Codrington v. Dolak
civil; driver sued police officers, the former police chief and the metro government under § 1983 for unlawful search and seizure, selective enforcement, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence and Monell liability; district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims; CA6 affirmed on the time-barred claims and on malicious prosecution, reversed on fabrication of evidence, vacated and remanded on Monell (result: mixed)
Facts
- 11 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) not no-evidence
The Jefferson County Circuit Court agreed and granted the motion to suppress before ultimately dismissing the charges against him.
- 11 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) not no-evidence
And although Codrington admitted that the little baggie of marijuana came from his car, he testified that the bigger bag was not his.
- 11 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) not no-evidence
Unlike the fabrication-of-evidence claim, which requires the act of using falsified evidence, malicious prosecution concerns prosecution without probable cause.
- 11 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) not no-evidence
Putting aside the questions of fact regarding the allegedly fabricated evidence, the undisputed facts established probable cause for the officers to arrest and charge Codrington with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia while possessing a firearm.
- 11 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) not no-evidence
Because the exclusionary rule does not forbid us from considering the indisputably non- fabricated evidence located in Codrington’s vehicle, we can rely upon the small amount of marijuana, marijuana grinder, and legal firearm seized from the vehicle to determine whether defendants had probable cause to arrest Codrington.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
Therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), Codrington’s § 1983 claims are governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
Because Codrington filed suit more than a year after these claims accrued, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on these three claims.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
Codrington’s complaint challenges the unlawful search and seizure of his person, which occurred on August 10, 2018.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
But he did not file his complaint until November 3, 2021, more than two years after the search.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
Indeed, Codrington conceded at oral argument that, with respect to the search and seizure of his person, this claim is time-barred.
- 18 Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) satisfied law
As explained above, Kentucky initiated legal process against Codrington, at the latest, on February 12, 2019, when a grand jury charged him with his alleged crimes.