42 U.S.C. § 1983

Elements

1. Suable "person" (natural person in individual capacity, official in official capacity for prospective relief, or municipality; excludes States)

   Every person who

   Under Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (491 U.S. 58 (1989)), neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for damages, though state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief (or in their personal capacities for damages under Hafer) are "persons".

2. Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law

   under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia

   Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

3. Deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws

   to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

   Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred (Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); sub-elements branch by the underlying constitutional/statutory provision.

4. Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected")

   subjects, or causes to be subjected,

   Because there is no respondeat superior in § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).

5. Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services)

   custom, or usage,

   Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).

6. Damages remedy (legacy CASE id; not a prerequisite for prospective relief)

   shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

   Remedy-specific damages issue retained for CASE compatibility. Compensatory damages require proof of compensable loss; nominal damages and other remedies have distinct rules. Article III standing is separately represented by standing-injury and is not synonymous with a damages award.

7. Rejected extra element: separate proof of "abuse of governmental power" (Collins v. City of Harker Heights)

   to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

   Non-element rejected by the Supreme Court in Collins: § 1983 does not require proof of an "abuse of governmental power" separate and apart from proof of a constitutional violation.

8. Federal action / Fifth Amendment claim (outside § 1983 state-law scope)

   of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia

   Section 1983 applies only to action under color of State, Territorial, or D.C. law; purely federal action requires a Bivens or Fifth Amendment theory with federal governmental participation.

9. Collateral-order appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified-immunity denials (Mitchell v. Forsyth; Johnson v. Jones)

   shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

   Under Johnson v. Jones (515 U.S. 304 (1995)) and Scott v. Harris (550 U.S. 372 (2007)), a court of appeals on interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity reviews abstract questions of law (taking the district court's assumed facts as true unless blatantly contradicted by the record).

10. Appellate preservation / forfeiture of issue not raised in district court

    or other proper proceeding for redress

    Procedural preservation rule applied in § 1983 appeals.

11. Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process)

    to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

    Under Thompson v. Clark (596 U.S. 36 (2022)), a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 requires showing that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.

12. Statutory bar on injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity (1996 amendment)

    except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

    Added by Pub. L. 104-317, § 309(c) (1996) to abrogate Pulliam v. Allen (466 U.S. 522 (1984)) with respect to injunctive relief against judges unless a declaratory decree was violated or unavailable.

13. District of Columbia exclusive Act of Congress inclusion clause (1979 amendment)

    For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

    Added by Pub. L. 96-170 (1979) to overturn District of Columbia v. Carter (409 U.S. 418 (1973)) and bring D.C. officials within § 1983.

14. Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan)

    shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law

    Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).

15. Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions)

    shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law

    Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.

16. Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity bar (official-capacity damages / retrospective relief)

    Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

    Bars damages suits in federal court against a State or state officials in their official capacities (absent waiver, whereas § 1983 does not abrogate sovereign immunity under Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)), but does not bar personal-capacity suits (Hafer) or Ex parte Young prospective injunctive relief.

17. Preiser / Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination and habeas-exclusivity bar

    in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

    Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 475 (1973)) and Heck v. Humphrey (512 U.S. 477 (1994)), a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to seek immediate/speedier release or damages/relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an extant conviction or sentence unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or invalidated.

18. Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)

    in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

    Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).

19. Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel from prior state criminal or civil judgment (Allen v. McCurry)

    in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

    Under Allen v. McCurry (449 U.S. 90 (1980)) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts hearing § 1983 actions give state-court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of that State, provided there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue.

20. Judicial standing prerequisite, separate from damages remedy

    party injured

    JUDICIAL_PREREQUISITE: the statutory phrase is only a context anchor. Article III injury, traceability, and redressability are judicial standing requirements; prospective relief requires a real ongoing or imminent injury, not proof of a compensatory damages amount. This is not an additional quoted statutory test.