AND · 42usc1981:protected-activity
CBOCS holds that advocacy for another person’s racially impaired contractual rights can support retaliation. The word retaliation is absent from §1981’s text; protection is authoritative judicial interpretation, not a statutory quotation. A generic workplace complaint unrelated to race/§1981 rights does not automatically qualify.
Exact element source
to make and enforce contractsSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1981; Unicode character offsets [176:205] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5e5aa212ab2f30dd84c80b0b228057e2c583768ee608c391e0ac73d92e609577.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| protected-advocacy/coworker-racial-dismissal | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /us/553/0442-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2008 — rule-announced/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/553/0442-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2008 | Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Humphries; opinion: majority; subject: party=Humphries; opinion=majority Advocacy of another employee’s contract-related racial rights is within statutory protection. No finding here establishes that Humphries proved advocacy, knowledge, retaliatory injury, or causation; factual retaliation claim returns for trial. | protected-advocacy/coworker-racial-dismissal | The case before us arises out of a claim by respondent, Hedrick G. Humphries, a former assistant manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant, that CBOCS West, Inc. (Cracker Barrel’s owner), dismissed him (1) because of racial bias (Humphries is a black man) and (2) because he had complained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had dismissed another black employee, Venus Green, for race-based reasons.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_553.jsonl#/us/553/0442-01; Unicode character offsets [584:989] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c96da3ddb7fc97b960047f291989cb0575a702127ad112659b4395b87c3cebd3.A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person’s contract-related “right.” We conclude that it does.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_553.jsonl#/us/553/0442-01; Unicode character offsets [51:581] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c96da3ddb7fc97b960047f291989cb0575a702127ad112659b4395b87c3cebd3.We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_553.jsonl#/us/553/0442-01; Unicode character offsets [25226:25305] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c96da3ddb7fc97b960047f291989cb0575a702127ad112659b4395b87c3cebd3. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation.
/us/553/0442-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2008
We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_553.jsonl#/us/553/0442-01; Unicode character offsets [25226:25305] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c96da3ddb7fc97b960047f291989cb0575a702127ad112659b4395b87c3cebd3.CBOCS holds that advocacy for another person’s racially impaired contractual rights can support retaliation. The word retaliation is absent from §1981’s text; protection is authoritative judicial interpretation, not a statutory quotation. A generic workplace complaint unrelated to race/§1981 rights does not automatically qualify.