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interpretation
As a result of these two conclusions, § 8(a)(3) permits unions and employers to require only that employees pay the fees and dues necessary to support the union’s activities as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.
As a result of these two conclusions, § 8(a)(3) permits unions and employers to require only that employees pay the fees and dues necessary to support the union’s activities as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_525.jsonl#/us/525/0033-01; Unicode character offsets [4256:4484] (end exclusive); SHA-256 59b2fc5005aa87837ef54b78e27bcf398b0f86e8001725829baaf66e46311ca8.The complete statutory provisos require proper representative status, no qualifying rescission election, and limits on exclusion or termination. §164(b) and judicial financial-core rules also matter; this is not blanket permission to compel full union membership. The full a(3) provisos are anchored above. This exception is true only when its conditions and section 164(b) state-law limits are satisfied; the separately modeled construction-agreement rule supplies the different seven-day route without removing the final a(3) safeguards. Marquez states the General Motors/Beck financial-core interpretation. The word membership does not authorize compulsory full membership or charges for non-germane activities over a proper objection; the existing statutory text is not rewritten.