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Case and law context
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Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
Instead, if the defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to be used.”
Instead, if the defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to be used.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_96.jsonl#/f3d/96/1223-01; Unicode character offsets [16365:16613] (end exclusive); SHA-256 40ad10d4b2591f25e735d6fbc670ebb8bf34e0b506150aa9c6cebd61cbf2fd74.Alternative statutory acts are placing, depositing/causing deposit, taking/receiving, or knowingly causing delivery; they are not cumulative requirements. USPS use need not itself cross a state line; the alternative private/commercial carrier must meet the statutory interstate-carrier description. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1228–1229 (9th Cir. 1996), applies Pereira's construction of causation: personal mailing or specific intent to use the mails is unnecessary where ordinary-course use is known or reasonably foreseeable. The causation inquiry is distinct from whether the mailing executes the scheme; mere foreseeability of a mailing does not establish furtherance. Hubbard's conspiracy posture does not import agreement or overt-act elements here.