Source: law/NOTES-21usc846.md
# Research notes — 21 U.S.C. § 846 Scope: separate attempt and conspiracy offenses for objects defined in Subchapter I, plus statutory incorporation of object-offense penalties. Research date: 2026-11-10. The header pins the complete 394-character canonical statute; source text is unchanged. `cited_by()["21 U.S.C. § 846"]` seeded relevant selection of Potter, Leal and Buchanan. The list contains only 50 recent entries; it is not a complete list of controlling opinions. Reporter IR retrieval supplied Shabani and the two actual drug-attempt decisions Joyce/Oviedo. All quoted passages are majority doctrinal analysis, not parties' contentions or case-citation tokens. ## Per-opinion research Read windows are end-exclusive Python character ranges in `load_case(path)["text"]`. They identify substantive paragraphs actually read, not a claim to full-opinion coverage. - **United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13-17 (1994)** — [/us/513/0010-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_513/0010_01/index.html); read @0..1700; 3340..4940; 8100..8700; 11000..12800. Neither statutory version requires an overt act. Agreement itself is the actus reus; reverses Ninth Circuit rule demanding an act. No-overt-act rule is limited to conspiracy, not attempt. - **United States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2019), part II.3** — [/f3d/927/0446-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_927/0446_01/index.html); read @17700..24200. Reconciles two/three-element formulations: agreement, knowledge and voluntary joinder. Participation is joinder rather than an overt act. Distribution-scale repeat purchases, coordinated purchases and funding supported conviction beyond buyer-seller relationship. - **United States v. Leal, 921 F.3d 951 (10th Cir. 2019), parts II.B-C and III** — [/f3d/921/0951-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_921/0951_01/index.html); read @9000..13900; 23900..27600; 29300..31300. Four-part circuit test includes interdependence. Government informant is not a coconspirator; common method/overlapping actors alone did not show one common conspiracy. Affirms denial of successive-conspiracy double-jeopardy dismissal. - **United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019), part II.A** — [/f3d/933/0501-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_933/0501_01/index.html); read @20300..21700; 22300..24300. Separates conspiracy agreement, knowledge/intent and participation from substantive possession elements. Phone coordination and mail-shipping arrangements corroborated the conspiracy; expert-instruction error did not warrant reversal on plain-error review. Not counted merely for sentencing discussion. - **United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1982)** — [/f2d/693/0838-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f2d/volume_693/0838_01/index.html); read @5000..9000. Adopts intent plus strongly corroborative substantial step for attempted possession with intent to distribute. Reverses where defendant refused to show money or purchase before a sufficient step; do not convert this record-specific result into universal abandonment immunity. - **United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1976)** — [/f2d/525/0881-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f2d/volume_525/0881_01/index.html); read @7500..13300. Reverses attempted heroin distribution where delivered substance was procaine and objective acts were equivocal under circuit test. Distinguishes Mandujano: accepting money and setting out to obtain heroin strongly corroborated intent there. The case is not a categorical holding that factual impossibility always defeats attempt. ## Statute versus judicial definition The statute names attempts/conspiracies, limits the object to this subchapter, and incorporates the object offense's penalties. It does not enumerate agreement, knowledge, intentional joinder, intent or substantial step. Those definitions are judicial interpretation anchored in the cases above. The repeated short statutory hooks attempts/conspires are unavoidable for this short statute; the rule quotes supply complete legal propositions. Conspiracy requires more than an agreement about a drug transaction in the abstract: defendant must know the unlawful objective and choose to join it. Potter explains that participation cannot mean an additional overt act, consistently with Shabani. Mere presence, association, knowledge alone, or a bare buyer-seller transaction does not automatically establish the required joinder. The rule is proof beyond reasonable doubt, not a reduced burden based on Potter's quoted slight-connection phrase. Leal's interdependence requirement is labeled Tenth Circuit law. It informs whether there is a genuine common agreement; the catalogue does not silently impose a fourth national element. An informant alone cannot supply the agreement partner, but use of an informant does not defeat a conspiracy among genuine participants. Attempt requires both culpable purpose directed at the object offense and corroborating conduct beyond preparation. Shabani's no-overt-act holding cannot be imported into this branch. Joyce and Oviedo have fact-sensitive and circuit-specific applications; no general impossibility defense or post-attempt withdrawal defense is inferred from them. Penalty incorporation is not an extra offense element. The selected object, quantity findings, applicable penalty law and defendant-specific attribution remain necessary to a penalty analysis. The catalogue does not claim that every conspiracy member automatically receives every quantity or enhancement applicable to another member. Round 5 adds the combined withdrawal/limitations defense below; all object-offense variants and other limitations/tolling issues remain beyond this bounded element catalogue. ## Rejected weak authority The previous draft cited McCloud only for the string 846 and 841 and omitted defined agreement/intent blocks. That is not a legal rule. Rodriguez-Soriano was screened and concerns corroboration of a firearms false-statement confession; Martin addresses sentence reductions. Neither substitutes for direct section 846 interpretation. O'Brien was screened for drug knowledge but the selected six more directly resolve this file's elements. ## Official primary checks - [Shabani, official United States Reports](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-513/pdf/USREPORTS-513-10.pdf), pp. 13-17: confirms the no-overt-act holding and common-law agreement rationale; the local IR rule quote is independently offset-verified. - [2024 official section 846](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title21/html/USCODE-2024-title21-chap13-subchapI-partD-sec846.htm): same operative sentence; amendment note confirms that the 1988 amendment changed maximum-only punishment to the same penalties as the object offense. Older attempt cases define attempt, but their historical penalty text is not used as current statutory text. These bounded checks do not purport to be a full citator for every circuit-specific sufficiency rule or penalty issue. ## Verification `python3 neov2/tools/lawdsl.py check neov2/law/21usc846.law` verifies seven statutory slices and seven substantive case slices. Independent claim-symbol resolution checks every expression identifier. QA2 review remains separate from author verification. ## Round 5 substantive re-audit (2026-11-10) The base conspiracy and attempt branches contain their distinct elements. Shabani's no-overt-act rule remains limited to conspiracy; Joyce/Oviedo's substantial-step requirement remains on attempt. Leal's genuine-conspirator/interdependence constraint is expressly circuit-qualified, not an additional national fourth element. Potter and Buchanan correctly support knowledge and voluntary joinder. No wrong-case rule pin was found in these seven original anchors. The conspiracy claim now explicitly labels its enumerated elements as judicial construction of the enacted word conspires. A concrete omitted defense is now operative: `withdrawal-limitations`, attached only to the conspiracy claim. **Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110-14 (2013)** (`/us/568/0106-01`, read @0..3700 and @4300..12400) addresses section 846 directly. Withdrawal does not undo the completed agreement. When established before the applicable limitations window, however, it bars prosecution; mere inactivity is insufficient. The defendant bears withdrawal by a preponderance, while the government retains the obligation to prove a timely continuing conspiracy when limitations is raised. These distinct burdens are not collapsed into a government obligation to disprove every defense. - [Smith, official United States Reports](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-568/pdf/USREPORTS-568-106.pdf): verifies the withdrawal, continued membership, and limitations holdings. Exact local majority anchors are @6767..6977 and @4417..4556, not the introductory jury-charge quotation. - [Section 846, official 2024 Code](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title21/html/USCODE-2024-title21-chap13-subchapI-partD-sec846.htm): confirms both inchoate routes and object-penalty incorporation; the statute itself contains no express overt-act requirement or newly invented withdrawal proviso. Known limits: section 846 incorporates an identified Subchapter I offense; this file does not reproduce every object's authorization/exception or all quantity/enhancement attribution rules. Smith does not create universal post-attempt abandonment immunity. Ordinary limitations defenses other than the modeled withdrawal combination, conspiracy termination, tolling, waiver, entrapment, and every circuit's buyer-seller/sufficiency test are not exhaustively modeled. No new claim of complete defense coverage is made. Verification: 8 statutory spans, 9 substantive rule spans, zero errors; all seven original IDs retained, one defense added; all 19 blocks in 10 CASE files resolve. The original verification paragraph's seven/seven counts describe the pre-round-5 record; these are the updated counts.