Ricci v. DeStefano

557 U.S. 557 (2009) Supreme Court of the United States 2009-06-29

civil; cross-motions for summary judgment, granted for employer and affirmed by CA2; certiorari by firefighters; Supreme Court reverses and holds plaintiffs entitled to summary judgment on disparate treatment (result: claimant-won)

Facts

  1. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization satisfied conceded
    When the City of New Haven undertook to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department (Department), the promotion and hiring process was governed by the City charter, in addition to federal and state law.
  2. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    Certain white and Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been promoted based on their good test performance sued the City and some of its officials.
  3. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    The results would determine which firefighters would be considered for promotions during the next two years, and the order in which they would be considered.
  4. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    The plaintiffs — who are the petitioners here — are 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations but were denied a chance at promotions when the CSB refused to certify the test results.
  5. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous.
  6. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white.
  7. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    With one member recused, the CSB deadlocked 2 to 2, resulting in a decision not to certify the results.
  8. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— i. e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates.
  9. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
  10. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied law
    Whatever the City’s ultimate aim — however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed — the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.
  11. 16 Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) not no-evidence
    The City and the officials defended their actions, arguing that if they had certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters.
  12. 16 Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) not no-evidence
    Ude stated that under federal law, “a statistical demonstration of disparate impact,” standing alone, “constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of racial discrimination to serve as a predicate for employer-initiated, voluntar[y] remedies — even . . . race-conscious remedies.”
  13. 16 Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) not no-evidence
    We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
  14. 16 Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) not no-evidence
    Even if respondents were motivated as a subjective matter by a desire to avoid committing disparate-impact discrimination, the record makes clear there is no support for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate, with some consequent disparate-impact liability in violation of Title VII.
  15. 16 Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) not no-evidence
    The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.