AND · 18usc1341:mails
Alternative statutory acts are placing, depositing/causing deposit, taking/receiving, or knowingly causing delivery; they are not cumulative requirements. USPS use need not itself cross a state line; the alternative private/commercial carrier must meet the statutory interstate-carrier description. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1228–1229 (9th Cir. 1996), applies Pereira's construction of causation: personal mailing or specific intent to use the mails is unnecessary where ordinary-course use is known or reasonably foreseeable. The causation inquiry is distinct from whether the mailing executes the scheme; mere foreseeability of a mailing does not establish furtherance. Hubbard's conspiracy posture does not import agreement or overt-act elements here.
Exact element source
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matterSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [584:650] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal ServiceSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [652:726] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrierSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [728:866] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thingSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [868:924] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thingSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1341; Unicode character offsets [926:1141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74b1f92847676f0dece4359c6b22244b8e760d8e46a597847855747fcd542511.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| postal-service | Sending or delivery by the Postal Service. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 0 | No annotation uses in this snapshot |
| postal-service/county-recorder-mails-recorded-deeds-to-parties | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/231/0471-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 — satisfied | |
| postal-service/custom-and-practice-proof-of-document-never-shown-to-exist | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/231/0471-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 — not | |
| postal-service/mailing-by-third-party-reasonably-foreseeable-to-defendant | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f2d/664/0161-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1981 — satisfied | |
| postal-service/stipulated-use-of-mails-in-sales-operation | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f2d/386/0132-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1967 — satisfied | |
| private-carrier | Deposit or delivery by a private or commercial interstate carrier, under the operative statutory language. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 0 | No annotation uses in this snapshot |
| Unspecified variant | No variant assigned in the database. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 4 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/912/0404-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · 2012 — background/merits; /f-supp/725/0446-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 — applied/merits; /f3d/29/0112-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 — background/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp-2d/912/0404-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · 2012 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / meritsPlaintiffs asserted 41 specific dated mail or wire communications; the court never reaches the mailing element because no scheme to defraud is pleaded. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f-supp/725/0446-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri · 1989 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsTwo mailings alleged (district mailed the application to the Department of Revenue; the Department mailed the permit back); not contested. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f2d/386/0132-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1967 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded Use of the mails was stipulated; each count charged a mailing of a letter or printed matter to a named purchaser. | postal-service/stipulated-use-of-mails-in-sales-operation | It was stipulated prior to trial that appellant used the mail in connection with his land sales.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_386.jsonl#/f2d/386/0132-01; Unicode character offsets [985:1081] (end exclusive); SHA-256 984d9591aa1d590044854cc6ba2d3627f236458be86a3fceb9b89b65a6836448.The company, through Lustiger, informed all customers that mail should be sent to the company at P.O. Box 13349, Phoenix, Arizona.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_386.jsonl#/f2d/386/0132-01; Unicode character offsets [2409:2539] (end exclusive); SHA-256 984d9591aa1d590044854cc6ba2d3627f236458be86a3fceb9b89b65a6836448. |
| /f2d/664/0161-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1981 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded "Knowingly causes to be delivered by mail" limb: the mailings were made by Wisconsin dealers to the State Department of Transportation; causation by reasonable foreseeability was found sufficient by the district court and is endorsed in a footnote, not separately contested on appeal. No separate `held` sentence beyond the rule line. CAVEAT: thin authority. The block rests on one footnote sentence approving the district court's view on a point the appeal did not put in issue (the appeal concerned only "for the purpose of executing"); basis is [conceded], not a reviewed sufficiency ruling. | postal-service/mailing-by-third-party-reasonably-foreseeable-to-defendant | These title applications constituted the requisite mailings which supported the mail fraud indictment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_664.jsonl#/f2d/664/0161-01; Unicode character offsets [1648:1750] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f61558d6d9d4966e7953a5e92fe1d9854c9d6b5b221f27d0c6da8139133e1ae4.As the district court noted, the evidence supported the finding that Galloway caused the mailings at issue, in the sense that he could reasonably have foreseen their occurrence. This, of course, is the only causation required by the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_664.jsonl#/f2d/664/0161-01; Unicode character offsets [16987:17239] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f61558d6d9d4966e7953a5e92fe1d9854c9d6b5b221f27d0c6da8139133e1ae4. |
| /f3d/231/0471-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; count: Count 13 (Hugo property; Truth in Lending disclosure allegedly mailed by lender GSM); subject: count=Count 13 (Hugo property; Truth in Lending disclosure allegedly mailed by lender GSM) Custom-and-practice evidence can prove mailing of a document shown to have entered the mail stream (Brackenridge, Green), but not where the jury must also infer that the document was ever created; unexplained absence of any copy or record of a legally required document supports a negative inference. | postal-service/custom-and-practice-proof-of-document-never-shown-to-exist | The GSM witnesses explained that when the mortgage company receives an application, it generates the document and, within three days from receipt of the application, sends it to the borrower.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [7877:8068] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.The GSM witnesses also testified that because the law requires this document, GSM has a series of provisions in place to insure that it is mailed, including cross-checks by other loan departments.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [8069:8265] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.No copy of the Truth in Lending notice in question was introduced at trial.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [8359:8434] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.No GSM witness testified that he or anyone else at the company had ever seen the specific, critical document, that there was any record that it had ever existed, that it was ever in GSM’s loan files (whether at the time of trial or earlier) or that the loan file was ever complete.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [8435:8716] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.Moreover, although the Bautistas, the putative borrowers, also testified at trial, they did not state that they had ever received the document, and they, also, did not produce a copy of it.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [8717:8906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.Obviously, as the chain of inferences based on usual practices gets longer, the probability that nothing went wrong in administering those practices lessens. At some point, a reasonable doubt arises concerning whether, as Murphy’s Law predicts, that which can go wrong did go wrong.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [11768:12050] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.Yet, the mailing is, of course, an essential element of the crime, and is the gatekeeper for separating those cases that are the exclusive province of the states from those that may be tried in federal court under the mail fraud statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [14611:14848] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.We therefore conclude that in this case the evidence of the required mailing is far too tenuous to be sufficient, and reverse Lo’s conviction on Count Thirteen accordingly.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [15177:15349] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61. |
| /f3d/231/0471-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2000 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; count: Counts 4-7 and 9-11 (MacArthur and 79th Avenue properties; deeds mailed by the County Recorder); subject: count=Counts 4-7 and 9-11 (MacArthur and 79th Avenue properties; deeds mailed by the County Recorder) The fact of mailing was undisputed; the court adds (footnote) that the defendant "caused" a third party's routine mailing because an experienced broker would know recorded deeds are mailed. | postal-service/county-recorder-mails-recorded-deeds-to-parties | After the “sales” closed, the Alameda County Recorder’s office mailed the original grant deeds to Aglibot and Bosnich, the original deeds of trust to CMS and BHSC, and, some time later, a grant deed from Elma Aglibot to Jayson Bryant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [3994:4228] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.Lo does not dispute that the County Recorder mailed deeds to the lenders and to the owners, real and sham, of the two Oakland properties.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [16625:16762] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.Printed at the top of the recording documents were specific instructions to the Recorder to mail the deed to the appropriate party when recorded.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [37248:37393] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61.. That Lo did not herself specifically plan the mailing is immaterial.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_231.jsonl#/f3d/231/0471-01; Unicode character offsets [36903:36973] (end exclusive); SHA-256 928e2918c9b3913eacca99122eeea1b3ae403267d7e5224bd39e0afe24020b61. |
| /f3d/29/0112-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 1994 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / meritsNo substantive mail fraud count; mail fraud appears only as an object of the 371 conspiracy, and no mailing is described. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f3d/628/0927-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2010 | Statutory mailing or carrier act | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: with 18 U.S.C. 1346 (honest services) The charged mailing was sent by the bribe-payer himself: his notice to neighbours required for the rezoning. Not challenged on appeal. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Instead, if the defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to be used.”
Instead, if the defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to be used.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_96.jsonl#/f3d/96/1223-01; Unicode character offsets [16365:16613] (end exclusive); SHA-256 40ad10d4b2591f25e735d6fbc670ebb8bf34e0b506150aa9c6cebd61cbf2fd74.Alternative statutory acts are placing, depositing/causing deposit, taking/receiving, or knowingly causing delivery; they are not cumulative requirements. USPS use need not itself cross a state line; the alternative private/commercial carrier must meet the statutory interstate-carrier description. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1228–1229 (9th Cir. 1996), applies Pereira's construction of causation: personal mailing or specific intent to use the mails is unnecessary where ordinary-course use is known or reasonably foreseeable. The causation inquiry is distinct from whether the mailing executes the scheme; mere foreseeability of a mailing does not establish furtherance. Hubbard's conspiracy posture does not import agreement or overt-act elements here.