42 U.S.C. § 1981

Elements

  1. Persons protected by equal contractual rights

    All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

    The text protects all persons within U.S. jurisdiction and equal rights enjoyed by white citizens; it is not limited to minority plaintiffs or employees of Title VII-sized employers. Race-based ancestry/ethnicity discrimination may qualify; sex, age or religion alone is not a §1981 contract claim. Citizenship/alienage applications and specific noncontract clauses require separate analysis.

  2. Plaintiff has rights in an existing or proposed contract

    to make and enforce contracts

    Domino’s Pizza requires plaintiff’s own actual or proposed rights, not merely injury through a shareholder’s or agent’s relationship with a contracting corporation. The requirement applies to the direct contract-discrimination claim; CBOCS separately protects advocacy for another person’s contract rights.

  3. Formation performance termination or contractual benefits

    For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

    Section 1981 is not an omnibus remedy for all offensive conduct. The 1991 definition displaced Patterson’s restricted postformation coverage; do not revive that superseded limitation. Contract rights can be impaired without a separately proven state-law breach-of-contract tort.

  4. Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement

    All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

    Intentional race discrimination is required; disparate impact by itself is insufficient. Nelson supplies alternative direct/circumstantial proof and pretext framework in the employment setting, not a universal comparator pleading requirement. Its 2019 formulation is read subject to Comcast’s 2020 but-for rule.

  5. Judicial but-for causation of contractual injury

    shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts

    This judicial requirement is not verbatim statutory language. Comcast rejected a motivating-factor pleading rule and importing Title VII’s mixed-motive standard. But-for does not mean race must be the sole cause. The official opinion is an external annotation, not a fabricated local IR rule quote.

  6. Nongovernmental impairment

    The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

    Subsection (c) reaches private racial discrimination. A contractual discrimination action against a private defendant does not require state action; corporate attribution and personal participation remain necessary to identify a liable defendant.

  7. Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment

    The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

    Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.

  8. Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights

    to make and enforce contracts

    CBOCS holds that advocacy for another person’s racially impaired contractual rights can support retaliation. The word retaliation is absent from §1981’s text; protection is authoritative judicial interpretation, not a statutory quotation. A generic workplace complaint unrelated to race/§1981 rights does not automatically qualify.

  9. Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation

    The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

    Link knowledge to the relevant decisionmaker/defendant, not a conclusory reference to defendants collectively. Boxill dismissed because concrete adverse-action/causal allegations were missing.

  10. Judicial material-adversity requirement for retaliation

    the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

    Boxill’s pinned retaliation test requires materially adverse action. Apply the reasonable-worker deterrence inquiry in employment; petty slights alone do not satisfy it. Retaliation does not require proof that the challenged action was itself motivated by the plaintiff’s race.

  11. Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury

    The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

    Require a causal connection and the applicable ultimate but-for standard; knowledge plus temporal sequence alone does not necessarily prove causation. Boxill is a pleading decision and does not hold that its prima facie articulation replaces the ultimate burden.

  12. Compensatory equitable punitive and fee remedies

    the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

    Section 1981 remedies are judicially developed; punitive damages require additional culpability and constitutional proportionality. Section 1981a(b)(3) employment caps do not cap §1981 awards; §1981a(b)(4) preserves §1981 relief. State/municipal defendants raise distinct immunity/remedial limits under §1983.

  13. Claim-specific limitations and accrual

    For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

    Bryant’s hostile-environment continuing-violation rule requires a component act in time; it does not revive all time-barred discrete employment decisions. No Title VII EEOC-charge prerequisite is imported into a direct §1981 claim.

  14. Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution

    the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

    Castleberry (Third Circuit) applies severe OR pervasive harassment, actual detrimental effect on plaintiff, objective effect on a reasonable person in like circumstances, and a basis to hold the employer responsible. These judicial requirements elaborate the contractual-conditions hook. A sufficiently severe single incident can qualify; no rule requires both severity and pervasiveness. The 2017 opinion's general Title VII analogy is read subject to Comcast for ultimate §1981 racial causation.

  15. Contract and retaliation scope with noncontract clauses identified

    to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

    The displayed title and formulas cover racial contractual impairment, including conditional hostile environment, and retaliation. Subsection (a) separately protects litigation/evidence participation, equal legal protection of persons/property, and equal punishment/exactions; those noncontract theories and alienage claims are not decomposed here. The own-contract requirement in these formulas is not a declaration that the quoted noncontract rights are absent from the statute.

Cases

  1. Sosa v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. & Marcy Berger 368 F. Supp. 3d 489 (2019)

    civil; public-school teacher's Section 1981 claims (brought through Section 1983) of race and skin-color discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation; Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss granted on adoption of the magistrate judge's R & R, with leave to amend (E.D.N.Y.) (result: claimant-lost)

  2. Wang v. Gen. Motors, LLC 371 F. Supp. 3d 407 (2019)

    civil; Section 1981 race and ethnicity claim by a U.S. citizen employed in Shanghai by a GM affiliate (mandatory retirement at 60; denied transfer to the United States); GM's Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted as to the Section 1981 count (E.D. Mich.) (result: claimant-lost)

  3. Mills v. Cellco Partnership 376 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (2019)

    civil; Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation claims (analysed together) by a current retail employee; employer's motion for summary judgment denied on the discriminatory-scheduling claim and granted on every other claim (N.D. Ala.) (result: mixed)

  4. Gonzalez v. City of N.Y. 377 F. Supp. 3d 273 (2019)

    civil; City Comptroller's Office employee's retaliation, discrimination, hostile-environment and constructive-discharge claims pleaded directly under Section 1981 against the City and four municipal employees; Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted as to every Section 1981 claim without leave to replead; parallel Section 1983 claims decided separately (S.D.N.Y.) (result: claimant-lost)

  5. Benzinger v. Nysarc, Inc. 385 F. Supp. 3d 224 (2019)

    civil; Section 1981 contract and equal-benefit claims by a clinic patient against the building's security contractor over a guard's laughter at a porter's racial slurs in the lobby; contractor's Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted with prejudice as to Section 1981 (S.D.N.Y.) (result: claimant-lost)

  6. Nelson v. USAble Mutual Insurance Co. 918 F.3d 990 (2019)

    Appeal from summary judgment for insurer on §1981 failure-to-promote claim; prima facie case acknowledged, employer reasons unrebutted. (result: claimant-lost)

  7. Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co. 919 F.3d 520 (2019)

    Employer appeals post-trial denial of judgment as a matter of law, punitive-damages award, and fees following hostile-environment jury verdict. (result: claimant-won)

  8. Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc. 922 F.3d 219 (2019)

    Appeal from summary judgment on Title VII and §1981 race discrimination; comparator and pretext errors require remand. (result: remanded)

  9. Haynes v. Dist. of Columbia Water 924 F.3d 519 (2019)

    civil; Section 1981 race discrimination in discharge after reorganization; pre-discovery summary judgment for employer and denial of Rule 56(d) discovery affirmed by CADC (result: claimant-lost)

  10. Hu v. City of New York 927 F.3d 81 (2019)

    Rule 12(b)(6) appeal; §1981 comparator-pleading dismissal vacated on same reasoning as race-based selective-enforcement claim; other claims separately addressed. (result: remanded)

  11. Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. 927 F.3d 961 (2019)

    civil; Sections 1981 and 1983 race-discrimination discharge claims against a municipal corporation; Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal vacated as to Section 1983/Title VII/ADA discrimination claims, affirmed as to the Monell policy claim on which the Section 1981 claim depends (CA7) (result: claimant-lost)

  12. Fields v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi. & Chad P. Weiden 928 F.3d 622 (2019)

    civil; Section 1981 (and ADEA) race discrimination and retaliation by a public-school teacher; summary judgment for school board and principal affirmed by CA7 for want of an adverse employment action (result: claimant-lost)

  13. FCS Advisors, LLC v. Missouri 929 F.3d 618 (2019)

    civil; Section 1981 claim by a lender to a minority-owned prime contractor whose state contract was terminated; Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal affirmed by CA8 (result: claimant-lost)

  14. Beasley v. Warren Unilube, Inc. 933 F.3d 932 (2019)

    civil; Title VII and Section 1981 discriminatory discharge; summary judgment for employer affirmed by CA8 (result: claimant-lost)

  15. Boxill v. O’Grady 935 F.3d 510 (2019)

    Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; §1981 retaliation dismissed despite availability of §1983 vehicle; equal-protection hostile-environment claim separately revived. (result: claimant-lost)

  16. Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff 935 F.3d 633 (2019)

    City appeals denial of judgment as a matter of law after jury exonerates mayor but awards damages against City under §1983 for §1981 discrimination. (result: claimant-lost)

  17. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald 546 U.S. 470 (2006)

    Review of dismissal for failure to state a claim; shareholder claims personal injuries from racial breach of corporation's contracts; Ninth Circuit reversed. (result: claimant-lost)