Knowing participation with intent to defraud

AND · 18usc1343:intent

Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.

Exact element source

having devised or intending to devise
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1343; Unicode character offsets [52:89] (end exclusive); SHA-256 944569d18f6d3624ae87dde151ee823f6cf078faa69c6d3e59fb832bc1aaa933.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
contemplated-harm/bribe-to-supposed-insider-concealed-from-victim1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f-supp/957/0039-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 1997 — satisfied
reckless-indifference/instruction-approved-on-plain-error-review0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f3d/923/0390-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — rule-announced/merits

vicarious-liability/executive-directed-scheme-and-approved-cover-statements0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f3d/923/0390-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — background/merits

Unspecified variantNo variant assigned in the database.0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f3d/333/1264-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2003 — applied/merits; /us/605/114 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — applied/merits

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp/957/0039-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 1997Knowing participation with intent to defraudsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: proved

contemplated-harm/bribe-to-supposed-insider-concealed-from-victim
defendant concealed his agreement with the undercover officer from Tishman
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [1063:1137] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

However, the government must establish that “some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [4322:4427] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Thus, the government has established that defendant intended to defraud Tishman of the honest services of its consultant.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [9897:10018] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/333/1264-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2003Knowing participation with intent to defraudnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

Not separately contested; the court folds "intentional participation" into its statement of the scheme element.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/923/0390-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019Knowing participation with intent to defraudnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
rule-announced / merits

theory: jury instruction: a representation is false if made with reckless indifference to its truth; subject: theory=jury instruction: a representation is false if made with reckless indifference to its truth

Unpreserved objection that the instruction conflicts with specific intent to defraud; rejected in two sentences on plain-error review.
reckless-indifference/instruction-approved-on-plain-error-review
The district court instructed the jury that a representation is false if it "is made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity" and that "[r]eckless indifference means the omission or misrepresentation was so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [50909:51185] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The "reckless indifference" instruction was not erroneous.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [41220:41278] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/923/0390-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019Knowing participation with intent to defraudnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
background / merits

theory: Pinkerton co-conspirator liability for the substantive wire fraud counts (in place of deciding the Rosemond aiding-and-abetting instruction issue); subject: theory=Pinkerton co-conspirator liability for the substantive wire fraud counts (in place of deciding the Rosemond aiding-and-abetting instruction issue)

NOT a finding of Baker's personal intent to defraud. The wire-fraud convictions were upheld on Pinkerton co-conspirator liability: the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction and convicted him of the conspiracy, and the fraudulent acts were reasonably foreseeable to him and done in furtherance of the conspiracy. On that ground the court expressly did not decide the challenge to the aiding-and-abetting instruction (Rosemond "advance knowledge"). The law file declares no id for Pinkerton or accomplice liability, so the passage is kept here only as background (not-reached, no basis); the polarity tags on the fact lines are relative to his involvement in the scheme, which is what the court weighed.
vicarious-liability/executive-directed-scheme-and-approved-cover-statements
The evidence at trial showed that Baker instructed others to participate in the channel-stuffing scheme and approved the statements covering it up.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [38909:39056] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Gluk testified that he "conspired with Mike Baker, John Raffle, David Applegate and others to misrepresent the accounts of ArthroCare Corporation, to engage in channel stuffing and hide the nature of the relationship between DiscoCare and ArthroCare, and as a result of all that, [ ] filed incorrect statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [41884:42240] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Baker's counsel attempted to show that although Baker was generally aware of the nature of DiscoCare's business, he did not have specific knowledge about the fraudulent details, or he learned about them too late.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [8373:8585] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

"A substantive conviction cannot be upheld solely under Pinkerton unless the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [38599:38716] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The substantial evidence of Baker's involvement establishes that the fraudulent acts were reasonably foreseeable by him and done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [39057:39219] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/605/114 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2025Knowing participation with intent to defraudnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

No ruling on the intent element: whether these defendants acted with intent to defraud was not separately contested, and the Court's no-net-economic-loss rule is a construction of the money-or-property requirement (see the rule-announced `property` block), not a holding about mens rea.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.

Court interpretations

interpretation

The Government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that DMC—led by Runner— advertised goods and services it never planned to deliver, and otherwise intentionally lied to trick customers into paying money. No more was needed for the jury to find fraudulent intent.

/f4th/143/146

The Government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that DMC—led by Runner— advertised goods and services it never planned to deliver, and otherwise intentionally lied to trick customers into paying money. No more was needed for the jury to find fraudulent intent.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_143.jsonl#/f4th/143/146; Unicode character offsets [28582:28849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 21fd65e23cb26bfd8dd04bb2c3c024b1d035709f3309d0b90f65bca9c7025acc.

Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.

interpretation

Even if Hagen broke a promise to refund $12,000 for the early termination, breach of contract is not fraud, and the cashing of Penner's check in April was not in furtherance of any dispute that arose at the end of the grazing season.

/f3d/917/0668-01

Even if Hagen broke a promise to refund $12,000 for the early termination, breach of contract is not fraud, and the cashing of Penner's check in April was not in furtherance of any dispute that arose at the end of the grazing season.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_917.jsonl#/f3d/917/0668-01; Unicode character offsets [11661:11894] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f4086637fbe3659b9c3436280b529e9f82158bf57ed3b57d504b7c7f7ebea967.

Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.