AND · 18usc1343:intent
Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.
Exact element source
having devised or intending to deviseSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1343; Unicode character offsets [52:89] (end exclusive); SHA-256 944569d18f6d3624ae87dde151ee823f6cf078faa69c6d3e59fb832bc1aaa933.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 2 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (2). Excluded context examples:United States v. Hasson — 333 F.3d 1264 (2003) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2003 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1343: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Kousisis v. United States — 605 U.S. 114 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _procedural accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is only the occasion for a procedural ruling. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:United States v. Baker — 923 F.3d 390 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:United States v. Baker — 923 F.3d 390 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · background/merits · not counted |
| contemplated-harm provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the defendant contemplated harm to the victim. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | United States v. Sancho — 957 F. Supp. 39 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 1997 — satisfied · proved (18usc1343: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| inferred-from-conduct provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether intent to defraud is inferred from the defendant's course of conduct and knowledge of the practice. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | United States v. Feldman — 931 F.3d 1245 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · proved (18usc1343: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Sancho — 957 F. Supp. 39 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 1997 — satisfied · proved (18usc1343: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved | bribe-to-supposed-insider-concealed-from-victim | defendant concealed his agreement with the undercover officer from TishmanSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [1063:1137] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64.However, the government must establish that “some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [4322:4427] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64.Thus, the government has established that defendant intended to defraud Tishman of the honest services of its consultant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_957.jsonl#/f-supp/957/0039-01; Unicode character offsets [9897:10018] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d4d9c76f73ba5d2026b0b0f29447c423328d268df1178783fd6dcec8db2fbe64. |
| United States v. Hasson — 333 F.3d 1264 (2003) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2003 — not reached (18usc1343: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsNot separately contested; the court folds "intentional participation" into its statement of the scheme element. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Baker — 923 F.3d 390 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits theory: jury instruction: a representation is false if made with reckless indifference to its truth; subject: theory=jury instruction: a representation is false if made with reckless indifference to its truth Unpreserved objection that the instruction conflicts with specific intent to defraud; rejected in two sentences on plain-error review. | reckless-indifference/instruction-approved-on-plain-error-review | The district court instructed the jury that a representation is false if it "is made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity" and that "[r]eckless indifference means the omission or misrepresentation was so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [50909:51185] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.The "reckless indifference" instruction was not erroneous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [41220:41278] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5. |
| United States v. Baker — 923 F.3d 390 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / merits theory: Pinkerton co-conspirator liability for the substantive wire fraud counts (in place of deciding the Rosemond aiding-and-abetting instruction issue); subject: theory=Pinkerton co-conspirator liability for the substantive wire fraud counts (in place of deciding the Rosemond aiding-and-abetting instruction issue) NOT a finding of Baker's personal intent to defraud. The wire-fraud convictions were upheld on Pinkerton co-conspirator liability: the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction and convicted him of the conspiracy, and the fraudulent acts were reasonably foreseeable to him and done in furtherance of the conspiracy. On that ground the court expressly did not decide the challenge to the aiding-and-abetting instruction (Rosemond "advance knowledge"). The law file declares no id for Pinkerton or accomplice liability, so the passage is kept here only as background (not-reached, no basis); the polarity tags on the fact lines are relative to his involvement in the scheme, which is what the court weighed. | vicarious-liability/executive-directed-scheme-and-approved-cover-statements | The evidence at trial showed that Baker instructed others to participate in the channel-stuffing scheme and approved the statements covering it up.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [38909:39056] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.Gluk testified that he "conspired with Mike Baker, John Raffle, David Applegate and others to misrepresent the accounts of ArthroCare Corporation, to engage in channel stuffing and hide the nature of the relationship between DiscoCare and ArthroCare, and as a result of all that, [ ] filed incorrect statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [41884:42240] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.Baker's counsel attempted to show that although Baker was generally aware of the nature of DiscoCare's business, he did not have specific knowledge about the fraudulent details, or he learned about them too late.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [8373:8585] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5."A substantive conviction cannot be upheld solely under Pinkerton unless the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [38599:38716] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5.The substantial evidence of Baker's involvement establishes that the fraudulent acts were reasonably foreseeable by him and done in furtherance of the conspiracy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0390-01; Unicode character offsets [39057:39219] (end exclusive); SHA-256 56c8a4a8edbb926a6e88073c3ca4cd1e36966785d95d343de83140e602ffb5f5. |
| United States v. Feldman — 931 F.3d 1245 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · proved (18usc1343: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; party: Isaac Feldman; count: conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349; object § 1343), Miami Beach "B-girl" nightclubs, retrial; subject: party=Isaac Feldman; count=conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349; object § 1343), Miami Beach "B-girl" nightclubs, retrial Knowing participation rested on the cooperating witness's testimony that Feldman knew of the unordered-bottle charges; the jury was entitled to credit it. | investor-manager's awareness of routine overcharging, shown by cooperating ringleader's testimony | "To prove a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government need not demonstrate an agreement specifically to use the interstate wires to further the scheme to defraud; it is enough to prove ... that the use of the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme was reasonably foreseeable," provided the government "prove[s] that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to ... a scheme to defraud."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/1245-01; Unicode character offsets [27471:27875] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9164187ee863c8b38f722756c8cb94047e4a0851d6f581235a3c33fbbbc39d72.Simchuk repeatedly testified that once a patron made the mistake of providing his credit card to a bartender, it would "be charged for bottles he didn't order," that "this happen[ed] at Stars Lounge," and that Feldman "was aware of this" and knew "exactly what[ ] [was] going on there."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/1245-01; Unicode character offsets [29393:29679] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9164187ee863c8b38f722756c8cb94047e4a0851d6f581235a3c33fbbbc39d72.Simchuk testified about a scheme to commit what qualifies as fraud under any interpretation of the wire-fraud statute, and he testified that Feldman knowingly participated in that scheme.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/1245-01; Unicode character offsets [30828:31015] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9164187ee863c8b38f722756c8cb94047e4a0851d6f581235a3c33fbbbc39d72. |
| Kousisis v. United States — 605 U.S. 114 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — not reached (18usc1343: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Knowing participation with intent to defraud | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsNo ruling on the intent element: whether these defendants acted with intent to defraud was not separately contested, and the Court's no-net-economic-loss rule is a construction of the money-or-property requirement (see the rule-announced `property` block), not a holding about mens rea. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
The Government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that DMC—led by Runner— advertised goods and services it never planned to deliver, and otherwise intentionally lied to trick customers into paying money. No more was needed for the jury to find fraudulent intent.
United States v. Runner — 143 F.4th 146 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 (18usc1343: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
The Government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that DMC—led by Runner— advertised goods and services it never planned to deliver, and otherwise intentionally lied to trick customers into paying money. No more was needed for the jury to find fraudulent intent.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_143.jsonl#/f4th/143/146; Unicode character offsets [28582:28849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 21fd65e23cb26bfd8dd04bb2c3c024b1d035709f3309d0b90f65bca9c7025acc.Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.
interpretation
Even if Hagen broke a promise to refund $12,000 for the early termination, breach of contract is not fraud, and the cashing of Penner's check in April was not in furtherance of any dispute that arose at the end of the grazing season.
United States v. Hagen — 917 F.3d 668 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 (18usc1343: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
Even if Hagen broke a promise to refund $12,000 for the early termination, breach of contract is not fraud, and the cashing of Penner's check in April was not in furtherance of any dispute that arose at the end of the grazing season.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_917.jsonl#/f3d/917/0668-01; Unicode character offsets [11661:11894] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f4086637fbe3659b9c3436280b529e9f82158bf57ed3b57d504b7c7f7ebea967.Judicial construction of the scheme language requires fraudulent intent, distinct from negligence or contract breach. A deliberate material deception aimed at obtaining the victim's property suffices without intent to leave the victim economically worse off. Earlier intent-to-harm formulations must be read subject to Kousisis.