/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01

United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016-02-12

Original case on neochart.com

Case and law context

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)

Role: background; posture: criminal; sentencing opinion after a jury conviction for felon-in-possession; the only questions are whether three Oregon prior convictions (Robbery III, Assault III, Coercion) are ACCA "violent felonies" (18 U.S.C. 924(e)) and Guidelines "crimes of violence", plus PSR objections; 922(g) is the offense of conviction and no element of it is in dispute; result: not-decided; claim: (g)(1)

Instances and excluded annotation blocks

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01 — United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016Actual or constructive possessionnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
background / merits

claim: (g)(1)

The jury verdict is recited as the premise of sentencing; this opinion neither describes the possession nor reviews it.
Unspecified variant
The indictment in this case alleged that on January 13, 2014, Defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed a handgun and that Defendant had at least three prior convictions for violent felonies.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [2718:2912] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Defendant was tried before a jury and, on May 15, 2015, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [2913:3064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01 — United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016Conviction punishable by more than one yearsatisfied
Excluded from merits counts
comparator / merits

basis: law; claim: (g)(1); theory: parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates; subject: theory=parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates

Not a ruling on the 922(g)(1) status element: the same words are construed as the ACCA / Guidelines predicate threshold. Recorded because the rule applied (statutory maximum, Murillo) is the opposite of the actual-exposure rule the law file attaches to status.g1 (McAdory). The cuts-against line is the defendant's legal contention, not a fact found.
punishable-term/statutory-maximum-not-state-guidelines-range
Each of Defendant’s prior convictions is for a Class C felony. Under ORS 161.605(3), a Class C felony is punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [32857:33013] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Defendant contends that the court cannot rely on the maximum statutory term of imprisonment in determining whether a conviction meets the threshold requirement, but must look instead to Oregon’s sentencing grid and guidelines.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31029:31255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Ninth Circuit has held that, for the purposes of determining predicate convictions, courts must use the “potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute, not the maximum sentence that could have been imposed against the particular defendant for his commission of the crime according to the state’s sentencing guidelines.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31256:31609] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Defendant’s prior convictions are therefore for crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [33014:33126] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01 — United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016Misdemeanor crime of domestic violencenot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
comparator / merits

claim: (g)(1); theory: Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause; subject: theory=Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause

922(g)(9) case law is used by analogy to hold that Oregon Assault III (and, by extension, Coercion) has the use of force as an element under ACCA; nobody here was charged under (g)(9). The court notes Castleman left open whether causing injury entails ACCA-level "violent force".
force-element/causing-bodily-injury-entails-use-of-force
§ 922(g)(9) prohibits anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [18585:18693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In assessing .whether a statute that prohibits causing injury meets the requirement of having as an element, the use or attempted use of force, the Court held that “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense,” and that “the knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [19560:19895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations recorded from this case