United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979-01-10
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil; cut-off retail gasoline customers v. wholesaler and five affiliated retail corporations all owned by one man; summary judgment for defendants on Sherman Act count; plaintiffs appeal; result: claimant-lost; claim:
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; party: Fearless Farris Wholesale and the five Retail Companies (the only defendants); theory: conspiracy in fact among the commonly owned corporations; subject: party=Fearless Farris Wholesale and the five Retail Companies (the only defendants); theory=conspiracy in fact among the commonly owned corporations Decided on the facts (one mind decided), not on legal incapacity: the court expressly leaves open whether corporations wholly owned by one person can ever conspire. Pre-Copperweld treatment of intra-enterprise conspiracy. | capacity-to-conspire/commonly-owned-corporations-single-decisionmaker | Defendant-appellee Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. (“Wholesale”) was a wholesaler of petroleum products and is wholly owned by Farris C. Lind. The other five named corporate defendants-appellees were retail gasoline service station companies (“Retail Companies”), also wholly owned by Lind.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [862:1152] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Beginning in January 1973, Wholesale reduced deliveries to U-Serve; later in that year Wholesale completely cut off U-Serve and six other retail customers, which included J. C. Penney Co., the Seven-Eleven chain, and Circle K.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [1308:1534] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Here the defendants have presented probative evidence that only a single person, Mr. Lind, made the decision to refuse to deal with certain customers of Wholesale.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [9066:9229] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.the most that can be plausibly inferred from the evidence presented is that Mr. Olson, in his capacity as general manager, carried out on a day-to-day basis the policy decisions of Farris C. Lind, the man who was sole owner and chief executive officer of Fearless Farris Wholesale.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [10420:10701] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.It is fundamental that a single person or economic entity cannot combine or conspire in isolation: there must be concerted action by a plurality of actors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [11362:11517] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.For even if the defendant corporations, acting through their officers or agents, were deemed theoretically capable of conspiring, here in fact no conspiracy, no meeting of two or more minds, occurred.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [14274:14474] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Plaintiffs have failed to controvert the defendants’ showing that the decision to discontinue gasoline supplies was made by Mr. Lind alone, and that this decision was only subsequently communicated to Mr. Olson for implementation.ISource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [10850:11081] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Lind (sole owner) and Olson (general manager); neither named as a defendant; theory: owner and his general manager as the co-conspirators; subject: party=Lind (sole owner) and Olson (general manager); neither named as a defendant; theory=owner and his general manager as the co-conspirators An agent who merely implements his principal's already-made decision does not conspire with him. Kept [law]: the rule is applied to the undisputed fact (established in the first block for want of contrary evidence) that Lind alone decided. | capacity-to-conspire/agent-implementing-principals-decision | that it was Mr. Olson who advised plaintiffs that Wholesale would not make further deliveries of gasoline in 1973;Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [6303:6417] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [14913:14980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Mr. Olson’s subsequent implementation of this decision does not make him a participant in a conspiracy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [14720:14823] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: law; party: Lind and Olson; neither named as a defendant; theory: even if two individual minds had met; subject: party=Lind and Olson; neither named as a defendant; theory=even if two individual minds had met "Moreover, even if plaintiffs could show ... a meeting of two or more individual minds": officers/agents of the same enterprise acting for it are not a plurality; the complaint alleged only that the corporations conspired. | capacity-to-conspire/officers-acting-for-the-same-corporations | The “two or more minds” that meet in conspiracy must be minds representing the respective business interests of two or more corporations.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [16118:16255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Had the two individuals conspired, both would have been acting on behalf of the same corporations.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [16572:16670] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; theory: "constructive plurality": the sole owner embodies six corporations; subject: theory="constructive plurality": the sole owner embodies six corporations | capacity-to-conspire/separate-incorporation-alone | and that accounting convenience and tax benefits were the original reasons for doing business through separate corporations.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [4662:4786] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.this court has in two recent cases taken the position that the mere formality of separate incorporation is not, without more, sufficient to provide the capability for conspiracy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [12624:12802] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.However, that position is conceptually indistinguishable from the position that mere separate incorporation is alone determinative of the question of in-tra-enterprise conspiracy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [15379:15558] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Private antitrust injury and fact of damage (Clayton Act §§ 4, 16; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsCourt notes plaintiffs would ultimately have to prove an unreasonable restraint (refusal to supply during the 1973 gasoline shortage) but disposes of the claim at the conspiracy threshold. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
It is fundamental that a single person or economic entity cannot combine or conspire in isolation: there must be concerted action by a plurality of actors.
/f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979
It is fundamental that a single person or economic entity cannot combine or conspire in isolation: there must be concerted action by a plurality of actors.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [11362:11517] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita).
interpretation
it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.
/f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979
it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [14913:14980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).