Supreme Court of the United States · 1998-11-03
author: unavailable · not independently reviewed
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interpretation
As a result of these two conclusions, § 8(a)(3) permits unions and employers to require only that employees pay the fees and dues necessary to support the union’s activities as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. — 525 U.S. 33 · Supreme Court of the United States · 1998 (29usc158: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
As a result of these two conclusions, § 8(a)(3) permits unions and employers to require only that employees pay the fees and dues necessary to support the union’s activities as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_525.jsonl#/us/525/0033-01; Unicode character offsets [4256:4484] (end exclusive); SHA-256 59b2fc5005aa87837ef54b78e27bcf398b0f86e8001725829baaf66e46311ca8.The complete statutory provisos require proper representative status, no qualifying rescission election, and limits on exclusion or termination. §164(b) and judicial financial-core rules also matter; this is not blanket permission to compel full union membership. The full a(3) provisos are anchored above. This exception is true only when its conditions and section 164(b) state-law limits are satisfied; the separately modeled construction-agreement rule supplies the different seven-day route without removing the final a(3) safeguards. Marquez states the General Motors/Beck financial-core interpretation. The word membership does not authorize compulsory full membership or charges for non-germane activities over a proper objection; the existing statutory text is not rewritten.