Dodson v. Polk County

628 F.2d 1104 (1980) United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 1980-08-26

civil; pro se prisoner's complaint against county public defender, her supervisor, county board and county dismissed as frivolous (no state action / no personal involvement); plaintiff appeals; reversed and remanded except habeas-type injunction claim (result: remanded)

Facts

  1. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied pleaded
    The complaint alleged that Martha Shepard, an attorney in the Polk County, Iowa, Offender Advocate’s office, failed to represent appellant adequately in his appeal of a robbery conviction to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
  2. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied pleaded
    Subsequently, she moved for permission to withdraw as counsel and to have the appeal dismissed as frivolous.
  3. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied pleaded
    All these lawyers are selected, paid, hired, and fired by the County.
  4. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied pleaded
    Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.
  5. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied pleaded
    We hold that an attorney in a county or state funded public defender’s office acts under color of state law in representing indigent defendants.
  6. 2 Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law satisfied law
    There can be no question that the members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors, in carrying out the responsibilities of that office, act under color of state law.
  7. 4 Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected") satisfied pleaded
    The Polk County Offender Advocate and the Polk County Board of Supervisors, also named as defendants, were alleged to be responsible for Ms. Shepard’s actions because they established rules and procedures for her to follow in handling criminal appeals.
  8. 4 Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected") satisfied pleaded
    Whether the requisite personal involvement by the Offender Advocate in the claimed unconstitutional conduct was sufficiently alleged, however, is a separate issue which the District Court did not reach.
  9. 4 Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected") satisfied pleaded
    These allegations are sufficient, as a matter of pleading, to state a § 1983 claim against the Offender Advocate.
  10. 4 Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected") satisfied pleaded
    Similar allegations were made as to the involvement of the Polk County Board of Supervisors, and we hold that the complaint is sufficient to state a claim against the Board members for the same reason.
  11. 5 Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) not pleaded
    Even though we interpret the allegations expansively, we are unable to say that the complaint alleges the necessary county involvement in the claimed unconstitutional conduct by virtue of the execution of county policy or custom.
  12. 5 Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) not pleaded
    . The portion of the complaint which names Polk County reads as follows: “Polk County is enjoined [sic-perhaps “joined” is meant] in this action because it is the political basis, and the source that authorized it’s [sic] political sub-divisions and it’s [sic] quasi-contractants to act in the manner prescribed in this complaint . . .
  13. 15 Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) not law
    We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.
  14. 15 Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) not law
    For these reasons, we are compelled to deny the invitation to extend absolute immunity to public defenders.
  15. 17 Preiser / Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination and habeas-exclusivity bar satisfied conceded
    This claim is in the nature of habeas corpus, and it is conceded that state remedies have not been exhausted.