Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel from prior state criminal or civil judgment (Allen v. McCurry)

DEFENSE · 42usc1983:x-collateral-estoppel

Under Allen v. McCurry (449 U.S. 90 (1980)) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts hearing § 1983 actions give state-court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of that State, provided there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue.

Exact element source

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [441:516] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
issue-preclusion/no-contest-plea-does-not-bar-excessive-force-claim0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — applied/procedural

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel from prior state criminal or civil judgment (Allen v. McCurry)not
Excluded from merits counts
applied / procedural

basis: law

Not preclusive, yet the same plea and stipulations are then used as admissions to defeat the claim on the merits.
issue-preclusion/no-contest-plea-does-not-bar-excessive-force-claim
Mr. Dye, represented through his attorney James Tekavec, withdrew his prior not guilty pleas and entered a plea of no contest with consent to a finding of guilty on the disorderly conduct charge.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [10041:10236] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

During the pretrial hearing Mr. Dye also stipulated to probable cause for the charges of resisting arrest and reckless operation of a vehicle.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [10373:10515] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Supreme Court has held that issues decided in a state court criminal proceeding may have a collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983 civil rights action, but only to the extent that the plaintiff sought relitigation of the same issues which were previously decided in the criminal proceeding.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [19925:20224] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Consequently, in this case, the issue of whether Chief Mandopoulos used excessive force in arresting Mr. Dye was neither actually litigated nor necessary to a determination on the charge of disorderly conduct in state court.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [22826:23050] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

The Supreme Court has held that issues decided in a state court criminal proceeding may have a collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983 civil rights action, but only to the extent that the plaintiff sought relitigation of the same issues which were previously decided in the criminal proceeding.

/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005

The Supreme Court has held that issues decided in a state court criminal proceeding may have a collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983 civil rights action, but only to the extent that the plaintiff sought relitigation of the same issues which were previously decided in the criminal proceeding.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [19925:20224] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Under Allen v. McCurry (449 U.S. 90 (1980)) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts hearing § 1983 actions give state-court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of that State, provided there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue.