Boxill v. O’Grady

935 F.3d 510 (2019) United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 2019-08-16

Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; §1981 retaliation dismissed despite availability of §1983 vehicle; equal-protection hostile-environment claim separately revived. (result: claimant-lost)

Facts

  1. 7 Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment satisfied law
    Boxill worked at FCMC as its Specialty Dockets Coordinator. Four of the Defendants below-Michael Brandt, Carrie Glaeden, James Green, and James O'Grady-were state court judges at FCMC. The remaining Defendant, Emily Shaw, was FCMC's Court Administrator.
  2. 7 Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment satisfied law
    The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
  3. 7 Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment satisfied law
    That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
  4. 9 Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation not pleaded
    Boxill alleges that "the Defendants knew" this letter was meant to "memorializ[e] complaints made" by her against O'Grady.
  5. 9 Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation not pleaded
    And Boxill has offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O'Grady was even aware of her complaints against him.
  6. 9 Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation not pleaded
    To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
  7. 9 Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation not pleaded
    Boxill does allege that the "Defendants knew" the letter drafted about O'Grady's behavior was "memorializing complaints made" by her. But again, this vague, conclusory reference to "the Defendants" is not enough to make a plausible showing that O'Grady was aware of her complaints.
  8. 11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not pleaded
    According to the complaint, Boxill reported her "ongoing harassment" to administrators and judges at FCMC-including Green and Shaw-several times between 2011 and 2013. She alleges that "[n]o administrator or Judge acted on these reports, but each discouraged [her] from action." In April 2013, the "Defendants began removing [her] responsibilities and diminishing [her] abilities to function as coordinator." Sometime thereafter, she "learned that Defendants had given a male subordinate a $14,000.00 per year increase in salary with no commensurate consideration of her contributions."
  9. 11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not pleaded
    Boxill has nevertheless failed to state a plausible retaliation claim against Brandt, Glaeden, Green, or Shaw. These allegations suffer from the same flaw: Boxill does not state facts specific to those Defendants. Her claims rest on broad, conclusory allegations that the "Defendants" diminished her job responsibilities; but she offers no facts to support a reasonable inference that any of these Defendants individually took such an action, much less that he or she did so in response to Boxill's protected speech.
  10. 11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not pleaded
    To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
  11. 11 Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury not pleaded
    As explained, Boxill's complaint does not plausibly allege that any Defendant took an adverse action against her because of her protected speech.