AND · 18usc1962:injury
Damages must be concrete, clear, and definite (not speculative or unripe pending exhaustion of contractual/collateral remedies), and must be domestic under RJR Nabisco v. European Community (579 U.S. 325 (2016)).
Exact element source
It shall be unlawful for any personSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec1962; Unicode character offsets [33:68] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6caae47f43b5ab0899b660616e298363bd36f9f540d915c2be11eb7126f5e27d.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 4 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 4 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (4). Excluded context examples:Negrete v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America — 926 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (2013) · United States District Court for the Central District of California · 2013 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz — 976 F.2d 1016 (1992) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1992 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1962: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · applied/merits · not counted Crest Construction II, Inc. v. Doe — 660 F.3d 346 (2011) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2011 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _comparator accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is used as a yardstick for another statute or question, not applied to this case's own conduct. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Roe v. Howard — 917 F.3d 229 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 2 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Bascuñán v. Elsaca — 927 F.3d 108 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Bascuñán v. Elsaca — 927 F.3d 108 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| business-or-property provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether the harm alleged is injury to business or property. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 1 | Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn — 604 U.S. 593 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — satisfied · law (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler — 510 U.S. 249 (1994) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1994 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/procedural · not counted |
| racketeering-injury provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether a distinct "racketeering injury" beyond harm from the predicate acts is required (Sedima). | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp. — 567 F. Supp. 1146 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of New Jersey · 1983 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| ripeness-of-loss provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the loss is definite enough to sue on. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Goldfine v. Sichenzia — 118 F. Supp. 2d 392 (2000) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2000 — not · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldfine v. Sichenzia — 118 F. Supp. 2d 392 (2000) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2000 — not · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (a),(c),(d) Fraudulently-induced-loan injury is unripe until foreclosure/guaranty/title-insurance remedies are tried and leave a deficiency (First Nationwide v. Gelt Funding). | not-ripe/secured-lender-has-not-exhausted-collateral-remedies | Plaintiffs admit in their Amended Complaint, as well as their Civil RICO Statement, that each and every loan was secured by a mortgage and note, most of which bind the individual Sichenzia defendants personally.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [10627:10838] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139.They also admit that each mortgage was insured through defendants Old Republic and/or Artesian Abstract. However, Plaintiffs have made no effort to enforce those rights prior to instituting this action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [10839:11041] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139.However, nowhere do Plaintiffs allege that they made any effort whatsoever to recover their alleged losses, or even any part of such losses, by seeking to enforce any of their admitted contractual rights.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [14868:15072] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139.Because the Plaintiffs have not exhausted the bargained-for remedies, which they admit are available to them, they have not satisfied RICO’s requirement of alleging damages that are clear and definite.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [11255:11456] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139.As Plaintiffs cannot allege “clear and definite” damages to their business or property, they lack standing under RICO, and their RICO causes of action must be dismissed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [16721:16890] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139. |
| Negrete v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America — 926 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (2013) · United States District Court for the Central District of California · 2013 — not reached (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (c),(d) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp. — 567 F. Supp. 1146 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of New Jersey · 1983 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (b),(c),(d) Defendants framed this as causation ("by reason of"); the court treats it as the racketeering-injury question and rejects the extra requirement. | direct-injury/no-separate-racketeering-injury-required | In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that it has suffered business and property damages of $759,039.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_567.jsonl#/f-supp/567/1146-01; Unicode character offsets [30293:30395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3836bc32665b8e1a72ea181c77043419d514089c013853f5fc10624d665e146c.However, this judicially imposed requirement of a “racketeering enterprise injury” seems artificial and unwarranted by the language of the RICO statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_567.jsonl#/f-supp/567/1146-01; Unicode character offsets [32442:32594] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3836bc32665b8e1a72ea181c77043419d514089c013853f5fc10624d665e146c.The First Count of the complaint clearly alleges that plaintiff suffered direct injury from defendants’ alleged racketeering activity and will not be dismissed for its failure to allege a separate and distinct “racketeering injury.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_567.jsonl#/f-supp/567/1146-01; Unicode character offsets [33827:34059] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3836bc32665b8e1a72ea181c77043419d514089c013853f5fc10624d665e146c. |
| Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz — 976 F.2d 1016 (1992) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1992 — not reached (18usc1962: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (c),(d) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Crest Construction II, Inc. v. Doe — 660 F.3d 346 (2011) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2011 — not reached (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (c) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Roe v. Howard — 917 F.3d 229 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits theory: RJR Nabisco Part IV: the § 1964(c) private remedy is limited to certain injuries and is not coextensive with § 1962; subject: theory=RJR Nabisco Part IV: the § 1964(c) private remedy is limited to certain injuries and is not coextensive with § 1962 The court distinguishes RJR Nabisco's refusal to apply RICO's private cause of action abroad (the domestic-injury limit of § 1964(c)) as resting on textual limits that § 1595 lacks. No RICO injury is at issue in this case. | _comparator | Justice Alito emphasized that the text of § 1964(c) limited its application to certain types of injuries, and thereby created a gap between the reach of § 1964(c) civil liability and § 1962 criminal liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_917.jsonl#/f3d/917/0229-01; Unicode character offsets [34124:34333] (end exclusive); SHA-256 29f728b010834487a503bde7090678350764c57a6f39848f4c397089e1bf4214.Rather, civil liability under § 1964(c) is premised on § 1962 criminal liability, but - crucially - is not coextensive with § 1962 liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_917.jsonl#/f3d/917/0229-01; Unicode character offsets [33982:34123] (end exclusive); SHA-256 29f728b010834487a503bde7090678350764c57a6f39848f4c397089e1bf4214.In that regard, § 1595 of the TVPA resembles § 1962 of RICO rather than the circumscribed text of § 1964(c).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_917.jsonl#/f3d/917/0229-01; Unicode character offsets [34867:34975] (end exclusive); SHA-256 29f728b010834487a503bde7090678350764c57a6f39848f4c397089e1bf4214. |
| Bascuñán v. Elsaca — 927 F.3d 108 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (c), (d); party: Bascuñán and affiliated plaintiffs (Chilean citizen and resident; owner of the Estate); Elsaca and affiliated defendants (cousin and estate manager holding power of attorney); count: the Fintair, Tarascona, Sham Anacapri Sale and BCI Dividend schemes (the New York Trust Account and BCI Share Theft schemes being undisputed); theory: domestic injury under RJR Nabisco / § 1964(c); subject: party=Bascuñán and affiliated plaintiffs (Chilean citizen and resident; owner of the Estate); Elsaca and affiliated defendants (cousin and estate manager holding power of attorney); count=the Fintair, Tarascona, Sham Anacapri Sale and BCI Dividend schemes (the New York Trust Account and BCI Share Theft schemes being undisputed); theory=domestic injury under RJR Nabisco / § 1964(c) Domestic-injury requirement of § 1964(c) (RJR Nabisco): money moved by the agent between the owner's own accounts is not yet stolen; the injury occurs where the funds sit when they leave the owner, here New York. The plaintiff's foreign residence was the district court's original (rejected) test. | foreign owner's funds stolen out of estate-owned New York bank accounts by his own agent | The Estate owned Fintair when Elsaca transferred money into and out of its New York bank account, a fact Elsaca conceded in a declaration he submitted to the district court.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [21890:22063] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.The alleged theft or misappropriation occurred when the funds left the Estate, at which time they were located in a Morgan Stanley bank account in New York.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [22412:22568] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.The SAC alleges that Elsaca opened eleven New York bank accounts in Tarascona's name, filled them with money from the Estate's foreign accounts, and over time transferred the money out of the Estate.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [26472:26671] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.Bascuñán is a resident and citizen of Chile.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [1273:1317] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c."when a foreign plaintiff maintains tangible property in the United States, the misappropriation of that property constitutes a domestic injury."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [18062:18207] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.In sum, each of the injuries alleged in the SAC, except for the Sham Management Fees Scheme, calls for a domestic application of civil RICO.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [29003:29143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c. |
| Bascuñán v. Elsaca — 927 F.3d 108 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (c), (d); party: Bascuñán and affiliated plaintiffs (Chilean citizen and resident; owner of the Estate); Elsaca and affiliated defendants (cousin and estate manager holding power of attorney); count: the Sham Management Fees scheme; theory: domestic injury under RJR Nabisco / § 1964(c); subject: party=Bascuñán and affiliated plaintiffs (Chilean citizen and resident; owner of the Estate); Elsaca and affiliated defendants (cousin and estate manager holding power of attorney); count=the Sham Management Fees scheme; theory=domestic injury under RJR Nabisco / § 1964(c) | location of the accounts the fees were taken from not alleged | Bascuñán concedes that he does not know where the injuries caused by the Sham Management Fees Scheme took place because he does not know the locations of the accounts from which Elsaca withdrew the relevant funds.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [28311:28524] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.Bascuñán claims Elsaca transferred this money from unknown accounts to several New York-based Morgan Stanley bank accounts owned by GM&E, a shell corporation that Elsaca indirectly owned.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [8737:8924] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c."the use of bank accounts located within the United States to facilitate or conceal the theft of property located outside of the United States does not, on its own, establish a domestic injury."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [19497:19691] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c.Because the SAC does not allege that these injuries took place in the United States, the district court correctly held that this scheme is impermissibly extraterritorial as pleaded.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0108-01; Unicode character offsets [28615:28796] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98fe49dd88fa827938a668df226c5f2fdb334de0cbade07511388246b19d7f3c. |
| Reves v. Ernst — 507 U.S. 170 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not reached (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (c) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler — 510 U.S. 249 (1994) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1994 — satisfied · pleaded (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: pleaded; claim: (c),(d); party: DWHO and SWHO (the clinics); NOW itself did not sue under RICO; subject: party=DWHO and SWHO (the clinics); NOW itself did not sue under RICO Decided as Article III standing (injury fairly traceable), not as the §1964(c) "business or property" element as such; recorded here because the same allegation serves both. | business-injury/clinic-operations-disrupted-by-threats | DWHO and SWHO alleged in their complaint that respondents conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working and obtain medical services elsewhere.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0249-01; Unicode character offsets [7474:7645] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cb4e617ad929914e8013956e456c6d025b7f974213b9a4c541b1fdd0f9d49931.Petitioners claimed that this conspiracy “has injured the business and/or property interests of the [petitioners].”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0249-01; Unicode character offsets [7686:7801] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cb4e617ad929914e8013956e456c6d025b7f974213b9a4c541b1fdd0f9d49931.The District Court dismissed petitioners’ claim at the pleading stage pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so their complaint must be sustained if relief could be granted “under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0249-01; Unicode character offsets [7155:7421] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cb4e617ad929914e8013956e456c6d025b7f974213b9a4c541b1fdd0f9d49931.Nothing more is needed to confer standing on DWHO and SWHO at the pleading stage.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0249-01; Unicode character offsets [8122:8203] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cb4e617ad929914e8013956e456c6d025b7f974213b9a4c541b1fdd0f9d49931. |
| Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn — 604 U.S. 593 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — satisfied · law (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Civil RICO injury to business or property (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Douglas Horn, commercial truck driver fired after a drug test (plaintiff; respondent); Medical Marijuana, Inc. and co-defendants, sellers of "Dixie X" (petitioners); count: civil RICO treble-damages claim, § 1964(c); theory: business or property loss deriving from a personal injury; subject: party=Douglas Horn, commercial truck driver fired after a drug test (plaintiff; respondent); Medical Marijuana, Inc. and co-defendants, sellers of "Dixie X" (petitioners); count=civil RICO treble-damages claim, § 1964(c); theory=business or property loss deriving from a personal injury Only the antecedent-personal-injury bar is decided (rejected). The Court assumed that Horn suffered a personal injury and left untouched the Second Circuit's unchallenged ruling that lost employment is injury to "business"; proximate cause was flagged as a possibly insurmountable obstacle on remand. | lost employment flowing from unwitting ingestion of THC (assumed to be an antecedent personal injury) | After Horn refused to complete a substance- abuse program—in his view, doing so would constitute “an admission to doing drugs,” id., at 91–92—his employer fredSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/593; Unicode character offsets [12560:12719] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7d2c2919066c4147ebeda30dba0ab8417dc2b1c103398f9c66191df2e5bf6392.But the “business or property” requirement operates with respect to the kinds of harm for which the plaintiff can recover, not the cause of the harm for which he seeks relief.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/593; Unicode character offsets [20612:20787] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7d2c2919066c4147ebeda30dba0ab8417dc2b1c103398f9c66191df2e5bf6392.In short, a plaintiff can seek damages for business or property loss regardless of whether the loss resulted from a personal injury.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/593; Unicode character offsets [20999:21131] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7d2c2919066c4147ebeda30dba0ab8417dc2b1c103398f9c66191df2e5bf6392.The phrase “injured in his business or property” does not preclude recovery for all economic harms that result from personal injuries.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/593; Unicode character offsets [47642:47776] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7d2c2919066c4147ebeda30dba0ab8417dc2b1c103398f9c66191df2e5bf6392. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
479, 497 (“[T]he compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts suffciently related to constitute a pattern”); Anza v.
Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn — 604 U.S. 593 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 (18usc1962: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
479, 497 (“[T]he compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts suffciently related to constitute a pattern”); Anza v.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/593; Unicode character offsets [5466:5605] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7d2c2919066c4147ebeda30dba0ab8417dc2b1c103398f9c66191df2e5bf6392.Damages must be concrete, clear, and definite (not speculative or unripe pending exhaustion of contractual/collateral remedies), and must be domestic under RJR Nabisco v. European Community (579 U.S. 325 (2016)).
interpretation
§ 1964(c) (creating a private right of action, in federal district court, for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter").
Ryan v. Salisbury — 380 F. Supp. 3d 1031 · United States District Court for the District of Hawaii · 2019 (18usc1962: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
§ 1964(c) (creating a private right of action, in federal district court, for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter").Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_380.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/380/1031-01; Unicode character offsets [30068:30255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88790a7a2b5207a13a0f41f4c5ea2fabac24d184e2e85a099b48bcb84714b89c.Damages must be concrete, clear, and definite (not speculative or unripe pending exhaustion of contractual/collateral remedies), and must be domestic under RJR Nabisco v. European Community (579 U.S. 325 (2016)).
interpretation
Because the Plaintiffs have not exhausted the bargained-for remedies, which they admit are available to them, they have not satisfied RICO’s requirement of alleging damages that are clear and definite.
Goldfine v. Sichenzia — 118 F. Supp. 2d 392 (2000) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2000 (18usc1962: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Because the Plaintiffs have not exhausted the bargained-for remedies, which they admit are available to them, they have not satisfied RICO’s requirement of alleging damages that are clear and definite.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_118.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/118/0392-01; Unicode character offsets [11255:11456] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7a6992301d8f07cdcfefb2ba1333ee88e7724e88e90a83145c93f1937232b139.Damages must be concrete, clear, and definite (not speculative or unripe pending exhaustion of contractual/collateral remedies), and must be domestic under RJR Nabisco v. European Community (579 U.S. 325 (2016)).
interpretation
However, this judicially imposed requirement of a “racketeering enterprise injury” seems artificial and unwarranted by the language of the RICO statute.
Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp. — 567 F. Supp. 1146 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of New Jersey · 1983 (18usc1962: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
However, this judicially imposed requirement of a “racketeering enterprise injury” seems artificial and unwarranted by the language of the RICO statute.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_567.jsonl#/f-supp/567/1146-01; Unicode character offsets [32442:32594] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3836bc32665b8e1a72ea181c77043419d514089c013853f5fc10624d665e146c.Damages must be concrete, clear, and definite (not speculative or unripe pending exhaustion of contractual/collateral remedies), and must be domestic under RJR Nabisco v. European Community (579 U.S. 325 (2016)).
not-required
Distinct "racketeering injury" separate from the harm caused by the predicate acts (Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985))
No source quotation recorded.
not-required
Absence of an antecedent personal injury, so long as the plaintiff seeks recovery for harm to "business or property" such as lost employment (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, 604 U.S. 593 (2025))
No source quotation recorded.