AND · 42usc1981:hostile-environment
Castleberry (Third Circuit) applies severe OR pervasive harassment, actual detrimental effect on plaintiff, objective effect on a reasonable person in like circumstances, and a basis to hold the employer responsible. These judicial requirements elaborate the contractual-conditions hook. A sufficiently severe single incident can qualify; no rule requires both severity and pervasiveness. The 2017 opinion's general Title VII analogy is read subject to Comcast for ultimate §1981 racial causation.
Exact element source
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1981; Unicode character offsets [691:788] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5e5aa212ab2f30dd84c80b0b228057e2c583768ee608c391e0ac73d92e609577.All variants
No variants recorded in this snapshot.
How courts decided this element
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Court interpretations
interpretation
Plaintiffs’ harassment claim under § 1981 alleges a hostile work environment on the basis of race. To win, a plaintiff must show that “1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability [meaning the employer is responsible].” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs assert that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard in dismissing this claim when it required them to plead discrimination that was “pervasive and regular.” See J.A. at 13 (emphasis added) (citing Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Ctr., 92 Fed.Appx. 876, 879 (3d Cir. 2004)). Instead, they only were required to plead that they were subjected to a hostile work environment in which there was discrimination that was “severe or pervasive.” See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ harassment claim under § 1981 alleges a hostile work environment on the basis of race. To win, a plaintiff must show that “1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability [meaning the employer is responsible].” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs assert that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard in dismissing this claim when it required them to plead discrimination that was “pervasive and regular.” See J.A. at 13 (emphasis added) (citing Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Ctr., 92 Fed.Appx. 876, 879 (3d Cir. 2004)). Instead, they only were required to plead that they were subjected to a hostile work environment in which there was discrimination that was “severe or pervasive.” See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_863.jsonl#/f3d/863/0259-01; Unicode character offsets [4811:5942] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0bef2fee39b4fd9b50ca4510b4f347d96584b2b3f2686389db72b8a666bd26fa.Castleberry (Third Circuit) applies severe OR pervasive harassment, actual detrimental effect on plaintiff, objective effect on a reasonable person in like circumstances, and a basis to hold the employer responsible. These judicial requirements elaborate the contractual-conditions hook. A sufficiently severe single incident can qualify; no rule requires both severity and pervasiveness. The 2017 opinion's general Title VII analogy is read subject to Comcast for ultimate §1981 racial causation.