Source: qa/law-wave2-QA2-reverify.md
# QA2 — wave-2 LAW re-verification (round 5) Reviewed `law-wave2-QA2-spot.md`, the Round 3 notes, requested wave-2 LAW files, the CBOCS case record, and current primary statutory text. Verdicts below distinguish exact quote validation from legal/model completeness. No LAW, CASE, or source-text files were edited. ## Prior QA2 FIX items ### 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — **FIX; prior findings remain open** None of the identified changes appears in the current catalogue: - No §925(a)(1) government-use exception is modeled. The exception covers transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, and importation of firearms/ammunition issued for government use, subject to express §922(g)(9) and §922(p) exceptions. As a result, it can qualify §922(g)(1)-(8) conduct. - `status.g2`, `status.g4`, and `status.g8.restraint` still do not anchor the incorporated §921(a)(15) fugitive, §921(a)(4) mental-adjudication/commitment, and §921(a)(32) intimate-partner definitions. The latter two also carry statutory boundaries relevant to their use. - `status.g3` still has no qualified construction of “unlawful user” or temporal/use boundary. The Hemani defense remains an as-applied constitutional holding and does not define that statutory term. Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 922](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-120/t18/s922/), [§ 921](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t18/s921/), [§ 925](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t18/s925/). ### 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) — **FIX; prior findings remain open** `transaction` still quotes and describes only exchange-registered and unregistered securities. It omits the statutory securities-based-swap-agreement alternative and the concluding provisions applying specified §78j(b) fraud rules and judicial precedents to those agreements. The current statute expressly contains both. The private-claim gloss still says purchaser/seller, but no private-only element or rule represents that Blue Chip limitation. Keep it separate from the shared statutory “in connection with” nexus. These are in-scope omissions; the separately disclosed §78j(a)/(c) exclusions are not newly treated as defects. Official text: [15 U.S.C. § 78j](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t15/s78j/). ### 29 U.S.C. § 623 — **FIX; prior findings remain open** - The claim formulas still omit applicable §623(f)(1)-(2) exceptions on §623(b), (c), and (e) routes. The statute expressly applies BFOQ, RFOA, foreign-law, seniority, and benefit-plan qualifications to the listed routes; the agency and union claims have no exception branches, and the advertising claim excludes only BFOQ. Exceptions should be conditional and mapped to each covered route. - The pension-accrual prohibition in §623(i) and special public-safety conditions in §623(j)/§631(c) remain outside the operative catalogue. Notes can bound scope, but the catalogue/report must not claim complete §623 coverage or “all statutory exceptions.” - `impact-applicant-limit` remains typed as an exception and is a universal conjunct in `disparate-impact`, although it is a circuit-specific construction of the statutory employee boundary. Recast/qualify it as applicability scope rather than a nationwide statutory defense. - `union-practice` still has only a §623(c)(1) text anchor while its variants also purport to cover referral/classification under (c)(2) and causing/attempting employer discrimination under (c)(3). Official text: [29 U.S.C. § 623](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-136/t29/s623/). The §623(f)(1)-(2) route language and §623(i)-(j) provisions confirm the gaps. ## Additional wave-2 review ### 18 U.S.C. § 1341 — **FIX on statutory mail-act completeness; PASS on furtherance separation** The separate `mails` and `furtherance` elements correctly distinguish the communication act from its execution-purpose nexus. Hagen supports the close-relationship/furtherance limitation, while Gross is used only as a district-court example involving mailings within an ongoing alleged scheme. However, the statutory `mails` anchor quotes only placement in a post office/authorized depository. The text also covers depositing or causing deposit with a private/commercial interstate carrier, taking/receiving matter therefrom, and knowingly causing delivery by mail or carrier. Gloss/variants mention carrier use but do not anchor/model all those statutory modes. Add the missing branches or label the mailing node expressly partial. Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 1341](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-136/t18/s1341/). ### 18 U.S.C. § 1343 — **PASS, with case-specific boundary** The file separates transmission/causation, interstate-commerce nexus, and furtherance. Boliaux supports foreseeability on its payment-processing/supervision facts; its formulation should remain a case-specific attribution gloss, not a universal independent statutory element. Buncich correctly warns that a scheme alone does not substitute for proof of the charged transmission. No invented wire branch was identified in the reviewed claims. ### 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) — **FIX on penalty coverage; PASS on liability/accomplice separation** The base claims correctly preserve the statute’s distinct use/carry “during and in relation to” and possession “in furtherance” formulations. Rosemond’s accomplice rule is explicitly described as an alternative §2 attribution route, not a principal-offense conjunct; its placement under generic `element accomplice` is a type/modeling mismatch, not an invented substantive rule. Penalty nodes are correctly kept out of base liability formulas. Penalty coverage is incomplete: `penalty.weapon` anchors the 30-year machinegun/destructive-device/silencer tier but omits the statute’s 10-year short-barreled-rifle/shotgun tier. The note about historical semiautomatic-assault-weapon wording is appropriately date-qualified. The §924(c)(5) armor branch also fails to represent its complete consequence structure in anchored sub-elements. Treat these as penalty-catalogue gaps, not defects in the base claims. Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 924](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t18/s924/). ### 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) — **FIX on union-security conditions; Mastro Plastics qualification PASS** The `lawful-union-security` gloss recognizes conditional permission, representative status, rescission, and membership/dues limits. But its statutory anchor includes only the after-thirtieth-day phrase and the model does not encode the threshold that the union was not established, maintained, or assisted by an unfair labor practice. The first proviso’s representative and recent-rescission-election requirements and the second proviso’s same-terms/uniform-dues limits are not represented as operative conditions. Thus `a3-discrimination` can negate an exception without exposing all its conditions. This is a material completeness issue. Mastro Plastics is not cited or modeled in the active catalogue/notes, and no invented Mastro rule was found. That omission is sound for this §8(a) scope: *Mastro Plastics*, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), addresses the interaction of a general no-strike agreement, NLRA §8(d), and strikes against unfair labor practices; it is not a §8(a)(3) union-security exception. If added as a boundary note, it must be qualified to that separate §8(d)/§7 context. Official text: [29 U.S.C. § 158](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-124/t29/s158/); [Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. 270](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-350/pdf/USREPORTS-350-270.pdf). ### Remaining three wave-2 files — **PASS, scoped review** - **21 U.S.C. § 846:** Agreement/intent/joinder and attempt/substantial-step routes are kept distinct; penalty incorporation is described as a consequence rather than a universal liability conjunct. The gloss expressly defers object-offense penalty and quantity attribution. No newly invented claim was identified in this review. - **15 U.S.C. § 1125:** The notes bound the catalogue to its chosen subsection and disclose omitted dilution/cybersquatting routes. Lexmark’s zone-of-interests/proximate-cause limitation is presented as judicial cause-of-action scope, not statutory text. No newly invented claim was identified in this review. - **42 U.S.C. § 1981:** The law catalogue distinguishes own-contract requirements for direct claims from CBOCS retaliation protecting advocacy for another’s contractual rights, and does not require the plaintiff to be the original discrimination victim for that retaliation route. No newly invented substantive rule was identified; see the CBOCS record-level issue below. ## CBOCS West cross-check — **FIX remains open; report only** `neov2/cases/42usc1981/us-553-442-cbocs-west-v-humphries.case` is still unchanged at the flagged issue: `remedies : not-reached` contains a rule and gloss that say §1981 and Title VII remedies are independent and that the Court rejects procedural circumvention. The Court decided that remedial-independence proposition while leaving actual factual liability and specific damages/fees unresolved. The current record therefore conflates a decided rule with remedies not reached; split the propositions or mark the rule announced/decided. The case file was not edited, per scope. ## Verification and scope The isolated checkout is based on current `origin/master`. `NEOV2_CORPUS=/home/mma/repos/neochart/neochartdocroot python3 neov2/tools/lawdsl.py check neov2/law` passed all 15 active LAW catalogues: zero errors and zero warnings. That validates syntax, source pins, and quote spans, not completeness; the substantive FIXes above remain despite a clean checker. Primary statutory text was checked against the linked Office of the Law Revision Counsel pages on 2026-11-10. This report is the only file in scope for commit/push.