Source: law/NOTES-18usc922.md
# Research notes — 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Scope: all statutory (g) status alternatives; possession is the researched core. Shipping/transport and receipt are separate textual branches, with the different commerce wording preserved. No other section 922 offense is catalogued. Research date: 2026-11-10. The canonical statute is pinned by SHA-1 in the LAW header. All text/rule fields are exact local IR slices; editorial oddities and PDF hyphenation remain intact. Local index `cited_by()["18 U.S.C. § 922"]` seeded selection; its 50 entries are a truncated recent list. Hayes was retrieved by its reporter IR record as additional controlling authority. ## Opinion reading record Windows are Python character intervals, end-exclusive, in `load_case(path)["text"]`; pins refer to the stated opinion section/page. They record actual doctrinal reading rather than claiming entire opinions were read. - **United States v. Watson, 142 F.4th 872 (6th Cir. 2025), opinion p. 12** — [/f4th/142/872](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/872/index.html); read @25900..28600. Enumerates felony status, knowledge of status, knowing possession and interstate movement; stipulations waived sufficiency challenge. Anchor supplies actual elements, not a citation token. - **United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025), opinion pp. 24-26** — [/f4th/143/169](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f4th/volume_143/169/index.html); read @39000..42000. Finds plea colloquy expressly required knowledge of felony status as well as possession; valid waiver. Corroborates Rehaif rather than imposing knowledge of the firearms ban. - **United States v. Gilliam, 934 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2019), part II.A** — [/f3d/934/0854-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_934/0854_01/index.html); read @6500..11000. Possession may be actual or constructive; abandoning control to another person broke continuous possession. Two possession counts affirmed; merely having owned the gun did not establish continued dominion. - **United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2019), part II(c)** — [/f3d/935/0838-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_935/0838_01/index.html); read @6800..10100; 11600..13400. Mandatory Washington sentencing ranges capped each predicate at one year; conviction vacated and indictment ordered dismissed. Maximum statutory label alone was insufficient under that circuit precedent. - **United States v. Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270 (11th Cir. 2025), part II.C, opinion pp. 25-27** — [/f4th/142/1270](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/1270/index.html); read @41200..44000. Addresses Commerce Clause merits separately from ACCA issues: out-of-state manufacture established minimal nexus. Do not import ACCA predicates into the basic possession claim. - **United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418, 421-26 (2009)** — [/us/555/0415-01](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_555/0415_01/index.html); read @0..900; 3400..7400. Domestic relationship must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in section 922(g)(9), but need not be an element of the predicate misdemeanor. Section 921(a)(33) supplies the defining force and relationship requirements. - **United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (June 18, 2026), majority pp. 7, 18-19** — [/cl/10876933](https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/clus/volume_cl/10876933/index.html); read @22800..24900; 46000..49500. Rejects prosecution based only on regular marijuana use under the government historical-analogy argument. Majority expressly reserves addicts, current intoxication and individualized dangerousness theories; Thomas Commerce Clause concurrence is not the holding. ## Statutory / interpretive boundary - Statutory: nine status categories (with two alien alternatives), firearm/ammunition object, possession/shipment/receipt and distinct commerce wording; protection-order prerequisites are conjunctive except for the two (C) alternatives. Section 921 definitions and conviction exclusions remain cross-references. The nonimmigrant-visa exception is incorporated in that status branch and cannot defeat an independent status. - Interpretive: actual versus constructive control, meaning of punishable imprisonment under a mandatory state regime, minimal commerce nexus, and Rehaif knowledge allocation. Rehaif does not make prohibited status itself judge-made: the statuses are enacted text. - Knowledge of status and knowing possession are separate elements. Rehaif left the precise proof for other statuses unresolved; a blanket claim that the defendant need not know his status would invert the holding. Knowledge of the federal ban and knowledge of interstate movement are different issues. - Hemani is an as-applied constitutional defense, not an additional enacted dangerousness element. Other constitutional challenges and fact-specific justification defenses are not exhaustively catalogued. - Rejected prior snippets: Romero (935 F.3d 1124), Lowry (935 F.3d 638), and Adams (934 F.3d 720) address suppression; those citation appearances did not support the substantive element statements. Gammell primarily concerns ACCA sentencing. They are not counted in the seven substantive readings. ## Official primary-source checks - [Rehaif, official opinion](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-9560_e2p3.pdf), pp. 1, 4-5, 11: knowledge attaches to possession and relevant status, not the jurisdictional commerce requirement; the Court reserves precise knowledge proof for other categories. The corpus has no 588 U.S. IR volume, so the local rule quotes use Watson and Thompson instead of fabricating an IR pointer. - [Rahimi, official opinion](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf), pp. 8-17: credible-threat finding supports temporary disarmament; the facial challenge fails on the circumstances before the Court. This does not establish every possible application of every (g) category. - [Hemani, official opinion](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1234_new_6k47.pdf), pp. 18-19: confirms the local majority limitation and reservations. Do not treat concurrences as additional holdings. - [2024 official section 924](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap44-sec924.htm), (a)(8) and 2022 amendment note: knowing section 922(g) violations now carry a fifteen-year maximum. Rehaif construed the earlier ten-year (a)(2) provision; the canonical local section 924 already contains the 2022 amendment. - [2024 official section 922](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap44-sec922.htm): confirms the (g)(1)-(9) enumeration. These primary checks are bounded currency checks, not a full citator or every circuit's constitutional doctrine. ## Verification `python3 neov2/tools/lawdsl.py check neov2/law/18usc922.law` and the independent claim-symbol check must both pass before handoff. QA2 remains independent; author does not self-approve. ## Round 5 substantive repair (2026-11-10) QA2 correctly identified the omitted government-use exemption and unexpanded status terms, but its mental-definition citation is wrong: **section 921(a)(4) defines destructive device**. It supplies no mental-adjudication or commitment definition. The new `status.g4.adjudication` and `status.g4.commitment` nodes retain section 922(g)(4) text hooks and identify **27 C.F.R. § 478.11** as the regulatory source. The alternatives are disjunctive; neither a diagnosis nor voluntary admission/observation alone establishes these regulatory categories. Regulations and judge-made construction are labeled separately from enacted text. Every possession/shipment/receipt formula now uses `(status.g9 | (status & !government-use))`. This exempts covered g(1)-(8) conduct while preserving a fully proved independent g(9) prosecution, including when the defendant also has another status. Section 925(a)(1) also expressly preserves section 922(d)(9) and provisions relating to prohibited section 922(p) firearms. Government employment alone does not establish the object-specific exemption. The companion provision is an `xref`, because this corpus does not contain a section 925 IR record; no offset is fabricated. The section 922(g) quote is explicitly the hook, not the exemption's source. The fugitive definition now gives section 921(a)(15)'s flight-from-a-State and avoidance-purpose requirements. The protection-order restraint node gives all section 921(a)(32) intimate-partner alternatives; the separate domestic-misdemeanor dating-relationship definition is not imported into it. `status.g3` now has distinct user/addiction alternatives. **United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2001)**, `/f3d/264/0809-01`, was read at @5600..8700; the majority's conclusion at @8170..8434 requires regular use over an extended period contemporaneous with purchase/possession. It is labeled Ninth Circuit construction, not a nationally fixed time interval or Hemani's constitutional rule. The original IR OCR `con-vietion` is preserved verbatim. The regulatory current-use definition is an xref and its examples do not become conclusive criminal presumptions. Hemani still does not excuse an independently established different status. The actual CASE catalogue also exposed an omitted controlling construction: **Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387-94 (2005)**, `/us/544/0385-01`, read @0..1700, excludes foreign convictions from g(1)'s any-court language. Its majority rule at @492..568 now qualifies `status.g1`, separately labeled judicial construction. Existing McAdory and Hayes pins remain attached to their proper issues; Thompson remains a plea-colloquy corroboration, not a newly invented freestanding holding. Official primary checks: - [Section 925(a)(1), official 2024 Code](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap44-sec925.htm): government-use objects/conduct and exclusions; the 922(p)-related sunset is listed for 2031, not assumed already operative. - [Section 921, official 2024 Code](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap44-sec921.htm): (a)(15), (32), and the actual destructive-device definition in (a)(4). - [27 C.F.R. § 478.11, official 2025 edition](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2025-title27-vol3/pdf/CFR-2025-title27-vol3-sec478-11.pdf), printed pp. 21-22, 32: adjudication, commitment, and unlawful-user/addict definitions. Live eCFR returned an access block; this dated official publication is the verified source, not a claim to a live regulatory citator. - [United States v. Stennerson, official Ninth Circuit opinion](https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/09/23-1439.pdf), pp. 17-19: directly discusses Purdy's regularity and temporal formulations. Used only to corroborate statutory/vagueness construction, not to override subsequent Hemani constitutional analysis. - [Small, official United States Reports](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-544/pdf/USREPORTS-544-385.pdf): confirms domestic-only construction. Known limits: this remains a section 922(g) catalogue, not all of section 922. Section 925(a)(2)'s legacy military-program transactions and individualized relief under section 925(c)/NICS relief statutes are not independently decomposed. Conviction relief in sections 921(a)(20)/(33), visa exceptions/waiver, and firearm/antique definitions remain substantive xrefs rather than separate fully enumerated trees; dating-relationship restoration and relief effective dates require their companion provisions. These are retained cross-section limits, not reasons to declare every possible exemption modeled. No nationwide mental-health commitment case survey or comprehensive post-Hemani citator was performed. Verification: 30 statutory spans and 9 rule spans pass. All 24 previous IDs remain; five compatible nodes added. All 45 blocks in 15 existing CASE files resolve. The government-use Boolean branch was evaluated for all six coherent status/g9/exemption combinations, including concurrent g9 plus another status.