445b4daf174c56aeda76084995.But, Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. precludes a finding that Defendants committed mail and wire fraud on the basis of fraudulent statements to the USPTO.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_912.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/912/0404-01; Unicode character offsets [38095:38253] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6eaf3112cfa04086c45f52ab5af031aa20d0fa445b4daf174c56aeda76084995. |
| United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: State of Missouri (alleged victim); theory: control over allocation of processing resources; money cost of processing the fraudulent application; subject: party=State of Missouri (alleged victim); theory=control over allocation of processing resources; money cost of processing the fraudulent application Two rulings merged: (a) no deprivation of control over resource allocation because the processing machinery was already in place; (b) the processing cost itself was not sought by the defendant and has no measurable value. | regulatory-cost/routine-cost-of-processing-one-application | (2) Money of the State of Missouri in the form of expenses and costs of processing a fraudulent school bus operator permit application,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [4584:4719] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.In the case at bar, the state had allocated resources for the purpose of processing bus operator’s permits long before defendant submitted his application.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [22486:22641] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Defendant certainly did not “obtain”, nor does the government suggest that defendant sought to “obtain”, the state’s processing expenses.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [24930:25067] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The government fails, however, to suggest an amount representing the expenses incurred by the state or even that the cost incurred by a government agency in processing a single application of this sort is susceptible of calculation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [25290:25522] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Processing this single permit did not deprive the state of its control over the allocation of resources.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [22833:22937] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.This Court cannot conclude that the effort exerted by the Missouri Department of Revenue in processing a single application for a bus operator’s permit in the regular course of business has any measurable value for the purposes of qualifying as “property” meriting the protection of the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [25590:25896] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3. |
| United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: State of Missouri (alleged victim); theory: state's control over distribution of bus operator's permits; the permit paper itself; subject: party=State of Missouri (alleged victim); theory=state's control over distribution of bus operator's permits; the permit paper itself The state's interest in a license is regulatory, not proprietary (a license has value only to the licensee); the physical permit paper is de minimis. | government-license/unissued-permit-in-hands-of-state | (3) Property of the State of Missouri being the exclusive control of distribution of school bus operator permits,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [4720:4833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.On August 27, 1988, the Department of Revenue mailed defendant’s bus operator’s permit to the Normandy School District.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [2476:2595] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.If the state has no proprietary interest in bus operator’s permits, then it can have no property right in controlling their distribution.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [20980:21117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The state, however, enjoys no property interest in licenses.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [20527:20587] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Likewise, the government’s claim that the state enjoyed any appreciable property interest in the piece of paper upon which defendant’s license was printed is patently absurd.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [25897:26071] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3. |
| United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory: intangible right to control how its money is spent; subject: party=Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory=intangible right to control how its money is spent Money is property, but the indictment's intangible theory alleged loss of control over money already budgeted for bus drivers, not loss of money; the court likens it to the rejected good-government theory and contrasts a bank deciding to whom it lends. | control-over-who-receives-budgeted-wages | (3) Property of the Normandy School District being the exclusive control of how its money is spent,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [3766:3865] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The school district certainly must have allocated a certain amount of money for the purpose of paying bus drivers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [23210:23324] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The district does not, in fact, object to how its money was spent. They wanted a bus driver, and that is precisely what they got. The district objects to who they got.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [23562:23729] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.This Court concludes that to find that the school district enjoyed a cognizable property right in controlling what type of person it paid wages would stand McNally on its head. The district enjoys no such property right.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [24352:24572] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3. |
| United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory: tangible money: wages paid to the defendant; subject: party=Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory=tangible money: wages paid to the defendant Wages are money, but the court requires a "deprivation": the district got the bus-driving services it paid for, so obtaining wages by a false application is held not to be a property fraud. The court also rejects the argument (Thomas, Cooper) that the "obtaining money or property by false pretenses" clause dispenses with deprivation. This equivalent-value reasoning is in tension with the law file's fraudulent-inducement variant and its Kousisis not-required note. CAVEAT: dated authority. This 1989 district-court holding rests on a deprivation / no-financial-injury requirement that the law file's own property rules (Kousisis: no net-economic-loss requirement; fraudulent-inducement variant: equivalent value in return is not dispositive) appear to reject. Read it as a historical instance, not as a current statement of the property element. | bargained-for-payment/wages-for-services-actually-performed | (1) Money from the Normandy School District in the form of wages paid,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [3554:3624] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.It is irrefutable that the school district suffered no financial injury. The school district paid wages for the services of a bus driver; defendant provided these services.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [26316:26488] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The government does not suggest that defendant did not perform the service of driving a bus for Normandy School District in return for the wages he received.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [29584:29741] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Nor does the government suggest that defendant was so poorly qualified to perform the service of driving school buses that the district somehow received less than it paid for.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [29742:29917] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.To summarize, this Court concludes that McNally and Carpenter stand for the proposition that a deprivation of property or an important right appurtenant thereto is required under the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [28757:28959] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.If the property itself is not lost, however, there must at least be some deprivation of an important right that accompanies the property, whereby the property holder’s use and enjoyment of the property is diminished.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [29226:29442] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.In the case at bar, the government makes no allegation that suggests that the school district was “deprived” of the wages paid to defendant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [29443:29583] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Hence, this Court concludes that the indictment alleges no property deprivation under McNally and Carpenter and that it, therefore, fails to allege a violation of the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [30242:30428] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3. |
| United States v. Granberry — 725 F. Supp. 446 (1989) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory: intangible right to control: who is hired, job distribution, tort liability, type of persons contracted with; subject: party=Normandy School District (alleged victim); theory=intangible right to control: who is hired, job distribution, tort liability, type of persons contracted with Bare control over hiring decisions, job distribution and liability exposure is not "property" under McNally/Carpenter: control must attach to something traditionally recognized as property. | employer-control-over-whom-it-hires | (4) Property of the Normandy School District being the exclusive control of who it hires to drive its children to and from school,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [3866:3996] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The school district then hired defendant as a school bus driver, which the government claims would not have been the case had the school district known of defendant’s prior murder conviction.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [2596:2787] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.Rather, they express only a desire for control over their general affairs; indeed, they seem to express a desire for control alone.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [19338:19469] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.This involves inquiring not only whether the asserted interest enjoys some ascertainable value, but also whether it is capable of being marketed, and whether the interest is a commodity that is generally exchanged for value in the open market.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [18407:18650] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.As the Court notes above, however, the interest in control must be focused upon some corresponding property right. Nothing in Carpenter suggests that control is in and of itself a property interest.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [19470:19668] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3.The Court finds that the remaining intangible interests alleged in the indictment are “too ethereal” to warrant the protection of the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_725.jsonl#/f-supp/725/0446-01; Unicode character offsets [20284:20437] (end exclusive); SHA-256 411855fcf12856c1d3a470b80a0ed9a653d8444a2dab2312389ba3c8e32475d3. |
| Lustiger v. United States — 386 F.2d 132 (1967) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1967 — not reached (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsPurchase money from lot buyers; not discussed as an issue. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Chung Lo — 231 F.3d 471 (2000) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 — not reached (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsLenders' loan funds; not contested. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | satisfied Excluded from merits counts background / dissent basis: pleaded; party: competing bidding banks (alleged victims); theory: reasonable expectancy of a prospective contract (tortious-interference analogy); opinion: Weis, J., dissenting; subject: party=competing bidding banks (alleged victims); theory=reasonable expectancy of a prospective contract (tortious-interference analogy); opinion=Weis, J., dissenting | fair-opportunity-to-bid-for-contract-not-yet-awarded | The allegations in the indictment make it clear that in each instance the bank that submitted the highest legitimate bid would have received the Commission’s money, but for the defendants’ fraud.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [27036:27231] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.This is demonstrated by the fact that the unsuccessful bidder would have had a civil remedy against these defendants and Bank A for the tortious interference with prospective contractual relationships.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [24735:24936] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.The fraudulent deprivation of a reasonable expectation to secure an economic advantage falls within the proscriptions of the federal fraud statutes.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [28996:29144] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Unlike the majority, I believe that the unsuccessful banks had a sufficient property interest in a legitimate bidding process to support the fraud charges here.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [23637:23797] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2. |
| United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — not reached (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / procedural party: the Commission (alternative victim urged on appeal); theory: Commission's confidential business information; Commission's right to control how its money is invested; opinion: majority; subject: party=the Commission (alternative victim urged on appeal); theory=Commission's confidential business information; Commission's right to control how its money is invested; opinion=majority Not decided: property theories absent from the indictment cannot be raised on appeal. The court expressly reserves whether loss of the right to control money satisfies McNally. | theory-not-charged-in-indictment | Bid-rigging by public officials typically results in a government entity paying more than it otherwise would have for goods or services, see, e.g., United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (3d Cir.1988), United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1495-96 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989), but the Commission allegedly made money here, receiving a higher interest rate on its deposits as a result of the scheme.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [16659:17120] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.The government now argues that Henry’s and Mike’s scheme also defrauded the Commission of.its confidential business information and the right to control how its money was invested, but these theories were not advanced in the indictment and cannot save it on appeal.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [6764:7029] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2..Because the loss of control theory was not alleged, we need not decide whether such a deprivation satisfies McNally.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [17121:17238] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2. |
| United States v. Henry — 29 F.3d 112 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — not · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Excluded from merits counts background / merits basis: pleaded; party: competing bidding banks (alleged victims); count: all counts (conspiracy with mail fraud as an object; wire fraud; bank fraud); theory: losing bidders' interest in a fair and honest opportunity to bid; opinion: majority; subject: party=competing bidding banks (alleged victims); count=all counts (conspiracy with mail fraud as an object; wire fraud; bank fraud); theory=losing bidders' interest in a fair and honest opportunity to bid; opinion=majority CHARGED: 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy whose objects were mail, wire and bank fraud), ten 1344 bank fraud counts and ten 1343 wire fraud counts; there is NO substantive 1341 count. The court construes the money-or-property requirement common to "the federal fraud statutes" and applies it to those counts, so this block is a cross-statute construction (case-level role background), not a 1341 instance; the holding is kept as the court's ruling on the indictment actually before it. A fair bidding process is a valuable condition but not a traditionally recognized, enforceable property right (no right of exclusion). Tangible gains to the schemers (deposits, a car loan, campaign contributions) are irrelevant because they did not come from the alleged victims. Ashman's open-outcry ruling is treated as indistinguishable. | fair-opportunity-to-bid-for-contract-not-yet-awarded | According to the indictment, on ten occasions Henry disclosed bid information to Mike and another individual in the Auditor General’s office, who in turn disclosed it to a representative of one bank, Bank A.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [2255:2462] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Bank A was thus allegedly able to narrowly outbid the other banks by offering a slightly higher rate of interest and, as a result, received deposits of $34,278,000 in Commission funds.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [2463:2647] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Here, however, the money had not yet been deposited, and there is no way of knowing to which, if any, of the bidding banks it would have gone. Even in a fair process, Bank A might still have won the deposits.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [8008:8216] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Just as the insurance commissions in McNally were not from the Commonwealth, the benefits Bank A and Mike received were not from the competing banks, and therefore those benefits cannot save the indictment here.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [15618:15829] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Thus, to determine whether a particular interest is property for purposes of the fraud statutes, we look to whether the law traditionally has recognized and enforced it as a property right.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [8995:9184] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.Violation of this condition may have affected each bidding bank’s possible future receipt of property, but that does not make the condition property.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [10241:10390] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.The issue, therefore, is whether the competing banks’ interest in having a fair opportunity to bid for something that would become their property if and when it were received is in itself property. We conclude that it is not.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [8217:8442] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2.In sum, we conclude that the indictment against Henry and Mike does not allege a scheme to defraud its victims of a property right and therefore does not state offenses under the federal fraud statutes.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_29.jsonl#/f3d/29/0112-01; Unicode character offsets [15835:16037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 48585ad0417a32453271cc5776b9db324b357461b0bf6490d7a01c321bf3cda2. |
| United States v. Boone — 628 F.3d 927 (2010) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2010 — not reached (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: with 18 U.S.C. 1346 (honest services) Not in issue: the charged object is the ward residents' right to the alderman's honest services under 1346, not money or property (although developers paid cash). | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Hird — 913 F.3d 332 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1341: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Traditional money or property as an object | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: William Hird (Traffic Court administrator) and Henry Alfano (private citizen); count: mail fraud counts pleaded to (Alfano 51-56, Hird 58-60), Philadelphia Traffic Court ticket-fixing; subject: party=William Hird (Traffic Court administrator) and Henry Alfano (private citizen); count=mail fraud counts pleaded to (Alfano 51-56, Hird 58-60), Philadelphia Traffic Court ticket-fixing Fines and costs imposed by judicial judgment are money legally due (Pasquantino), not a purely regulatory interest (Cleveland distinguished); the absence of any guilty judgment is no answer because the scheme's object was to prevent such judgments. Facts are the indictment's allegations, taken as true. | ticket-fixing to obviate traffic-court judgments that would impose statutory fines and costs due to city and state | In acceding to requests for "consideration," defendants were depriving the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of money which would have been properly due as fines and costs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [7543:7739] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51.In contrast, the indictment here explicitly states that the scheme deprived the City and the Commonwealth of money, and it describes the object of the scheme as obviating judgments of guilt that imposed the fines and costs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [15630:15853] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51.The Motor Vehicle Code imposes fines and costs for each violation, eliminating any judicial discretion in this regard.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [23884:24002] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51.None of the cases directly associated with Alfano and Hird resulted in a guilty judgment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [17883:17972] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51.Under Pasquantino , then, traffic tickets (or more precisely, judgments arising from them) are considered an "entitlement to collect money from individuals, the possession of which is 'something of value.' "Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [22728:22935] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51.We conclude that, as alleged, this scheme had the objective of preventing the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from possessing a lawful entitlement to collect money in the form of fines and costs-a property interest-from individuals who Alfano and Hird assisted.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_913.jsonl#/f3d/913/0332-01; Unicode character offsets [24109:24396] (end exclusive); SHA-256 13e01e98e0549fb28ba321ff123e504931aa821c3c90e8538b8796ac798a2d51. |
| Cleveland v. United States — 531 U.S. 12 (2000) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 — not · law (18usc1341: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md)) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; theory: alternate ground first urged in this Court: the second clause ("for obtaining money or property") is an independent offense satisfied because the license is property in the licensee's hands; subject: theory=alternate ground first urged in this Court: the second clause ("for obtaining money or property") is an independent offense satisfied because the license is property in the licensee's hands Reaffirms McNally: the two clauses of 1341 are not separate offenses; what the defendant gains is irrelevant unless the victim loses property. The "fact" line is the Government's contention about the license's character, not a finding. | victim-property/thing-obtained-is-property-only-in-recipients-hands | Because a video poker license is property in the hands of the licensee, the Government says, Cleveland “obtained] . . . property” and thereby committed the second offense even if the license is not property in the hands of the State.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [19861:20094] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.But we rejected that construction of the statute, instead concluding that the second phrase simply modifies the first by “ma[king] it unmistakable that the statute reached false promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as other frauds involving money or property.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [20467:20747] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.Although we do not here question that video poker licensees may have property interests in their licenses, we nevertheless disagree with the Government’s reading of §1341.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [20095:20266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c. |
| Cleveland v. United States — 531 U.S. 12 (2000) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 — not · law (18usc1341: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md)) | Traditional money or property as an object | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; theory: the State's interest in its unissued video poker licenses is property in the hands of the victim; subject: theory=the State's interest in its unissued video poker licenses is property in the hands of the victim The State's stake is regulatory (police power), not proprietary: fees and revenue share flow only after issuance and were paid in full; the right to choose licensees is sovereign power, unlike a patent holder's or franchisor's saleable asset. Federalism clear-statement rule and lenity reinforce the reading. Conviction vacated on this element as a matter of law, so recorded as applied. | victim-property/unissued-state-license-in-regulators-hands | Louisiana law allows certain businesses to operate video poker machines. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§27:301 to 27:324 (West Supp. 2000). The State itself, however, does not run such machinery.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [1129:1315] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson had violated § 1341 by fraudulently concealing that they were the true owners of TSG in the initial license application and three renewal applications mailed to the State.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [3447:3668] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.Without doubt, Louisiana has a substantial economic stake in the video poker industry.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [12315:12401] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.The State receives the lion’s share of its expected revenue not while the licenses remain in its own hands, but only after they have been issued to licensees. Licenses pre-issuance do not generate an ongoing stream of revenue.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [13054:13280] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.Tellingly, as to the character of Louisiana’s stake in its video poker licenses, the Government nowhere alleges that Cleveland defrauded the State of any money to which the State was entitled by law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [13761:13960] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.Indeed, there is no dispute that TSG paid the State of Louisiana its proper share of revenue, which totaled more than $1.2 million, between 1993 and 1995.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [13961:14115] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.It does not suffice, we clarify, that the object of the fraud may become property in the recipient’s hands; for purposes of the mail fraud statute, the thing obtained must be property in the hands of the victim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [724:935] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.these intangible rights of allocation, exclusion, and control amount to no more and no less than Louisiana’s sovereign power to regulate.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [14722:14859] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.We conclude that § 1341 requires the object of the fraud to be “property” in the victim’s hands and that a Louisiana video poker license in the State’s hands is not “property” under § 1341.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [21722:21911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c.Our holding means that Cleveland’s § 1341 conviction must be vacated.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_531.jsonl#/us/531/0012-01; Unicode character offsets [22088:22157] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7475017476dcba887c9f39abcfaabec69164a6cec5dec1a7d59cf1ff35702e5c. |
| Nijhawan v. Holder — 557 U.S. 29 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — not reached (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Traditional money or property as an object | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits count: prior conviction: conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering; subject: count=prior conviction: conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering The only thing said about 1341: it (like 1343, 1344, 371) has no monetary-loss element, which is why the INA's $10,000 threshold must be read as circumstance-specific rather than categorical. Consistent with the law file's not-required note under `property` (no loss requirement), but this Court decides nothing about any 1341 element; the prior conviction's validity is not in issue. Polarity here only means "the prior offense was a fraud conviction" / "no loss finding was made". | loss-amount/no-statutory-loss-threshold | In 2002 he was indicted for conspiring to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering. 18 U. S. C. §§371, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1956(h). A jury found him guilty.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0029-01; Unicode character offsets [1401:1578] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9988303e21a980c9b165f2278e5f0111a2f8d0b4c18840b870fe63b0834163c3.But because none of these statutes requires a finding of any particular amount of victim loss, the jury made no finding about the amount of the loss.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0029-01; Unicode character offsets [1579:1728] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9988303e21a980c9b165f2278e5f0111a2f8d0b4c18840b870fe63b0834163c3.We have found no widely applicable federal fraud statute that contains á relevant monetary loss threshold.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0029-01; Unicode character offsets [14376:14482] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9988303e21a980c9b165f2278e5f0111a2f8d0b4c18840b870fe63b0834163c3. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Obtaining the victim's money or property must have been the “aim,” not an “incidental byproduct,” of the defendant's fraud.
Kousisis v. United States — 605 U.S. 114 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 (18usc1341: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
Obtaining the victim's money or property must have been the “aim,” not an “incidental byproduct,” of the defendant's fraud.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_605.jsonl#/us/605/114; Unicode character offsets [20152:20275] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3fafd32698ec39e27fdd3e9010c70c21801f2f3a822702b3632e487bec94666a.Judicial construction of the statutory property/object requirement: the property target must be an object of the scheme, not merely an incidental expense of exercising regulatory power. Traditional intangible property can qualify; intangible regulatory interests and a free-standing right to control economic decisions cannot. Kousisis preserves Ciminelli and Kelly while rejecting a net-economic-loss requirement. Its holding applies to the identical mail-fraud language (605 U.S. 114, 121 n.2).
interpretation
In short, the wire fraud statute is agnostic about economic loss. The statute does not so much as mention loss, let alone require it.
Kousisis v. United States — 605 U.S. 114 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 (18usc1341: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
In short, the wire fraud statute is agnostic about economic loss. The statute does not so much as mention loss, let alone require it.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_605.jsonl#/us/605/114; Unicode character offsets [23857:23990] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3fafd32698ec39e27fdd3e9010c70c21801f2f3a822702b3632e487bec94666a.Judicial construction of the statutory property/object requirement: the property target must be an object of the scheme, not merely an incidental expense of exercising regulatory power. Traditional intangible property can qualify; intangible regulatory interests and a free-standing right to control economic decisions cannot. Kousisis preserves Ciminelli and Kelly while rejecting a net-economic-loss requirement. Its holding applies to the identical mail-fraud language (605 U.S. 114, 121 n.2).
not-required
Intent to cause net pecuniary loss where material deception targets a transfer of traditional property.
No source quotation recorded.