Supreme Court of the United States · 2013-04-23
Case and law context
Role: comparator; posture: immigration removal (civil); BIA held a Georgia marijuana possession-with-intent conviction an INA "aggravated felony" because punishable as a felony under 841, CA5 denied review; certiorari by the noncitizen; 841 is the federal comparator under the categorical approach, not the statute of conviction; result: claimant-lost; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4)
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 | Specific intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense the possessed controlled substance | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4); party: Attorney General Holder / the Federal Government (respondent; the side asserting the § 841 felony match); Adrian Moncrieffe, noncitizen ordered removed (petitioner); count: the COMPARED offense, not a § 841 count: Georgia offense of conviction, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1); theory: categorical comparison in the abstract to 841(a)(1): first condition, the state offense necessarily proscribes CSA conduct; subject: party=Attorney General Holder / the Federal Government (respondent; the side asserting the § 841 felony match); Adrian Moncrieffe, noncitizen ordered removed (petitioner); count=the COMPARED offense, not a § 841 count: Georgia offense of conviction, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1); theory=categorical comparison in the abstract to 841(a)(1): first condition, the state offense necessarily proscribes CSA conduct Not a finding about what Moncrieffe did: the state offense's elements (possession, marijuana, intent to distribute) correspond to the 841(a)(1) offense. The actual facts are legally irrelevant under the categorical approach (hence the 1.3 g fact is [neutral]; v1 had to tag it cuts-against). | categorical-match/state-possession-with-intent-offense | Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [3052:3184] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [9133:9383] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.There is no question that it is a federal crime to "possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c). So far, the state and federal provisions correspond.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [10025:10256] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b. |
| /us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 | Mens rea: "knowingly or intentionally" (including knowledge that the substance is a controlled substance) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 | Possession (actual, constructive, sole, or joint dominion and control) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4) Subsumed in the categorical match above; not separately analysed. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 | Misdemeanor treatment for distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration (§ 841(b)(4)) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4); party: Attorney General Holder / the Federal Government (respondent; the side asserting the § 841 felony match); Adrian Moncrieffe, noncitizen ordered removed (petitioner); count: the COMPARED offense, not a § 841 count: Georgia offense of conviction, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1); theory: categorical comparison: second condition, whether the conviction necessarily establishes the (b)(1)(D) felony tier rather than the (b)(4) misdemeanor tier; subject: party=Attorney General Holder / the Federal Government (respondent; the side asserting the § 841 felony match); Adrian Moncrieffe, noncitizen ordered removed (petitioner); count=the COMPARED offense, not a § 841 count: Georgia offense of conviction, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1); theory=categorical comparison: second condition, whether the conviction necessarily establishes the (b)(1)(D) felony tier rather than the (b)(4) misdemeanor tier Holding direction: the id is the (b)(4) exception, and `satisfied` means the conviction is treated as resting on (b)(4) conduct because it does not rule that conduct out; the felony tier is therefore NOT necessarily established (v0 recorded the same ruling as not-satisfied of the felony tier). Nothing is found about Moncrieffe's own conduct. 841(b)(4) (small amount of marijuana, no remuneration -> treated as simple possession) is read as one of two mutually exclusive punishment tiers, not a mitigating exception to a felony default. A state statute covering social sharing therefore is not categorically an 841 felony. "Small amount" itself is left undefined. In an actual federal prosecution the lower courts put the (b)(4) burden on the defendant; the Court holds that procedural overlay irrelevant here. | felony-vs-misdemeanor-tier/state-conviction-does-not-negate-b4-social-sharing | It is possible neither was; we know that Georgia prosecutes this offense when a defendant possesses only a small amount of marijuana, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 Ga.App. 890, 581 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2003) (6.6 grams), and that "distribution" does not require remuneration, see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 628, 628-629, 353 S.E.2d 532, 533-534 (1987).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [12485:12844] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [11581:11732] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [11733:11960] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [16730:16835] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [12280:12484] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Ambiguity on this point means that the conviction did not "necessarily" involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [12938:13091] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b. |
| /us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 | Controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812 Schedules I-V) or counterfeit substance (§ 841(a)(2)) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4) | schedule-i/marijuana | (1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [14158:14249] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
(1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
(1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [14158:14249] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Includes controlled substance analogues treated as Schedule I under 21 U.S.C. § 813 when intended for human consumption (McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015)).
interpretation
These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [11581:11732] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Under Moncrieffe v. Holder (569 U.S. 184 (2013)), because § 841(b)(4) punishes social sharing of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844, a state marijuana distribution statute that reaches such conduct is not categorically an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
interpretation
The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [11733:11960] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Under Moncrieffe v. Holder (569 U.S. 184 (2013)), because § 841(b)(4) punishes social sharing of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844, a state marijuana distribution statute that reaches such conduct is not categorically an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
interpretation
The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [16730:16835] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Under Moncrieffe v. Holder (569 U.S. 184 (2013)), because § 841(b)(4) punishes social sharing of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844, a state marijuana distribution statute that reaches such conduct is not categorically an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
interpretation
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [9133:9383] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Governed by the notice and information procedures of 21 U.S.C. § 851 (and exempted from Apprendi's jury requirement under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
interpretation
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.
/us/569/0184-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2013
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [9133:9383] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Frequently litigated when § 841 serves as the generic federal comparator in immigration (Moncrieffe), Armed Career Criminal Act, or Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.2) cases.