United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986-01-06
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: criminal; jury convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 846 conspiracy, and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) firearm; defendant appeals sufficiency of the evidence on each count; result: claimant-won; claim: (a)(1)
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Cross-statute route alias: see separate aiding-abetting (§ 2) and x-conspiracy-846 (§ 846) routes | satisfied Excluded from merits counts background / merits basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: Prieto-Tejas (with Dusal); count: 21 U.S.C. 846 conspiracy count; subject: party=Prieto-Tejas (with Dusal); count=21 U.S.C. 846 conspiracy count NOT aiding liability under § 841: this is the separate 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy count, parked under `aiding` only because neov2/law/21usc841.law declares no § 846 id; `role background` keeps it out of the § 841 instances. Separate offence under 21 U.S.C. 846 (v0 parked it under `aiding`); kept as a background block, not as aiding liability under 841. | conspiracy-846/tacit-agreement-inferred-from-joint-transport | They entered into an agreement to travel together to San Antonio. Prieto-Tejas purchased a car and Dusal agreed to drive.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [12094:12215] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Furthermore, both men were wearing a large amount of gold jewelry, although neither had a significant source of income.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [13012:13131] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.To obtain a conviction under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and each coconspirator’s (2) knowledge of the agreement, (3) intent to join it, and (4) participation in the conspiracy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [10035:10309] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.But an express, explicit agreement is normally not required, and a tacit, mutual agreement with common design, purpose, and understanding will usually suffice.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [10592:10751] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The two men clearly acted in concert in transporting a significant amount of cocaine.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [13417:13502] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer a tacit agreement between Dusal and Prieto-Tejas and their knowledge, intent to join, and participation in the agreement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [13132:13318] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Specific intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense the possessed controlled substance | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: Prieto-Tejas; count: substantive 841(a)(1) possession-with-intent count; subject: party=Prieto-Tejas; count=substantive 841(a)(1) possession-with-intent count About 30 g (roughly one ounce) of high-purity cocaine: not a quantity that alone compels the inference. Personal-use defense defeated by the defendant's own numbers (claimed habit cost more than his income), plus a cocaine-dusted scale and purity suited to cutting. | inferred/quantity-purity-scale-and-unaffordable-claimed-habit | The bags contained 27.79 grams of 82 percent pure cocaine and 2.89 grams of 73 percent pure cocaine.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [6630:6730] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The evidence suggested that this cocaine was of a purity usually diluted for distribution.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [6839:6929] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The scale had traces of cocaine in the weighing pans and the DEA agent testified that scales of this type are commonly used by those who sell cocaine, but not often by purchasers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [9212:9391] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Prieto-Tejas testified that he was addicted to cocaine and that at the time of his arrest he had been using up to three or four grams a day for several months.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [7439:7598] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Construed most favorably to him, his testimony would indicate that his total income was at the most $2,000 per month.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [8243:8360] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Intent to distribute a controlled substance may generally be inferred solely from possession of a large amount of the substance.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5865:5993] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The purity and value of the substance also are relevant to the possessor’s intent to distribute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [6177:6273] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could infer either that he did not use a large amount and intended to sell a portion of the cocaine, or that he did consume large amounts and also sold cocaine to supplement his income in support of his expensive habit.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [8838:9092] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.The presence of the scale in addition to the quality and quantity of the cocaine and Prieto-Tejas’s testimony concerning his cocaine use support a finding of his intent to distribute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [9392:9575] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Mens rea: "knowingly or intentionally" (including knowledge that the substance is a controlled substance) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); party: Prieto-Tejas; subject: party=Prieto-Tejas | admitted/defendant-admits-knowing-possession | A conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof of knowing possession with intent to distribute (or manufacture or dispense) the substance.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5220:5418] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5653:5851] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Possession (actual, constructive, sole, or joint dominion and control) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); party: Prieto-Tejas; subject: party=Prieto-Tejas | actual/admitted-ownership-of-drugs-hidden-in-own-car | Dusal was driving a 1978 Oldsmobile and Prieto-Tejas, who owned the automobile, was riding in the front passenger seat.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [802:921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.When questioned at the checkpoint, Prieto-Tejas told Nichols that the cocaine belonged to him, but denied knowledge of the gun.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [2869:2996] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5653:5851] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Possession (actual, constructive, sole, or joint dominion and control) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: Dusal (co-defendant, not an appellant); count: 846 conspiracy count (his possession is found as a step in the conspiracy analysis; no 841 conviction of his is under review); subject: party=Dusal (co-defendant, not an appellant); count=846 conspiracy count (his possession is found as a step in the conspiracy analysis; no 841 conviction of his is under review) Driver of another man's car, who knew of the cocaine hidden in it, constructively and jointly possesses it. | constructive/driver-with-dominion-over-vehicle-holding-drugs | Both men were aware of the large amount of cocaine that they carried on the trip.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [12216:12297] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Possession of a narcotic may be actual or constructive, may be joint with others, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [12298:12425] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Dusal may be deemed to have been in constructive possession of the cocaine, which he knew of, because such possession may be proved when one “has dominion over or controls the premises or vehicle where contraband is seized.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [12489:12713] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Partial penalty-tier drug type and quantity table (selected § 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) hook) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) Pre-1986-amendment sentencing; quantity matters only as evidence of intent. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986 | Controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812 Schedules I-V) or counterfeit substance (§ 841(a)(2)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) Cocaine, Schedule II; noted in a footnote, undisputed. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof of knowing possession with intent to distribute (or manufacture or dispense) the substance.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof of knowing possession with intent to distribute (or manufacture or dispense) the substance.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5220:5418] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Under McFadden v. United States (576 U.S. 186 (2015)), the government must prove the defendant knew he was dealing with "a controlled substance" (either by knowing the substance is listed on the federal schedules, or by knowing the physical identity/chemical makeup of the substance even if unaware it is scheduled).
interpretation
Possession of a narcotic may be actual or constructive, may be joint with others, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
Possession of a narcotic may be actual or constructive, may be joint with others, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [12298:12425] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Constructive possession requires power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the contraband (directly or through others); mere proximity, association, or unconsummated inspection prior to payment does not suffice.
interpretation
Intent to distribute a controlled substance may generally be inferred solely from possession of a large amount of the substance.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
Intent to distribute a controlled substance may generally be inferred solely from possession of a large amount of the substance.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [5865:5993] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Routinely inferred from distribution-level quantity, purity, street value, packaging materials, scales, ledgers, firearms, or absence of personal-use paraphernalia.
interpretation
The purity and value of the substance also are relevant to the possessor’s intent to distribute.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
The purity and value of the substance also are relevant to the possessor’s intent to distribute.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [6177:6273] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Routinely inferred from distribution-level quantity, purity, street value, packaging materials, scales, ledgers, firearms, or absence of personal-use paraphernalia.
interpretation
To obtain a conviction under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and each coconspirator’s (2) knowledge of the agreement, (3) intent to join it, and (4) participation in the conspiracy.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
To obtain a conviction under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and each coconspirator’s (2) knowledge of the agreement, (3) intent to join it, and (4) participation in the conspiracy.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [10035:10309] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Cross-statute route only; § 846 is distinct from aiding under § 2 and from substantive § 841(a)(1).
interpretation
But an express, explicit agreement is normally not required, and a tacit, mutual agreement with common design, purpose, and understanding will usually suffice.
/f2d/779/1098-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1986
But an express, explicit agreement is normally not required, and a tacit, mutual agreement with common design, purpose, and understanding will usually suffice.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl#/f2d/779/1098-01; Unicode character offsets [10592:10751] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3f39a24d0e7fd74f68caa830c5b43b98bd09511d85522b3dfc3c1703468bc7f2.Cross-statute route only; § 846 is distinct from aiding under § 2 and from substantive § 841(a)(1).