Judicial material-adversity standard for retaliation

AND · 29usc623:retaliatory-adversity

Davis-Garett applies Burlington Northern: harm need not change employment terms, but trivial slights do not suffice. Evaluate context and employer knowledge of protected conduct.

Exact element source

It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title29.jsonl#title29_sec623; Unicode character offsets [1750:2342] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d7414b39849853d6a6068539da731f835b09d9f238c028f95f2d0dd04fb6f667.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
retaliation/leave-and-termination-after-charge1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f-supp-3d/380/0783-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — satisfied
retaliation/transfer-denial-after-hotline-complaint1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f3d/921/0030-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — satisfied

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp-3d/380/0783-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019Judicial material-adversity standard for retaliationsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded

The court accepted the pleaded leave, constructive discharge, and termination as materially adverse at Rule 12(b)(6).
retaliation/leave-and-termination-after-charge
Next, she alleges that she suffered a series of adverse employment actions, including putting her on administrative leave, taking legal action against her, changing the educational requirements for her position, constructively discharging her, and terminating her.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_380.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/380/0783-01; Unicode character offsets [7611:7875] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ae65194fc22e806d299e7b218c92596a3be1c881f1451e66c47790b7cf1aad24.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

An action is materially adverse if it might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_380.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/380/0783-01; Unicode character offsets [7877:8011] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ae65194fc22e806d299e7b218c92596a3be1c881f1451e66c47790b7cf1aad24.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Moreover, Spratt's allegations that she was placed on administrative leave and endured months of adverse workplace conduct following her EEOC charge is sufficient to deter a reasonable employee from engaging in future protected activity.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_380.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/380/0783-01; Unicode character offsets [8472:8709] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ae65194fc22e806d299e7b218c92596a3be1c881f1451e66c47790b7cf1aad24.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/921/0030-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019Judicial material-adversity standard for retaliationsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: triable

The court vacates summary judgment and remands for trial. The alleged retaliatory transfer denial raises a triable material-adversity issue under the proper standard, not a proven final liability finding.
retaliation/transfer-denial-after-hotline-complaint
However, Garett was not transferred to Edgewater. Soon after Garett's Edgewater interview, Shearer received a call from Anthropologie's regional manager Jen Berry, who informed her of Garett's late-August hotline call and complaint about Shearer's handling of Garett's transfer request. (See id. ¶¶ 52-53.) It was in this telephone conversation that the decision not to transfer Garett to the Edgewater store was made. (See id. ¶ 54; Deposition of Amy Shearer ("Shearer Dep.") at 79-80.) Although Garett testified in her deposition that she did not know who made the decision to deny approval of her transfer to Edgewater (see Garett Dep. 163), she inferred in her affidavit that it was a "retaliat[ory]" decision made by "Shearer instantly" upon learning of Garett's complaint against her (Garett Aff. ¶ 54).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_921.jsonl#/f3d/921/0030-01; Unicode character offsets [10931:11740] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d3b4abda9b979025ac492543c26131c9c5310e43746649f023d41554dbcad96e.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We have considered all of Anthropologie's appellate arguments in support of summary judgment and have found them to be without merit. The judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded for trial of Garett's ADEA claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, and for further consideration of her claims under state laws.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_921.jsonl#/f3d/921/0030-01; Unicode character offsets [54151:54477] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d3b4abda9b979025ac492543c26131c9c5310e43746649f023d41554dbcad96e.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_921.jsonl#/f3d/921/0030-01; Unicode character offsets [36793:36872] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d3b4abda9b979025ac492543c26131c9c5310e43746649f023d41554dbcad96e.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

Rather, a plaintiff may recover for retaliation by "show[ing] that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse , which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination ." Id . at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal quotation marks omitted (emphases ours)).

/f3d/921/0030-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019

Rather, a plaintiff may recover for retaliation by "show[ing] that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse , which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination ." Id . at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal quotation marks omitted (emphases ours)).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_921.jsonl#/f3d/921/0030-01; Unicode character offsets [36726:37086] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d3b4abda9b979025ac492543c26131c9c5310e43746649f023d41554dbcad96e.

Davis-Garett applies Burlington Northern: harm need not change employment terms, but trivial slights do not suffice. Evaluate context and employer knowledge of protected conduct.