United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988-03-08
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: criminal; jury convictions of one corporation and its vice president; defendants appeal the per se instruction and sufficiency of the evidence; result: claimant-won; claim:
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; party: Co-Op and Beaupain (appellants); subject: party=Co-Op and Beaupain (appellants) Sufficiency upheld on a participant's testimony (equivocal on cross, rehabilitated on redirect) corroborated by customers who were turned away "because of the agreement"; the two company presidents who attended the same lunch were acquitted. | direct-evidence/immunized-coconspirator-testimony-of-meeting | In November, 1981, a luncheon meeting was held in Dayton, Ohio, and attended by Handler, Borack, Beaupain, and Beaupain’s boss, Blair Mooney.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [2808:2949] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Handler replied that “Tri-State would not call on any Co-Operative Theatres’ accounts.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [4762:4849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.The government also called on three other theater owners who testified that Tri-State had called on them prior to November, 1981, but had subsequently refused their business on the grounds that Tri-State and Co-Op had an agreement not to take each other’s customers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [5581:5847] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.One of the theater owners further testified that he also contacted the President of Co-Op, Blair Mooney, who confirmed the existence of the agreement between Co-Op and Tri-State.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [5848:6026] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.the standard of review is whether the relevant evidence could be accepted by a reasonably minded jury as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubtSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22001:22190] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.we find that the direct evidence presented through Handler’s testimony when viewed in favor of the government was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that defendants had entered into an illegal agreement not to seek business from each other’s accountsSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23599:23865] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04. |
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Criminal mens rea: knowing participation in the conspiracy or intent to restrain trade | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / meritsRule about the CONTENT of the element, not a finding: in a per se case the government need not show knowledge of probable anticompetitive effects (a proposed extra requirement rejected). The jury had in fact been instructed on the stricter standard and convicted anyway; knowing joinder is reviewed only inside the global "sufficient evidence to support the convictions" conclusion (see the agreement block), with no separate held sentence. | knowing-joinder/per-se-no-proof-of-anticipated-effects | the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracySource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22567:22702] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23032:23117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the government is not required in a per se case to show that the conspirators entered into the agreement with knowledge of its probable anti-competitive effects.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22704:22906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04. |
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law A limited allocation (existing accounts only, unsolicited switches arguably still allowed, new customers open) is still naked customer allocation; novelty of the "no-solicitation" label and absence of proven market effect do not take it out of the per se rule when no procompetitive justification is offered. | horizontal-customer-allocation/no-solicitation-of-existing-accounts | This case involves an alleged agreement not to compete between two movie theater booking agents, Co-Operative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. (Co-Op), and Tri-State Theatre Services, Inc. (Tri-State).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [984:1175] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.each of the two competing corporations agreed to refrain from competing for customers who were currently being serviced by the other rival corporationSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [250:400] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Under the terms of the alleged agreement, the companies remained free to compete for new customers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [402:501] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.As noted by the district court, the defendants failed to articulate a single pro-competitive justification for the horizontal restrictions imposed by the alleged agreement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19623:19795] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [9969:10143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19471:19622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the agreement between the defendants not to call on each other’s customers was an unreasonable restraint of trade as a matter of law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [21585:21786] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19471:19622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [9969:10143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracySource:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22567:22702] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.
interpretation
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23032:23117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.
interpretation
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracySource:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [22567:22702] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In criminal per se prosecutions, intent to restrain trade is satisfied by knowing participation in the conspiracy without separate proof of intent to produce anticompetitive effects.
interpretation
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [23032:23117] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.In criminal per se prosecutions, intent to restrain trade is satisfied by knowing participation in the conspiracy without separate proof of intent to produce anticompetitive effects.