Source: xref/out/r2/act_precision_supplement.json
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"context": "distribution center employees” at both facilities. Because the company planned to consolidate and transfer its operations to Lebanon, Indiana, it argued that holding an election would not effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”). The NLRB’s Regional Director found that the intended relocation did not render an immediate election inappropriate and ordered an election.\nThe Board denied the company’s Request for Review of the Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of Ele",
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"context": " for review of an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) order declaring an ocean terminal facility owned by intervenor Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) to be a “line of railroad” within the meaning of former section la of the Interstate Commerce Act (the Act) (now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (Supp.1979)) and thus subject to ICC jurisdiction. The City presents three alternative arguments: the ICC had no authority to declare FEC’s ocean terminal a “line of railroad” because a petition for permission to ",
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"context": "the proof was insufficient to show that the parties lived separate and apart in excess of two years or that the marriage was irretrievably broken down, as required by the “no-fault” provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 401(a)(2)). It is respondent’s position that the “living separate and apart” ground for dissolution set forth in section 401(a)(2) of the Act requires that spouses live physically separate and apart for two years",
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"context": "t” provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 401(a)(2)). It is respondent’s position that the “living separate and apart” ground for dissolution set forth in section 401(a)(2) of the Act requires that spouses live physically separate and apart for two years. Respondent urges this court to reject the holding in In re Marriage of Kenik (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 266, that the state of “living separate and apart” can be realized without ",
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"context": "his first amended complaint. The court held that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). Plaintiff argues in this appeal that the Act does not foreclose a common-law cause of action. We affirm.\nCount I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged that he was employed by defendant Dixon Publishing Company, d/b/a Dixonweb Printing Co. (Dixonweb). On May 15, 1985, plaintiff suffere",
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"context": "s second death penalty hearing is presented in detail in our opinion on defendant’s direct appeal and will not be recounted here. We will discuss only those facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2000)) is a statutory vehicle which provides criminal defendants with an opportunity to obtain relief from substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights that occurred at trial or sentencing",
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"context": " provides criminal defendants with an opportunity to obtain relief from substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights that occurred at trial or sentencing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A petition filed under the Act is not an appeal, but a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction or sentence. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (2001); People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). Consequently, the purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is not to determ",
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"context": "ly, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in that the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act) is not applicable to transactions between a mobile home park landlord and tenant. We note, however, that the applicability of the Act was never clearly raised before the trial court; therefore, it may be considered waived. (Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 141, 147.) However, because the issue is one of public importance concerning a matter of statutory interpretati",
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"context": "\nJUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe are asked to decide whether the settlement of a property damage lawsuit can pass the good-faith test under the Contribution Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1996)) when the plaintiff, as a condition of the settlement agreement, assigns his cause of action to the defendant. We conclude that this kind of settlement undermines the policy of the Act and reverse.\nIn an earlier revie",
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{
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"context": "test under the Contribution Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1996)) when the plaintiff, as a condition of the settlement agreement, assigns his cause of action to the defendant. We conclude that this kind of settlement undermines the policy of the Act and reverse.\nIn an earlier review of this case, we dismissed the appeal of defendant Litgen Concrete Cutting and Coring Company (Litgen) for lack of jurisdiction. See Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 36, 669 N.E.2d 694 (1",
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"context": "ering the plea. Since defendant’s post-conviction petition raises issues collateral to the waiver of his right to file a post-conviction petition, we will review defendant’s appeal on the merits.\nSection 122 — 2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act), in effect at the time deféndant filed his petition for post-conviction relief, requires the court to examine the petition and enter an order “[wjithin 30 days after the filing and docketing of each petition.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 199",
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"context": "g and docketing of a post-conviction petition, the court may enter an order dismissing a defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit. If the petition is not dismissed, it must be docketed for further consideration in accordance with the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122 — 2.1 (now codified, as amended, at 725 ILCS 5/122 — 2.1(a)(2) (West 1992)).\nOur supreme court has indicated that the 30-day rule set forth in section 122 — 2.1 is mandatory, not directory. (People v. Porter (",
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"url": "https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_198/0045_01/index.html",
"context": "vron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), as are the regulations consistent with that view, since they are neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the Act, see, e.g., Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We are not persuaded to the contrary vi",
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"context": "ordinance does not enjoy presumptive validity (Columbus Park, 25 Ill. 2d at 71-72), and the burden of proof shifts to the city.\nIn its petition for rehearing, the Church brings to our attention House Bill 2370, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the Act) (Pub. Act 90 — 806, eff. December 2, 1998). This act, signed by the Governor on December 4, 1998, applies retroactively and adopts the compelling interest test set out in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). The",
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"context": "s retroactively and adopts the compelling interest test set out in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). The Church contends that since the Church’s right to free exercise of religion is burdened by the ordinance, the Act requires that the city meet the Yoder burden of proof: that the city’s interest in adoption of the zoning ordinance is compelling and that the ordinance is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. We agree, but by applying the compel",
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{
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"context": "hatever justice might be found at trial. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that when the government indicated its notice of readiness for trial, it did not intend to immediately proceed.\nAny objection based on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (the Act), 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., and implementing post July 1, 1966 Southern District Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases must also fail for much the same reasons. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act and the Plan a defendant such as Goldman ",
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"context": "on based on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (the Act), 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., and implementing post July 1, 1966 Southern District Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases must also fail for much the same reasons. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act and the Plan a defendant such as Goldman is required to be tried within 180 days of the indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(g); however, cases pending on July 1, 1976, the effective date of the Act, are to be tried within 180 days of July 1,1976. 18 U.S.C.",
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"context": "l for much the same reasons. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act and the Plan a defendant such as Goldman is required to be tried within 180 days of the indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(g); however, cases pending on July 1, 1976, the effective date of the Act, are to be tried within 180 days of July 1,1976. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(b)(2); Rule 5(a)(1) of the Statement of Time Limits and Procedures for Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases (the local rules).\nNotwithstanding this requirement, certain peri",
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