Mills v. Cellco Partnership

376 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (2019) United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 2019-03-26

civil; Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation claims (analysed together) by a current retail employee; employer's motion for summary judgment denied on the discriminatory-scheduling claim and granted on every other claim (N.D. Ala.) (result: mixed)

Facts

1 Persons protected by equal contractual rights satisfied conceded
Margo Mills, an African American female, has worked at Verizon in retail sales since November 2012 and continues to work for Verizon.
2 Plaintiff has rights in an existing or proposed contract satisfied conceded
Margo Mills has worked in retail sales for Defendant Verizon Wireless since November 2012.
3 Formation performance termination or contractual benefits satisfied triable
To qualify as adverse employment action, "the employer's action must impact the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff's job in a real and demonstrable way."
3 Formation performance termination or contractual benefits satisfied triable
Verizon has not pointed to anything in the record conclusively contradicting Ms. Mills's allegations that her manager favored white employees with preferable schedules.
3 Formation performance termination or contractual benefits satisfied triable
By contrast, Ms. Mills alleges that her manager consistently scheduled her for weekend closing shifts, exhibiting a pattern of discrimination against her and other African American employees.
3 Formation performance termination or contractual benefits satisfied triable
Though Ms. Mills's allegedly unfavorable schedule did not reduce her compensation
3 Formation performance termination or contractual benefits satisfied triable
So the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Mills suffered adverse employment action by having to work more weekend closing shifts than her coworkers.
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
As the Eleventh Circuit recently clarified, to be a valid comparator, an employee must be similarly situated "in all material respects" but need not be "nearly identical" to the plaintiff.
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
The white and African American employees all had the same rank and position and were all under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor who determined the schedules.
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
while Ms. Mills does not allege that her manager made racial comments related to scheduling
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
the court concludes that Ms. Mills has created an inference of discriminatory intent as to her unfair scheduling claim.
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
But Verizon confusingly never proffers any reason for Ms. Mills to rebut.
4 Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement satisfied triable
Verizon also points out that when Ms. Mills complained to her manager about the unfair schedules, he placed her in charge of scheduling for some period of time no shorter than a month.
8 Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights satisfied conceded
Verizon does not dispute that Ms. Mills has engaged in activity protected under Title VII.
8 Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights satisfied conceded
Ms. Mills made her first formal complaint to Verizon's Human Resources department on December 18, 2014, when she emailed her complaints about Mr. Gould's alleged racial comments and discriminatory treatment.
11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not no-evidence
Ms. Mills alleges she complained to Mr. Gould several times throughout 2014 that he unfairly scheduled her and other black employees for a disproportionate number of undesirable weekend closing shifts.
11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not no-evidence
But Ms. Mills's claim that she suffered this adverse employment action because she complained to Mr. Gould must fail; she presented no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not no-evidence
While Ms. Mills indicated that African Americans, herself included, received more undesirable shifts than white employees, she never alleged or testified that she received more undesirable shifts than employees who had never complained about racial discrimination.
11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not no-evidence
In fact, Mr. Gould initially responded to her scheduling complaints by placing her in charge of scheduling for the store.
11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not no-evidence
The language of the coachings indicates that specific interactions with customers prompted the alleged threats of discipline, rather than Ms. Mills's engaging in protected activity.
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
"Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
Ms. Mills alleges her manager in Trussville, Kerry Gould, subjected her to daily racial remarks and negative treatment throughout 2014.
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
her coworkers at the relevant times echo the allegation that Mr. Gould frequently made racially offensive comments.
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
But Ms. Mills's testified that both of Mr. Gould's comments about the KKK occurred during a single conversation, very early in her time working under his management.
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
Ms. Mills also specifically testified that she did not feel physically threatened at the time Mr. Gould made these comments but rather "felt hurt [she] was working with a racist."
14 Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution not no-evidence
So the court concludes that a jury could not reasonably find that Mr. Gould's repeated racial statements, including approving references to the KKK, were severe and pervasive enough to create hostile work environment under Title VII.