Spencer v. VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Facts

1. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded

   Dr. Zoe Spencer, a sociology professor at Virginia State University, sued the University under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII for paying her less than two male professors, allegedly because she is a woman.

2. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded

   Spencer earned about $ 70,000 per year-a median salary when compared to the men who were also full professors in the Department of Sociology, Social Work, and Criminal Justice.

3. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded

   But Spencer's lawsuit proposes comparing her pay to that of two former University administrators, Drs. Michael Shackleford and Cortez Dial, who each earned over $ 100,000 per year as professors in other departments.

4. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded

   Though Spencer establishes a pay disparity, she fails to present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that Shackleford and Dial are appropriate comparators.

5. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

   First, Shackleford and Dial taught in different departments than Spencer did.

6. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

   Spencer taught mainly undergraduate courses, while Shackleford and Dial taught more graduate courses.

7. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

   Nor did the professors work equal hours, as the record shows that Shackleford and Dial worked more than Spencer did week to week.

8. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

   Where, as here, the prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than men in similar jobs.

9. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

   For the same reasons we discussed above, Spencer's broad generalizations cannot even show sufficient similarity to meet her burden under Title VII.

10. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence

    While a plaintiff may use statistics to suggest a discriminatory motive, Spencer's expert found no statistical evidence that the University paid women less than men.