Source: qa/law-wave2-QA2-spot.md
# QA2 adversarial spot-check — wave-2 LAW catalogues Reviewed QA1's wave-2 report and the three requested catalogues against the pinned local statute text and current Office of the Law Revision Counsel text. `lawdsl.py check` passes all three files (59 statutory quote spans and 33 case-rule spans, zero errors). Exact quote spans do not establish that the catalogue covers the whole statutory rule or that the claim formula includes all applicable exceptions. ## 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — **FIX** The catalogue faithfully reproduces all nine disqualifying-status categories and separates the three conduct alternatives: ship/transport, possess, and receive. It also preserves the distinct commerce wording and the conjunctive §922(g)(8)(A)-(B) / alternative (C)(i)-(ii) structure. The visa exception is linked to §922(y)(2), the g(1) conviction exclusions to §921(a)(20), and the domestic-violence definition to §921(a)(33). Material gaps remain: - The §922(g) claims omit the cross-section exception in 18 U.S.C. §925(a)(1). The chapter generally does not apply to government-use firearms for transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation, with express exceptions for §922(g)(9) and §922(p). That is a meaningful exception to g(1)-(8) conduct, and the catalogue currently has no corresponding statutory exception or claim scope note. - Some incorporated status terms are left unexpanded: `status.g2` has no §921(a)(15) fugitive definition; `status.g4` has no §921(a)(4) mental-adjudication/commitment definition; and the §922(g)(8) order refers to “intimate partner” without the §921(a)(32) definition. The notes say §921 definitions remain cross-references, but these three blocks do not carry them. - `status.g3` (“unlawful user”) has no interpretive rule or temporal/use boundary. That term is not self-defining, and the Hemani as-applied defense does not supply its ordinary statutory meaning. Keep the Second Amendment issue separate while adding an appropriately qualified construction of the status term. Opened anchors: - **PASS — McAdory**, `status.g1`: the Ninth Circuit directly construes “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” against Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme. The catalogue notes this is circuit-specific. - **PASS — Hayes**, `status.g9`: the Supreme Court directly holds the domestic relationship need not be an element of the predicate misdemeanor, but must be proved in the §922(g)(9) prosecution. - **PASS, limited — Thompson**, `knowledge-status`: the Second Circuit affirms the plea after finding that the magistrate correctly explained the Rehaif status-knowledge requirement. The quoted words are the plea colloquy, not a freestanding doctrinal holding; the catalogue's research notes appropriately describe it as corroboration of Rehaif. Official sources: [18 U.S.C. § 922](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-120/t18/s922/), [18 U.S.C. § 921](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t18/s921/), and [18 U.S.C. § 925](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t18/s925/). ## 15 U.S.C. § 78j — **FIX within otherwise disclosed Rule 10b-5 scope** The notes expressly scope this as a core Rule 10b-5 catalogue, not a complete treatment of §78j(a) short-sale/stop-loss rules or §78j(c) securities lending. Those omissions are disclosed and are not independent failures of this spot-check. The §78j(b) quotation correctly anchors the Commission rulemaking hook, and the SEC/private/criminal claim separation is readable. Two gaps remain inside the declared scope: - The current §78j(b) text expressly includes “any securities-based swap agreement.” The `transaction` text anchor and xref cover exchange-registered and unregistered securities but omit this third statutory alternative. The catalogue also omits the concluding provision that extends §78j(b) fraud rules and precedents to securities-based swaps. Add that branch or state explicitly that swaps are outside this version's scope. - The private claim's gloss says the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller, but the claim formula has no purchaser/seller-standing element or rule anchor. `transaction` is the statutory “in connection with” nexus and does not itself encode the judge-made Blue Chip purchaser/seller limitation. Label that private-only doctrine separately from the shared statutory transaction nexus. Opened anchors: - **PASS — Janus**, `statement`: the Supreme Court directly states the Rule 10b-5(b) “maker” test based on ultimate authority over content and communication. - **PASS — Dura**, `loss-causation`: the quoted holding distinguishes a loss being touched by fraud from one caused by it in a private securities action. - **PASS — Afriyie**, `willfulness`: the quote is a criminal jury instruction, and the Second Circuit holds there was no instructional error. It supports a criminal mens rea example, not a universal instruction for every charged theory; the catalogue's gloss already preserves this limitation. Official text: [15 U.S.C. § 78j](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-124/t15/s78j/). ## 29 U.S.C. § 623 — **FIX; scope caveats are not enough to sustain QA1's all-PASS** The core claims correctly distinguish employer treatment, impact, retaliation, agency, union, advertising, and wage-reduction routes. The notes disclose that the catalogue is not a complete pension-actuarial or federal-sector model. That is a useful scope warning, but the operative catalogue still lacks major §623 rules and its claim formulas do not reflect all exceptions that the statute expressly applies to the listed routes. - Section 623(f)(1)-(2) says its listed exceptions can excuse actions prohibited under (a), (b), (c), or (e). Yet `agency-discrimination` and `union-discrimination` include no applicable exception branch, and `age-advertising` excludes only BFOQ while omitting the other relevant (f)(1)-(2) paths. In particular, (f)(1)'s RFOA and foreign-law alternatives and (f)(2)'s seniority/benefit-plan rules expressly cover (b), (c), and (e). Model them conditionally by route, rather than presenting the agency, union, and advertisement formulas as exception-free. - The operative pension-plan prohibition in §623(i)(1) is absent as a claim/element. The notes say pension details are out of scope, but §623(i) is a separate substantive prohibition on age-based benefit-accrual cessation/reduction, not merely a complex defense. The special public-safety age rules in §623(j) and §631(c) are likewise not in the catalogue. Explicitly exclude these routes from the displayed scope or add them before calling this a complete §623 catalogue. The QA1 statement that it “models all statutory exceptions” is too broad. - `impact-applicant-limit` is labeled as an `exception`, although it is a judge-made construction of “employees” in §623(a)(2), not a separate statutory carve-out. Its gloss says the rule is jurisdiction-sensitive, but `claim disparate-impact` applies it as a universal conjunct with no jurisdiction qualifier. Recast it as an applicability constraint or scope note and preserve the circuit limitation. - The `union-practice` block's only statutory text span quotes §623(c)(1), while its name and variants also claim to model §623(c)(2) referral/classification and §623(c)(3) causing or attempting to cause employer discrimination. The quote checker passes, but those two statutory branches have no separate text anchors or sub-elements. Split them or anchor the full c(1)-(3) scope. Opened anchors: - **PASS — Westmoreland**, `age-causation`: the rule pin at `/f3d/924/0718-01` accurately quotes a Fourth Circuit Gross but-for holding. QA1's report calls this same quote “Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, 984 F.3d 1199,” which is a different case; the report's case identification is wrong even though the catalogue's source pointer is correct. - **PASS — O'Brien**, `rfoa`: the Seventh Circuit expressly treats RFOA as an affirmative defense and explains its reasonableness standard and lighter burden. - **PASS, scoped — Kleber**, `impact-applicant-limit`: the en banc Seventh Circuit directly holds §623(a)(2) protects employees rather than outside applicants. This supports that circuit's construction, not an unqualified nationwide exception. Official text: [29 U.S.C. § 623](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-136/t29/s623/). ## Overall verdict on QA1 QA1's all-PASS conclusion is too lenient. Its quote-span checks are valid and the reviewed case passages generally support their attached doctrine. But the report overstates statutory completeness: it misses the §925(a)(1) §922(g) carveout and incorporated §921 definitions, the §78j(b) securities-based-swap branch and purchaser/seller doctrine, and ADEA exceptions/routes omitted or applied inconsistently across claims. The ADEA core scope warning is helpful, but it does not make the affected rules complete, and QA1 misidentifies the source case for the Gross-rule pin. These are substantive review issues, not quote-offset failures. Verification: `python3 neov2/tools/lawdsl.py check neov2/law/18usc922.law neov2/law/15usc78j.law neov2/law/29usc623.law` — 3 catalogues, 59 statutory quotes, 33 case-rule quotes, 0 errors. No law files or source text were edited.