Source: law/42usc1983.law
# 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Civil action for deprivation of rights
# Reverse-engineered from verbatim statutory text + citing cases in statute_cited_by.json & neov2/cases/42usc1983/
law 42usc1983
cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983
title Civil action for deprivation of rights
url https://www.neochart.com/catalog/federal/civil_rights/title_42/chapter_21/section_1983/title42_sec1983_3595ea1c3dc2/1983_civil_action_for_deprivation_of_rights_every_person_who_0001/index.html
address catalog/federal/civil_rights/title_42/chapter_21/section_1983/title42_sec1983_3595ea1c3dc2/1983_civil_action_for_deprivation_of_rights_every_person_who_0001/index.html
source ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983 sha1=0fdfc0864057247c142108d9b5b325bc9bb77dcf chars=1067
claim individual-damages : person & color-of-law & deprivation & causation & damages & !qualified-immunity & !x-absolute-immunity & !x-eleventh-amendment & !x-habeas-exhaustion & !statute-of-limitations & !x-collateral-estoppel
gloss Personal-capacity damages suit against a state or local official (Hafer v. Melo). Subject to qualified or absolute common-law immunities.
claim individual-injunctive : person & color-of-law & deprivation & causation & standing-injury & !judicial-officer-injunctive-relief & !x-habeas-exhaustion & !statute-of-limitations
gloss Prospective injunctive/declaratory suit against an official (Ex parte Young / Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police fn. 10). Article III injury and causation establish standing; proof of compensatory damages is not required. The statutory judicial-officer bar remains applicable.
claim municipal : person & color-of-law & deprivation & policy & causation & damages & !statute-of-limitations & !x-collateral-estoppel
gloss Local-government liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services (436 U.S. 658 (1978)): no respondeat superior; municipal policy or custom must be the moving force behind an underlying constitutional violation. Municipalities may not assert qualified immunity.
constraint state-action-convergence(color-of-law, deprivation) : In Fourteenth Amendment claims, the statutory "under color of" state law requirement and the constitutional "state action" requirement converge.
rule /us/502/0021-01 @10623..10820 | Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.
rule /us/526/0040-01 @9774..9977 | Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”
constraint municipal-non-bootstrap(policy, deprivation) : Municipal responsibility (Monell policy/custom, including Canton deliberate indifference) and the underlying constitutional deprivation are separate inquiries; satisfying policy cannot supply the constitutional violation.
rule /us/503/0115-01 @8208..8382 | The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @40372..40551 | It is well established that a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the acts of an employee where the municipal employee committed no constitutional violation.
element person : and
name Suable "person" (natural person in individual capacity, official in official capacity for prospective relief, or municipality; excludes States)
text @46..62 | Every person who
rule /us/502/0021-01 @7140..7341 | the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.
rule /us/502/0021-01 @7778..7984 | By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term “person.”
rule /us/502/0021-01 @2191..2437 | As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.
rule /us/503/0115-01 @5492..5650 | In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.
variant municipality/city | Local government / municipal corporation sued as a "person" under Monell (Collins)
variant state-official/personal-capacity-for-official-acts | State officer sued in personal capacity for acts taken in official authority (Hafer)
gloss Under Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (491 U.S. 58 (1989)), neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for damages, though state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief (or in their personal capacities for damages under Hafer) are "persons".
element color-of-law : and
name Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law
text @64..186 | under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia
rule /us/526/0040-01 @9774..9977 | Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”
rule /us/526/0040-01 @13972..14077 | Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.
rule /us/526/0040-01 @18073..18238 | a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state officials,” Tulsa, supra, at 486, cannot.
rule /f2d/628/1104-01 @3729..3980 | Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.
variant no-state-action/private-insurer-using-state-authorized-withholding-procedure | Private insurer utilizing state-permitted procedure without state compulsion or joint participation (American Manufacturers)
gloss Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
element color-of-law.state-created-right : and
name Lugar prong 1: deprivation caused by exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct created by the State
text @64..131 | under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
rule /f-supp/567/1159-01 @22675..22884 | Also to be satisfied is the second aspect of the Lugar test: whether the alleged deprivation of rights resulted from the exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority.
rule /f-supp/567/1159-01 @23493..23577 | While CAGW is a state actor, not all actions by such actors constitute state action.
gloss First prong of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)): the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.
element color-of-law.state-actor : and
name Lugar prong 2: party charged with the deprivation may fairly be said to be a state actor
text @133..186 | of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia
rule /f-supp/567/1159-01 @20922..21130 | The Court agrees with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in finding that the lack of a majority of public officials on the board is irrelevant to a conclusion that CAGW is a state actor.
rule /us/526/0040-01 @13972..14077 | Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.
gloss Second prong of Lugar: whether the private or hybrid entity may fairly be treated as a state actor under the public-function test, state-compulsion/nexus test, symbiotic-relationship test, or joint-action test.
element deprivation : and
name Deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /us/503/0115-01 @2843..2953 | More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.
not-required Separate proof of "abuse of governmental power" apart from the underlying constitutional violation (Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992))
not-required Specific state-of-mind requirement in § 1983 itself beyond what the underlying constitutional or statutory right requires (Parratt v. Taylor; Daniels v. Williams)
gloss Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred (Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); sub-elements branch by the underlying constitutional/statutory provision.
element deprivation.first-amendment : or
name Deprivation of First Amendment rights (free speech, retaliation, free exercise, petition)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f3d/935/1159-01 @15083..15178 | Apart from the narrowed universe of justifications, Turner and its progeny govern Pesci's case.
rule /f3d/935/1159-01 @34023..34099 | we hold that the 2010 ban on Duck Soup does not violate the First Amendment.
gloss Pesci v. Budz (11th Cir. 2019) is an actual First Amendment merits ruling, rejecting a civil detainee’s newsletter challenge under a modified Turner test. This is a scoped civil-detention speech example, not a universal test for retaliatory arrest or public-employee speech. The unrelated Olivier/Heck passage is removed.
element deprivation.fourth-amendment : or
name Deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights (unreasonable search, warrantless entry, false arrest, excessive force)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @27444..27736 | In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-4, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the United States Supreme Court established that the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop is provided by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @26493..26899 | In instances of excessive force claims, this Court considers the facts and circumstances of each particular case, taking into account such nonexhaustive factors as enunciated in Saucier, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
rule /f3d/189/0808-01 @23173..23474 | White v. Pierce County establishes that a special exigency excuses a warrantless entry where the government officers have probable cause to believe that the child has been abused and that the child would be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were first necessary to obtain a court order.
rule /f3d/189/0808-01 @34695..34951 | The reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals in their homes includes the interests of both parents and children in not having government officials coerce entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment and humiliate the parents in front of the children.
gloss Evaluated under Graham v. Connor objective reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
element deprivation.eighth-amendment : or
name Deprivation of Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /us/503/0001-01 @5811..6140 | we hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
rule /us/503/0001-01 @10728..10945 | When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. See Whitley, supra, at 327. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.
rule /us/503/0001-01 @11847..12097 | The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort “ ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”
rule /cl/10881677 @7348..7601 | The Court has long held that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to the deprivation of a prisoner’s basic needs, that is, when they “kno[w] of and disregar[d] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
not-required Proof of "significant injury" in an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim (Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992))
gloss Splits into excessive force (Whitley/Hudson malicious-and-sadistic test) and conditions of confinement / medical care (Farmer v. Brennan subjective deliberate indifference test).
element deprivation.equal-protection : or
name Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f3d/475/0645-01 @12518..12646 | “the equal protection clause confers on a public employee a federal constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination.”
gloss Requires purposeful discrimination / disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators (or facial classification) without the requisite level of scrutiny justification.
element deprivation.procedural-due-process : or
name Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (protected liberty/property interest + inadequate process)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /us/526/0040-01 @27361..27504 | The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in “property” or “liberty.”
rule /us/526/0040-01 @30072..30393 | Thus, for an employee’s property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.
gloss Two-step inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest (see `.due-process-property` and `.due-process-liberty`), and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient (Mathews v. Eldridge).
element deprivation.substantive-due-process : or
name Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /us/503/0115-01 @14135..14370 | Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
rule /us/503/0115-01 @17237..17414 | we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law
gloss Protects fundamental rights and guards against executive abuse of power that "shocks the conscience" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis), but does not constitutionalize ordinary state tort law or impose an affirmative workplace-safety duty absent custody (DeShaney; Collins).
element deprivation.due-process-property : or
name Protected property interest under the Due Process Clause (Board of Regents v. Roth)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f-supp/772/0583-01 @7009..7252 | A public employee can have a property interest in hot being demoted without cause — as opposed to not being' transferred without cause — where shch an interest arises from established “rules” or the parties’ “mutually explicit understandings.”
rule /f-supp/772/0583-01 @12013..12162 | Plaintiff’s argument fails to recognize a primary element of constructive discharge: that “the employee [be] forced into an involuntary resignation.”
gloss Property interests are created and defined by independent sources such as state law, rules, or mutually explicit understandings that support a legitimate claim of entitlement.
element deprivation.due-process-liberty : or
name Protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause (including stigma-plus under Paul v. Davis)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f-supp/772/0583-01 @17587..17742 | The individual must not only be stigmatized, but stigmatized in connection with the denial of a right or status “theretofore recognized under [state law].”
rule /f-supp/772/0583-01 @18751..18895 | It is not necessary, then, that the right be completely extinguished, as in the case of a discharge, but merely that it be “distinctly altered.”
gloss Reputational injury alone is insufficient under Paul v. Davis; requires "stigma-plus" (defamatory governmental statement coupled with extinguishment or distinct alteration of a state-recognized right or employment status).
element deprivation.due-process-fair-trial : or
name Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial (Brady / fabricated evidence / unduly suggestive identification)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f4th/141/417 @23687..23874 | a police officer violates a plaintiff’s right to a fair 30 trial when he “creates false information likely to influence a jury’s 31 decision and forwards that information to prosecutors.”
rule /f4th/141/417 @16807..16884 | The suggestiveness of an identification 19 procedure is assessed holistically
rule /f4th/141/417 @21020..21148 | a lineup that hides that the suspect is short is unduly 20 suggestive to a viewer known to believe that the perpetrator is tall.
gloss Violated when officers fabricate evidence forwarded to prosecutors, rig witness identifications, or suppress material exculpatory/impeachment evidence (Brady).
element causation : and
name Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected")
text @188..224 | subjects, or causes to be subjected,
rule /f2d/628/1104-01 @11175..11377 | Whether the requisite personal involvement by the Offender Advocate in the claimed unconstitutional conduct was sufficiently alleged, however, is a separate issue which the District Court did not reach.
variant personal-involvement/requests-handled-by-subordinates-not-defendant | Supervisor had no personal involvement in actions handled solely by subordinates (Johnson v. Caudill)
gloss Because there is no respondeat superior in § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
element policy : and
name Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services)
text @115..132 | custom, or usage,
rule /f3d/935/0804-01 @9027..9183 | Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local government's "policy or custom" led to the plaintiff's injury. Monell , 436 U.
rule /us/503/0115-01 @8208..8382 | The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.
rule /f4th/142/884 @2309..2435 | Consequently, we vacate the district court’s derivative judgment in favor of defendants on Codrington’s claims under Monell v.
not-required Respondeat superior / vicarious liability is rejected; municipality is not liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor (Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)
gloss Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).
element policy.failure-to-train : or
name Municipal failure to train or supervise amounting to deliberate indifference (City of Canton v. Harris)
text @115..132 | custom, or usage,
rule /us/503/0115-01 @10489..10725 | Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @39812..40082 | A plaintiff suing a municipality under Section 1983 for the acts of one of its employees must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @40372..40551 | It is well established that a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the acts of an employee where the municipal employee committed no constitutional violation.
gloss Under City of Canton v. Harris (489 U.S. 378 (1989)) and Connick v. Thompson (563 U.S. 51 (2011)), failure to train is actionable only where it amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact" and a municipal employee actually committed an underlying constitutional violation.
element damages : and
name Damages remedy (legacy CASE id; not a prerequisite for prospective relief)
text @404..516 | shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
rule /us/502/0021-01 @2191..2437 | As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.
gloss Remedy-specific damages issue retained for CASE compatibility. Compensatory damages require proof of compensable loss; nominal damages and other remedies have distinct rules. Article III standing is separately represented by standing-injury and is not synonymous with a damages award.
element x-abuse-of-governmental-power : and
name Rejected extra element: separate proof of "abuse of governmental power" (Collins v. City of Harker Heights)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /us/503/0115-01 @2843..2953 | More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.
gloss Non-element rejected by the Supreme Court in Collins: § 1983 does not require proof of an "abuse of governmental power" separate and apart from proof of a constitutional violation.
element x-federal-action : or
name Federal action / Fifth Amendment claim (outside § 1983 state-law scope)
text @133..186 | of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia
rule /f-supp/567/1159-01 @26283..26413 | Absent some “other factors” indicating federal governmental participation in CAGW’s actual operations, there is no federal action.
gloss Section 1983 applies only to action under color of State, Territorial, or D.C. law; purely federal action requires a Bivens or Fifth Amendment theory with federal governmental participation.
element x-interlocutory-jurisdiction : and
name Collateral-order appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified-immunity denials (Mitchell v. Forsyth; Johnson v. Jones)
text @404..516 | shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
rule /f3d/813/0938-01 @19245..19385 | instead, we lack jurisdiction only if our review would require second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.”
rule /f3d/813/0938-01 @21067..21312 | “Second, when the ‘version of events’ the district court holds a reasonable jury could credit ‘is blatantly contradicted by the record,’ we may assess the case based on our own de novo view of which facts a reasonable jury could accept as true.”
gloss Under Johnson v. Jones (515 U.S. 304 (1995)) and Scott v. Harris (550 U.S. 372 (2007)), a court of appeals on interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity reviews abstract questions of law (taking the district court's assumed facts as true unless blatantly contradicted by the record).
element x-issue-not-raised-below : and
name Appellate preservation / forfeiture of issue not raised in district court
text @478..516 | or other proper proceeding for redress
rule /f3d/813/0938-01 @19245..19385 | instead, we lack jurisdiction only if our review would require second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.”
gloss Procedural preservation rule applied in § 1983 appeals.
element x-malicious-prosecution : or
name Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process)
text @306..402 | to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
rule /f4th/141/417 @23687..23874 | a police officer violates a plaintiff’s right to a fair 30 trial when he “creates false information likely to influence a jury’s 31 decision and forwards that information to prosecutors.”
gloss Under Thompson v. Clark (596 U.S. 36 (2022)), a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 requires showing that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.
exception judicial-officer-injunctive-relief : exception
name Statutory bar on injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity (1996 amendment)
text @518..763 | except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
rule /us/502/0021-01 @11580..11696 | officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue
gloss Added by Pub. L. 104-317, § 309(c) (1996) to abrogate Pulliam v. Allen (466 U.S. 522 (1984)) with respect to injunctive relief against judges unless a declaratory decree was violated or unavailable.
element dc-statute-inclusion : and
name District of Columbia exclusive Act of Congress inclusion clause (1979 amendment)
text @764..933 | For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
rule /us/502/0021-01 @10623..10820 | Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.
gloss Added by Pub. L. 96-170 (1979) to overturn District of Columbia v. Carter (409 U.S. 418 (1973)) and bring D.C. officials within § 1983.
defense qualified-immunity : defense
name Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan)
text @404..460 | shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law
rule /f3d/935/0444-01 @0..255 | Evaluating the qualified immunity defense is thus a two-step process. The first is to determine whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated by conduct that, viewed from the officer's perspective and information at the time, is objectively unreasonable.
rule /f3d/813/0938-01 @31902..32154 | Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.
rule /f3d/813/0938-01 @34744..34847 | the Supreme Court has admonished “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”
rule /f3d/475/0645-01 @11809..11975 | An official’s actions violate a “clearly established” constitutional right only if “in the light of pre-existing law [,] the unlawfulness” of the actions is apparent.
rule /f4th/141/417 @29074..29234 | “[t]he salient question is whether the state of the law gave the 15 defendant fair warning that his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was 16 unconstitutional.”
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @35495..35721 | Thus, even if the officer unreasonably used force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should be granted if the officer had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief about the legality of the officer’s actions.
variant not-clearly-established/no-authority-for-specific-conduct | Plaintiff identifies no pre-existing precedent clearly establishing unlawfulness of the specific conduct (Johnson v. Caudill)
variant objectively-reasonable-conduct/termination-after-third-party-ended-core-job-function | Official acted reasonably in light of neutral trigger (Johnson v. Caudill)
gloss Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
defense x-absolute-immunity : defense
name Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions)
text @404..460 | shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law
rule /us/502/0021-01 @11580..11696 | officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue
rule /us/502/0021-01 @12127..12218 | State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.
rule /f2d/628/1104-01 @7155..7366 | We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.
gloss Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.
defense x-eleventh-amendment : defense
name Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity bar (official-capacity damages / retrospective relief)
text @46..145 | Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
rule /us/502/0021-01 @15323..15472 | That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose “individual and personal liability” on state officials under § 1983.
gloss Bars damages suits in federal court against a State or state officials in their official capacities (absent waiver, whereas § 1983 does not abrogate sovereign immunity under Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)), but does not bar personal-capacity suits (Hafer) or Ex parte Young prospective injunctive relief.
defense x-habeas-exhaustion : defense
name Preiser / Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination and habeas-exclusivity bar
text @441..516 | in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
gloss Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 475 (1973)) and Heck v. Humphrey (512 U.S. 477 (1994)), a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to seek immediate/speedier release or damages/relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an extant conviction or sentence unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or invalidated.
defense statute-of-limitations : defense
name Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)
text @441..516 | in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @15288..15446 | As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @17838..18064 | This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.
rule /f3d/935/0738-01 @1290..1518 | Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.
gloss Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).
defense x-collateral-estoppel : defense
name Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel from prior state criminal or civil judgment (Allen v. McCurry)
text @441..516 | in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
rule /f-supp-2d/367/1175-01 @19925..20224 | The Supreme Court has held that issues decided in a state court criminal proceeding may have a collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983 civil rights action, but only to the extent that the plaintiff sought relitigation of the same issues which were previously decided in the criminal proceeding.
gloss Under Allen v. McCurry (449 U.S. 90 (1980)) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts hearing § 1983 actions give state-court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of that State, provided there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue.
element standing-injury : and
name Judicial standing prerequisite, separate from damages remedy
text @427..440 | party injured
gloss JUDICIAL_PREREQUISITE: the statutory phrase is only a context anchor. Article III injury, traceability, and redressability are judicial standing requirements; prospective relief requires a real ongoing or imminent injury, not proof of a compensatory damages amount. This is not an additional quoted statutory test.