DEFENSE · 42usc2000e-2:x-disparate-impact-compliance
Ricci v. DeStefano standard reconciling § 2000e-2(a) disparate treatment and § 2000e-2(k) disparate impact: good-faith fear of disparate-impact litigation or a raw statistical disparity alone is insufficient; the employer must show a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.
Exact element source
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national originSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [320:395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| strong-basis-in-evidence | Employer must have a strong basis in evidence that it will be subject to disparate-impact liability before taking race-conscious intentional action | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 0 | No annotation uses in this snapshot |
| strong-basis-in-evidence/statistical-disparity-alone | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — not |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) Judge-made justification reconciling (a)(1) with (k): good-faith fear is not enough, actual violation is not required. Fails here because only the prima facie disparity existed; both business-necessity and less-discriminatory-alternative pointed the employer's way. Two rulings in one block: the standard itself (strong basis in evidence) is announced as a matter of law, then applied on the summary-judgment record ("no support", "no genuine dispute"); the basis records the application. | strong-basis-in-evidence/statistical-disparity-alone | The City and the officials defended their actions, arguing that if they had certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [2256:2484] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ude stated that under federal law, “a statistical demonstration of disparate impact,” standing alone, “constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of racial discrimination to serve as a predicate for employer-initiated, voluntar[y] remedies — even . . . race-conscious remedies.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [9982:10258] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [46788:47141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [50531:50879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Even if respondents were motivated as a subjective matter by a desire to avoid committing disparate-impact discrimination, the record makes clear there is no support for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate, with some consequent disparate-impact liability in violation of Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [47316:47665] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [46788:47141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ricci v. DeStefano standard reconciling § 2000e-2(a) disparate treatment and § 2000e-2(k) disparate impact: good-faith fear of disparate-impact litigation or a raw statistical disparity alone is insufficient; the employer must show a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.
interpretation
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [50531:50879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ricci v. DeStefano standard reconciling § 2000e-2(a) disparate treatment and § 2000e-2(k) disparate impact: good-faith fear of disparate-impact litigation or a raw statistical disparity alone is insufficient; the employer must show a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.