Neder v. United States — 527 U.S. 1 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999

Role: rule-announced; posture: criminal; jury conviction on 9 mail fraud counts (with wire fraud, bank fraud and tax counts) under instructions that omitted materiality, affirmed by CA11; certiorari on whether materiality is an element of the fraud statutes; the Court holds it is and remands for harmless-error review of the fraud counts; result: remanded; claim:

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

The holding is "X IS an element" (materiality) with application left to the court below; `role rule-announced` + not-reached carries that, but nothing marks the block as the origin of the element itself (the .law file cites this opinion as the element's rule), nor that the scheme block is a "not required" ruling (reliance, damage) rather than a test. Known item 2.

The fraud-count facts appear only in the Court's background narrative and are about bank-loan schemes charged under three statutes at once (9 mail, 9 wire, 12 bank fraud counts); the opinion never says which misstatements or which mailings belong to the 1341 counts, so the fact lines cannot be tied to this statute's counts. No mailing is described at all.

Most of the majority opinion (Part II) decides that omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to Chapman harmless-error review and applies it to the 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) tax counts (affirmed). That is the remand standard for the 1341 counts too, but it is a constitutional/procedural rule with no declared id; not recorded as a block.

The trial judge found materiality himself, outside the jury's presence, only for the bank fraud and tax counts; for mail and wire fraud no one found it. A lower-court block was not written because there is no lower-court materiality ruling on the 1341 counts to report.

Text capped at 60000 chars inside Justice Scalia's partial dissent; the majority opinion and its footnotes are complete. Separate opinions (Stevens, Scalia) agree with Part III and are not recorded.

interpretation

By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.

Neder v. United States — 527 U.S. 1 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.

A fraudulent plan, including a deliberately false promise, is required; an unsuccessful scheme can qualify. Do not convert a mere breach of contract into fraudulent intent.

interpretation

Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.

Neder v. United States — 527 U.S. 1 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (18usc1341: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.

Judge-made incorporation of common-law fraud, not an express word in this statute. Petlechkov supplies the Sixth Circuit's ordinary-prudence formulation, not a uniform national definition. Kousisis leaves unresolved the parties' competing formulations of the materiality standard; it does not adopt an essence-of-the-bargain test as an additional universal element.

interpretation

By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.

Neder v. United States — 527 U.S. 1 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (18usc1343: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)

By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.

A fraudulent plan, including a deliberately false promise, is required; an unsuccessful scheme can qualify. Do not convert a mere breach of contract into fraudulent intent.

interpretation

Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.

Neder v. United States — 527 U.S. 1 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (18usc1343: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)

Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.

Judge-made incorporation of common-law fraud, not an express word in this statute. Kousisis leaves unresolved the parties' competing formulations of the materiality standard; it does not adopt an essence-of-the-bargain test as an additional universal element.