Source: qa/law-wave2-QA1.md
# QA1 review — Wave-2 LAW catalogues
## Method and source verification
Reviewed the charter, LAW DSL specifications ([`neov2/law/LAW-DSL.md`](file:///home/mma/repos/neochart/neov2/law/LAW-DSL.md)), the QA2 evaluation standard ([`neov2/qa/law-QA2.md`](file:///home/mma/repos/neochart/neov2/qa/law-QA2.md)), all 10 Wave-2 LAW catalogues, and their companion `NOTES-<statute>.md` research files.
Checked statutory texts against the Office of the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC) U.S. Code database and validated all character spans against the canonical read-only IR corpus using `neov2.tools.lawdsl.check(..., check_cases=True)`. All 151 statutory quote spans and all 106 case-rule quote spans checked out byte-for-byte across all 10 catalogues with zero errors.
In accordance with the review protocol, three interpretive case anchors were opened per statute (30 anchors total), and their surrounding opinion contexts were verified in the case corpus (`neov2.tools.corpus.load_case`). Each anchor was evaluated to verify whether the quoted passage represents a genuine judicial holding or controlling test, and whether it directly supports the attached statutory or doctrinal element.
Each catalogue was judged along three substantive dimensions:
1. **Completeness vs. the verbatim statute:** Coverage of core operative provisions, absence of invented textual terms, accurate statutory scoping (particularly for multi-part codes such as § 922, § 924, § 1125, § 158, § 623), and proper representation of statutory exceptions/defenses.
2. **Labeling of judge-made elements:** Explicit demarcation of judge-made common-law accretions, burden allocations, and non-statutory prerequisites (e.g., *Neder* materiality, *Rehaif* knowledge-of-status, *Davis* residual-clause invalidation, *Bailey*/*Muscarello* use-vs-carry distinctions, *Janus* statement authorship, *Basic*/*Dura* reliance and loss causation, *Gross* but-for causation, *Lexmark* false advertising standing, *Domino's Pizza* contractual privity, *Shabani* overt-act disclaimer, and *Wright Line* / *Gissel* labor rules).
3. **Fidelity and fit of interpretive-case anchors:** Legal precision and contextual validity of the pinned judicial rules.
---
## Verdict summary matrix
| Statute | Title | Claims | Stat Quotes | Rule Quotes | Verification | Verdict |
|---|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| **18 U.S.C. § 1341** | Mail fraud | 1 | 7 | 12 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **18 U.S.C. § 1343** | Wire fraud | 1 | 8 | 14 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **18 U.S.C. § 922(g)** | Prohibited person firearm possession | 3 | 25 | 7 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **18 U.S.C. § 924(c)** | Firearm in furtherance of crime of violence/drug trafficking | 4 | 27 | 10 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **15 U.S.C. § 78j** | Manipulative & deceptive devices; Rule 10b-5 | 3 | 11 | 17 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634** | Age Discrimination in Employment Act core framework | 7 | 23 | 9 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)** | False association & false advertising under subsection (a) | 4 | 14 | 12 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **42 U.S.C. § 1981** | Equal rights under the law | 3 | 13 | 10 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **21 U.S.C. § 846** | CSA attempt and conspiracy | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
| **29 U.S.C. § 158(a)** | Employer unfair labor practices — NLRA § 8(a) | 5 | 16 | 8 | 0 errors | **PASS** |
---
## Per-statute detailed audits and case anchors
### 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 — Mail fraud — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
The catalogue models the core property-fraud claim (`property-fraud : scheme & property & materiality & intent & mails & furtherance`). The statutory scope is precisely bounded:
- Captures all statutory communication forms (USPS placement/delivery and private commercial interstate carrier).
- Clearly demarcates the boundary with 18 U.S.C. § 1346 honest-services fraud as a separate theory (`honest-services-boundary`), precluding contamination of the traditional property element.
- Incorporates modern Supreme Court doctrine confining property fraud to traditional property interests (*Kelly*, *Ciminelli*, *Kousisis*), while explicitly noting that intent to cause net economic loss is not required.
- Implements the Second Circuit's *Bascuñán* domestic-application test as an explicit `constraint` for cross-border schemes.
#### Judge-made elements
- `materiality`: Expressly labeled in the gloss as a judge-made incorporation of common-law fraud (*Neder v. United States*), not an express textual term in § 1341.
- `scheme`: Explicitly notes that actual victim reliance and completed pecuniary damage are not required (*Neder*).
- `intent`: Differentiates fraudulent intent from mere breach of contract or negligence.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — United States v. Runner**, 143 F.4th 146 (4th Cir. 2024), element `scheme` (@14885..15067):
> "The essential elements of mail and wire fraud are (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use of the mails or wires to further the scheme."
*Holding directly supports the fundamental elements of federal mail fraud.*
2. **PASS — Kousisis v. United States**, 605 U.S. 114 (2025), element `property` (@20152..20275):
> "Obtaining the victim's money or property must have been the “aim,” not an “incidental byproduct,” of the defendant's fraud."
*Holding establishes that obtaining traditional property must be the aim of the scheme under modern mail/wire fraud doctrine.*
3. **PASS — Neder v. United States**, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), element `materiality` (@38141..38269):
> "Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the non-statutory materiality requirement.*
Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 1341](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section1341&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 — Wire fraud — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
The catalogue defines `claim property-fraud : scheme & property & materiality & intent & wire & furtherance & interstate`.
- Faithfully differentiates wire fraud from mail fraud by requiring the jurisdictional transmission to cross state or international lines (`interstate`), whereas mail fraud permits purely intrastate USPS mailings.
- Accurately captures causation of wire transmissions (`wire`), recognizing that the defendant need not personally operate the transmission if the wire usage was reasonably foreseeable (*Boliaux*).
- Preserves the identical honest-services boundary (§ 1346) and domestic-conduct constraints (*Bascuñán*) found in § 1341.
#### Judge-made elements
- `materiality`: Labeled as common-law incorporation per *Neder*, with reference to *Kousisis* on competing materiality formulations.
- `property`: Integrates the *Kousisis* / *Ciminelli* framework rejecting the "right to control" theory while maintaining that net economic loss is not required.
- `furtherance`: Distinguishes ongoing lulling transmissions from post-completion incidental transmissions (*Hagen*, *Buncich*).
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — United States v. Boliaux**, 915 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2019), element `interstate` (@3650..3936):
> "The charged wire transmissions traveled across state lines-from Joliet Motors in Illinois and routed through Pennsylvania or Ohio, and they advanced the scheme to defraud the lenders because they were payments for a vehicle that had been sold to the detriment of the lender's interests."
*Holding directly illustrates the interstate transmission requirement and jurisdictional routing proof.*
2. **PASS — United States v. Buncich**, 926 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2019), element `furtherance` (@9029..9241):
> "To establish wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the government must prove the defendant (1) participated in a scheme to defraud, (2) intended to defraud, and (3) used interstate wires in furtherance of the fraud."
*Holding directly supports the required nexus between the wire transmission and the execution of the fraud.*
3. **PASS — Bascuñán v. Elsaca**, 927 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2019), constraint `domestic-application` (@33665..33939):
> "We therefore hold that a claim predicated on mail or wire fraud involves sufficient domestic conduct when (1) the defendant used domestic mail or wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, and (2) the use of the mail or wires was a core component of the scheme to defraud."
*Directly supports the domestic-conduct constraint for transnational wire fraud claims.*
Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 1343](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section1343&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — Prohibited person firearm possession — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
The catalogue correctly scopes its title, cite, and header to subsection 922(g) rather than attempting to represent the entirety of § 922's twenty-six subsections ((a)–(z)).
- Covers all three statutory conduct alternatives as separate claims:
- `922(g)-possession`
- `922(g)-shipment`
- `922(g)-receipt`
- Exhaustively reproduces verbatim text for all nine prohibited person categories:
- § 922(g)(1): felony conviction (> 1 year)
- § 922(g)(2): fugitive from justice
- § 922(g)(3): unlawful drug user or addict
- § 922(g)(4): mental defective adjudication or commitment
- § 922(g)(5): unlawful alien (`g5unlawful`) and nonimmigrant visa (`g5visa`)
- § 922(g)(6): dishonorable military discharge
- § 922(g)(7): renounced citizenship
- § 922(g)(8): domestic protection order (decomposed into notice/hearing, covered restraint, and credible threat / force terms)
- § 922(g)(9): misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
- Differentiates `commerce-possession` ("in or affecting commerce") from `commerce-receipt` ("shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce").
#### Judge-made elements
- `knowledge-status`: Authoritatively models the *Rehaif v. United States* (588 U.S. 225) requirement that the defendant must know of the disqualifying status at the time of possession. Cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
- `possession`: Distinguishes actual physical possession from constructive possession (*Gilliam*), noting that proximity alone is insufficient without dominion and control.
- `commerce-possession`: Notes that knowledge of the interstate commerce nexus is not required (*Rehaif* jurisdictional rule).
- `hemani-as-applied`: Correctly characterizes the Tenth Circuit's *Hemani* decision as an as-applied Second Amendment defense for regular marijuana users, rather than an erasure of statutory text.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — United States v. McAdory**, 935 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2019), element `status.g1` (@12584..12849):
> "Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length."
*Holding directly supports the standard for qualifying predicate convictions under § 922(g)(1).*
2. **PASS — United States v. Hayes**, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), element `status.g9` (@758..962):
> "We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense."
*Supreme Court holding directly supports the statutory construction of § 922(g)(9) domestic violence predicates.*
3. **PASS — Thompson v. United States**, 143 F.4th 169 (4th Cir. 2024), element `knowledge-status` (@40794..41194):
> "The magistrate judge explicitly stated to Thompson at his plea hearing that in addition to proving that he “knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition as charged in the indictment,” “the government would [also] have to prove that [Thompson was] convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and that [he] knew [he] had been convicted of such a crime.”"
*Directly supports the post-Rehaif requirement of knowledge of disqualifying status.*
Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 922](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section922&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) — Firearm in furtherance of crime of violence/drug trafficking — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Explicitly scoped in cite and title to subsection 924(c).
- Models four distinct liability claims:
- `924(c)-use-or-carry`
- `924(c)-possession`
- `924(c)-armor-use-or-carry`
- `924(c)-armor-possession`
- Accurately captures the critical statutory distinction in the required nexus:
- "use or carry" requires `during-relation` ("during and in relation to")
- "possession" requires `furtherance` ("in furtherance of")
- Properly handles predicate offenses:
- Enumerated drug felonies under § 924(c)(2).
- Crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause.
- Recognizes *United States v. Davis* (588 U.S. 2319), which held the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague.
- Exemplary separation of sentencing consequences: Mandatory minimums (5-year base, 7-year brandish, 10-year discharge, 30-year machinegun/silencer, 25-year repeat) and consecutive sentencing are modeled under `element penalty : or` as post-conviction consequences, rather than improperly treated as elements of the underlying offense.
#### Judge-made elements
- `use`: Expressly integrates *Bailey v. United States* (active employment standard) and *Watson v. United States* (receiving a gun in trade for drugs is not "use").
- `carry`: Integrates *Muscarello v. United States* (vehicular conveyance).
- `furtherance`: Details the *Ceballos-Torres* nonexclusive factors (accessibility, loaded condition, proximity) and notes that mere presence does not establish furtherance.
- `accomplice`: Integrates *Rosemond v. United States* (active participation with advance knowledge that a confederate would carry/use a gun).
- `penalty.consecutive`: Notes *Barrett* (January 2026) holding precluding cumulative convictions under (c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for the same act.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — Bailey v. United States**, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), element `use` (@12290..12429):
> "We conclude that the language, context, and history of § 924(c)(1) indicate that the Government must show active employment of the firearm."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the active-employment requirement for the "use" prong.*
2. **PASS — Muscarello v. United States**, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), element `carry` (@444..621):
> "it also applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies."
*Supreme Court holding directly supports the vehicular conveyance construction of "carry".*
3. **PASS — United States v. Ceballos-Torres**, 218 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000), element `furtherance` (@15344..15461):
> "Thus, firearm possession that furthers, advances, or helps forward the drug trafficking offense violates the statute."
*Seminal circuit holding directly defining and establishing the "in furtherance of" standard.*
Official text: [18 U.S.C. § 924](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section924&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j — Manipulative & deceptive devices; Rule 10b-5 — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Properly models § 78j(b) and implementing Rule 10b-5 across three distinct enforcement postures:
1. `private-misstatement`: Private investor Rule 10b-5(b) damages action, requiring purchaser/seller standing, reliance, actual economic loss, and loss causation.
2. `sec-core-fraud`: SEC civil enforcement action, requiring a preponderance of the evidence, and explicitly excluding private reliance and economic loss.
3. `criminal-core-fraud`: Criminal prosecution via 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), adding proof of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Pinned quote for `rule10b5` is carefully selected from subsection (b) (@959..1037), avoiding confusing repetition with short sales in (a) or securities lending in (c).
- Integrates the PSLRA's statutory loss-causation allocation (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)) and separates PSLRA/Rule 9(b) pleading rules into a `constraint` (*Metzler* / *Tellabs*).
#### Judge-made elements
- `statement`: Labeled as judicial attribution doctrine under *Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders* (maker must have ultimate authority), and notes *Macquarie* (2024) limiting pure omissions under Rule 10b-5(b).
- `scheme`: Incorporates *Lorenzo v. SEC* scheme liability for non-makers under Rule 10b-5(a)/(c), and *Chestman* fiduciary misappropriation.
- `scienter`: Explicitly identifies the required mental state (intent to deceive or severe recklessness) as judicial doctrine.
- `reliance`: Separates direct reliance from the *Basic* fraud-on-the-market rebuttable presumption.
- `loss-causation`: Explicitly incorporates *Dura Pharmaceuticals*, explaining that purchase at an inflated price alone does not establish loss causation.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders**, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), element `statement` (@7684..7865):
> "For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the "maker" rule for Rule 10b-5(b) liability.*
2. **PASS — Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo**, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), element `loss-causation` (@8927..9017):
> "To “touch upon” a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires."
*Supreme Court holding directly establishes the loss-causation standard in private securities fraud actions.*
3. **PASS — United States v. Afriyie**, 929 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2019), element `willfulness` (@9094..9480):
> "If the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the defendant engaged in an insider trading scheme, it must then prove that the defendant engaged in that scheme knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud MSD Capital .... It is for you to determine whether the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt such knowledge and intent on the part of the defendant."
*Directly supports the heightened mental state and criminal willfulness requirement under § 78ff(a).*
Official text: [15 U.S.C. § 78j](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section78j&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 — ADEA core framework — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Anchored in 29 U.S.C. § 623 with comprehensive cross-sectional coverage across the ADEA.
- Models seven distinct statutory causes of action:
- `disparate-treatment` (§ 623(a)(1))
- `disparate-impact` (§ 623(a)(2))
- `wage-reduction` (§ 623(a)(3))
- `agency-discrimination` (§ 623(b))
- `union-discrimination` (§ 623(c))
- `retaliation` (§ 623(d))
- `age-advertising` (§ 623(e))
- Models all statutory exceptions and affirmative defenses:
- Bona fide occupational qualification (`bfoq`, § 623(f)(1))
- Reasonable factors other than age (`rfoa`, § 623(f)(1))
- Foreign workplace law conflict (`foreign-law`, § 623(f)(1))
- Bona fide employee benefit plan / seniority (`benefit-plan`, § 623(f)(2))
- Discipline for good cause (`good-cause`, § 623(f)(3))
- Properly references § 630 employer/agency/union coverage thresholds, § 631 age 40 floor, and § 626 enforcement/charge-filing procedures.
#### Judge-made elements
- `age-causation`: Explicitly captures the strict but-for causation standard mandated by *Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.* (557 U.S. 167), noting that Title VII motivating-factor burden shifting does not apply under the ADEA.
- `rfoa`: Accurately models the *Smith v. City of Jackson* / *Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab.* framework placing the burden of persuasion on the employer, while distinguishing reasonableness from Title VII business necessity.
- `impact-applicant-limit`: Incorporates the Seventh Circuit's en banc *Kleber* rule holding that § 623(a)(2) disparate impact protects current employees, not outside job applicants.
- `retaliatory-adversity`: Incorporates the *Burlington Northern* material adversity standard (*Davis-Garett*).
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.**, 984 F.3d 1199 (6th Cir. 2021), element `age-causation` (@8471..9075):
> "An employee who alleges that her employer violated this prohibition "must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged employer decision." Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. , 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). In other words, an employee cannot prevail on an age discrimination claim by showing that age was one of multiple motives for an employer's decision; the employee must prove that the employer would not have fired her in the absence of age discrimination. Id. at 177, 129 S.Ct. 2343."
*Directly supports the Gross but-for causation requirement for ADEA disparate treatment.*
2. **PASS — O’Brien v. Caterpillar Inc.**, 900 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2018), defense `rfoa` (@19946..20847):
> "The plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, but Caterpillar raises an affirmative defense that its liquidation plan is based on a reasonable factor other than age. To prevail Caterpillar must show that its less favorable treatment of retirement-eligible employees was "reasonably designed to further or achieve a legitimate business purpose and administered in a way that reasonably achieves that purpose in light of the particular facts and circumstances that were known, or should have been known, to the employer." ... "Unlike the [Title VII] business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement." Smith , 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536."
*Directly establishes the RFOA affirmative defense and its distinction from Title VII business necessity.*
3. **PASS — Kleber v. CareFusion Corp.**, 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019) (en banc), exception `impact-applicant-limit` (@2643..2746):
> "By its terms, § 4(a)(2) proscribes certain conduct by employers and limits its protection to employees."
*En banc holding directly establishes the employee-only limitation for § 4(a)(2) disparate-impact claims.*
Official text: [29 U.S.C. § 623](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title29-section623&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) — False association and false advertising under subsection (a) — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Explicitly scoped to Lanham Act § 43(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), noting in the header and notes that dilution (§ 1125(c)) and cybersquatting (§ 1125(d)) are separate subsections outside this catalogue.
- Disaggregates § 1125(a) into four well-defined claims:
- `mark-infringement`: Unregistered trademark infringement under § 1125(a)(1)(A).
- `false-association`: False sponsorship/endorsement under § 1125(a)(1)(A).
- `unregistered-trade-dress`: Trade dress under § 1125(a)(3), incorporating the statutory nonfunctionality burden.
- `false-advertising`: Commercial misrepresentation under § 1125(a)(1)(B).
- Captures statutory nonfunctionality (§ 1125(a)(3)), classic descriptive fair use (§ 1115(b)(4)), and statutory remedial references (§§ 1116–1118).
#### Judge-made elements
- `nonfunctional-dress`: Incorporates the *Qualitex* utilitarian test and *TrafFix* competitive necessity test (*Bodum*).
- `commercial-injury` & `proximate-cause`: Incorporates *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.* (572 U.S. 118), setting the zone-of-interests (commercial injury to sales or reputation) and proximate-cause standards, while explicitly rejecting direct competition as a mandatory element.
- `false-association`: Incorporates *Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, restricting origin-of-goods claims to producers of tangible goods rather than originators of uncopyrighted ideas.
- `likely-confusion`: Notes that multi-factor circuit confusion tests (such as Ninth Circuit *Sleekcraft*) are flexible guidelines rather than rigid statutory mandates.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — VersaTop Support Sys., LLC v. Georgia Expo, Inc.**, 921 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 2019), element `likely-confusion` (@18544..19034):
> "These factors, as summarized in Au-Tomotive Gold , are "(1) strength of the mark(s); (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels; (6) degree of consumer care; (7) defendant's intent; (8) likelihood of expansion." 457 F.3d at 1075-76. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that "the eight factors [ Sleekcraft ] recited are not exhaustive," and should be applied "in a flexible manner." Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145."
*Directly provides the controlling multi-factor likelihood-of-confusion framework.*
2. **PASS — Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.**, 572 U.S. 118 (2014), element `commercial-injury` (@19861..20047):
> "We thus hold that to come within the zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the zone-of-interests standing threshold for false advertising.*
3. **PASS — Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.**, 572 U.S. 118 (2014), element `proximate-cause` (@24018..24297):
> "We thus hold that a plaintiff suing under § 1125(a) ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant's advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the direct-flow proximate-causation standard.*
Official text: [15 U.S.C. § 1125](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section1125&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — Equal rights under the law — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Covers the full span of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (b), and (c).
- Defines three distinct claims:
- `private-contract-discrimination`: Direct action against private actors under § 1981(a)–(c).
- `state-contract-discrimination`: State-actor discrimination enforced exclusively through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- `retaliation`: Retaliation for opposing racial discrimination in contracting.
- Reflects the 1991 Civil Rights Act definition of "make and enforce contracts" (§ 1981(b)) covering formation, performance, modification, and termination, superseding *Patterson*.
- Captures the two-tier statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 and *Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.* (four-year federal catch-all for post-1991 claims vs. borrowed state personal injury statute for pre-1991 claims).
#### Judge-made elements
- `own-contract`: Incorporates *Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald* (546 U.S. 470), requiring plaintiff to have actual or proposed rights under the contract, precluding derivative claims by shareholders or agents.
- `but-for-causation`: Explicitly captures the *Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African American-Owned Media* (589 U.S. 327) rule requiring but-for causation at both pleading and trial, rejecting Title VII mixed-motive standards.
- `state-remedial-route`: Captures *Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.* (491 U.S. 701) and circuit precedent (*Boxill*, *Ridgell*) establishing that § 1981 provides no independent private cause of action against state actors and must be brought via § 1983.
- `protected-activity`: Captures *CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries* (553 U.S. 442) recognizing retaliation under § 1981, noting that the term "retaliation" is non-textual.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald**, 546 U.S. 470 (2006), element `own-contract` (@6665..7639):
> "Any claim brought under § 1981, therefore, must initially identify an impaired “contractual relationship,” § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has rights. Such a contractual relationship need not already exist, because § 1981 protects the would-be contractor along with those who already have made contracts. ... Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship."
*Supreme Court holding establishes the threshold contractual-rights requirement.*
2. **PASS — Boxill v. O’Grady**, 935 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2019), element `state-remedial-route` (@13207..13654):
> "The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.")."
*Directly supports the exclusive § 1983 remedial vehicle for state-actor violations of § 1981.*
3. **PASS — CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries**, 553 U.S. 442 (2008), element `protected-activity` (@25226..25305):
> "We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation."
*Direct holding establishing that § 1981 prohibits retaliation.*
Official text: [42 U.S.C. § 1981](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title42-section1981&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 9. 21 U.S.C. § 846 — CSA attempt and conspiracy — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
The catalogue maps the entirety of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (394 characters in enacted text).
- Properly models both statutory offenses:
- `846-conspiracy : object-offense & agreement & knowledge & intentional-joinder`
- `846-attempt : object-offense & attempt-intent & substantial-step`
- Accurately models penalty incorporation (`penalty : and`) under the 1988 statutory formula ("same penalties as those prescribed for the offense..."), treating penalties as consequences rather than elements of the base offenses.
- Differentiates Subchapter I controlled substance offenses (§ 841) from import/export offenses under Subchapter II (21 U.S.C. § 963).
#### Judge-made elements
- `agreement`: Incorporates the landmark unanimous holding in *United States v. Shabani* (513 U.S. 10), which ruled that § 846 conspiracy does **not** require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (unlike 18 U.S.C. § 371). Explicitly marked with `not-required Overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (Shabani)`.
- `constraint genuine-common-agreement`: Incorporates the rule that a conspiracy requires agreement between two or more genuine co-conspirators; dealing solely with a government agent or informant cannot constitute a conspiracy (*Leal*, 921 F.3d 951).
- `attempt-intent` & `substantial-step`: Formulates the two-pronged attempt doctrine from seminal case law (*Joyce*, *Oviedo*), requiring specific intent to commit the substantive offense and conduct constituting a substantial step strongly corroborating that intent.
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — United States v. Shabani**, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), element `agreement` (@8339..8491):
> "In order to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy."
*Unanimous Supreme Court holding eliminating the overt-act requirement for § 846 drug conspiracies.*
2. **PASS — United States v. Buchanan**, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019), element `knowledge` (@20686..20872):
> "The elements of a drug distribution conspiracy are "(1) an agreement to violate drug laws ... ; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.""
*Directly supports the knowledge and joinder elements of drug distribution conspiracy.*
3. **PASS — United States v. Oviedo**, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976), element `substantial-step` (@11448..11647):
> "In making that determination, we recognized that in order to be guilty of an attempt, the objective conduct of the defendant must strongly corroborate the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent."
*Leading circuit decision establishing the objective substantial-step standard for criminal attempt.*
Official text: [21 U.S.C. § 846](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title21-section846&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
### 10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) — Employer unfair labor practices — NLRA § 8(a) — **PASS**
#### Statutory completeness and doctrinal architecture
Properly scoped in title, cite, and header to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (NLRA § 8(a)).
- Exhaustively models all five subsections of § 8(a) as distinct claims:
- `a1-interference` (§ 8(a)(1) interference, restraint, or coercion)
- `a2-domination-support` (§ 8(a)(2) employer domination/assistance of labor organizations)
- `a3-discrimination` (§ 8(a)(3) discrimination in hire/tenure to encourage/discourage union membership)
- `a4-retaliation` (§ 8(a)(4) discrimination for filing charges or giving testimony)
- `a5-refusal` (§ 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain collectively)
- Captures statutory provisos and exceptions:
- § 8(c) noncoercive employer speech protection (`protected-speech`)
- § 8(a)(2) working-hours conference proviso (`working-hours-conference`)
- § 8(a)(3) conditional union-security proviso (`lawful-union-security`)
- § 8(d) good-faith bargaining definition and concession disclaimer (`refusal-to-bargain.good-faith`)
#### Judge-made elements
- `same-decision`: Incorporates the *Wright Line* / *NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.* dual-motive burden-shifting affirmative defense (*Tschiggfrie*, 916 F.3d 1095).
- `protected-speech`: Incorporates the *NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.* standard distinguishing objective predictions of economic consequence from employer threats of reprisal (*Hendrickson*, 932 F.3d 465).
- `defense special-circumstances`: Incorporates the *In-N-Out* (894 F.3d 707) doctrine permitting narrow employer restrictions on union insignia based on documented safety or public-image justifications.
- `constraint derivative`: Accurately codifies the well-established doctrine that an employer violation of § 8(a)(5) derivatively violates § 8(a)(1) (*Carey Salt*).
#### Opened interpretive case anchors
1. **PASS — Bozzuto’s, Inc. v. NLRB**, 927 F.3d 672 (2d Cir. 2019), element `interference` (@30972..31185):
> "An employer's questioning of an employee will, however, amount to a violation of § 8(a)(1) if "either the words themselves or the context in which they are used ... suggest an element of coercion or interference.""
*Directly supports the context-dependent coercion standard for § 8(a)(1) employer interrogation.*
2. **PASS — Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd. v. NLRB**, 916 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2019), elements `employment-discrimination` and defense `same-decision` (@8519..8646, @9569..9753):
> "An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by suspending or discharging an employee for engaging in protected union activity." ... "Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden [of persuasion] shifts to the company to show that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the unlawful motive."
*Directly supports the Wright Line dual-motive framework under § 8(a)(3).*
3. **PASS — Carey Salt Co. v. NLRB**, 930 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2019), element `refusal-to-bargain` (@6846..7079):
> "It is therefore "an infringement of the Act for the employer to disregard the bargaining representative by negotiating with individual employees, whether a majority or a minority, with respect to wages, hours and working conditions.""
*Directly establishes direct dealing as a per-se refusal to bargain under § 8(a)(5).*
Official text: [29 U.S.C. § 158](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title29-section158&num=0&edition=prelim).
---
## Cross-cutting observations on LAW DSL Wave-2 evolution
1. **Resolution of Wave-1 Structural Deficiencies:**
Wave 2 directly addresses the methodological vulnerabilities identified during the Wave-1 review ([`neov2/qa/law-QA2.md`](file:///home/mma/repos/neochart/neov2/qa/law-QA2.md)). In Wave 1, broad multi-section acts were frequently over-claimed in headers (e.g., claiming all of § 841 or § 1983 while omitting major subsections or conflating civil and criminal claims). In Wave 2, every catalogue dealing with an expansive statutory code explicitly bounds its scope in both the `cite` and `title` fields:
- `18usc922` explicitly targets `18 U.S.C. § 922(g)`.
- `18usc924` explicitly targets `18 U.S.C. § 924(c)`.
- `15usc1125` explicitly targets `15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)`.
- `29usc158` explicitly targets `29 U.S.C. § 158(a)`.
- `29usc623` clearly designates its scope as the `Age Discrimination in Employment Act core framework` with cross-sectional references.
2. **Clean Demarcation of Statutory Elements vs. Sentencing Consequences:**
Unlike early attempts that attempted to force mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements into the base offense claims, Wave 2 catalogues (notably § 924(c) and § 846) model sentencing consequences under `element penalty : or` / `element penalty : and`. This correctly treats sentencing factors as consequences triggered upon conviction rather than mandatory conjuncts of the primary liability claims.
3. **Disaggregation of Regulatory, Civil, and Criminal Claims:**
In statutes where enforcement remedies diverge significantly—most prominently Exchange Act § 10(b) / Rule 10b-5 (`15usc78j`)—Wave 2 appropriately creates distinct claim definitions (`private-misstatement`, `sec-core-fraud`, `criminal-core-fraud`). Non-statutory private requirements (such as *Basic* reliance and *Dura* loss causation) are strictly confined to private claims, preventing improper exportation to SEC civil enforcement or criminal prosecutions.
4. **100% Quote Offset and Anchor Accuracy:**
Across all 10 catalogues, all 151 statutory quote spans and all 106 case-rule spans check cleanly with zero errors. All 30 opened case anchors represent on-point, majority doctrinal holdings from controlling or leading authorities.