Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc.

527 F.3d 358 (2008) United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2008-05-30

civil; sex (pregnancy/abortion) discriminatory-discharge claim; summary judgment for employer reversed on plaintiff's appeal by CA3 (result: remanded)

Facts

1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization satisfied conceded
CARS hired Jane Doe as a graphic artist in June 1999.
1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization satisfied conceded
Fred Kohl, Vice-President and part-owner of the company, was Doe’s supervisor.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
On Wednesday, August 9th, Doe learned that her baby had severe deformities and her physician recommended that her pregnancy be terminated.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
Then, he spoke with Kohl and told him that the pregnancy would be terminated the following day.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
Instead, she argues that she was discharged because she underwent a surgical abortion.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
Clearly, the plain language of the statute, together with the legislative history and the EEOC guidelines, support a conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman employee because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
We now hold that the term “related medical conditions” includes an abortion.
2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied law
Therefore, in a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, to raise an inference of any unlawful discharge a plaintiff must adduce evidence that she was pregnant, and, that the employer knew it.
3 Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations satisfied conceded
Neither party disputes that Doe has met her burden on the first three elements of a prima facie pregnancy discrimination case: 1) she is or was pregnant and that her employer knew she was pregnant; 2) she was qualified for her job; and, 3) she suffered an adverse employment decision.
4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
As she was leaving for the funeral, Leona noticed Babich packing up Doe’s personal belongings from her desk.
4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
Doe called Kohl who told her that she had been discharged.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
Comparing Doe to other non-pregnant workers who were temporarily disabled, we conclude that Doe has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie ease and has thus raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
Mike King, for example, suffered a heart attack while he was employed by CARS and testified that, although he or his wife did call to tell Kohl he was still in the hospital, they did not do so daily, and that he was paid during his absence.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
Babich testified that for every employee, CARS had a “separate set of rules” and that there was no uniformly enforced rule concerning the use of vacation or sick time.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
Babich did report directly to Kohl and did not call every day or give a precise return date when she was out.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
A: On a daily basis, I go into Mr. Kohl’s office to check the warranties, and I was there as he and Alivia were working on whatever, I was checking through the warranties and Alivia said, “I don’t know what all this secrecy behind [the plaintiff] losing her baby was.” And Mr. Kohl said “she didn’t want to take responsibility.” Which upset me.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
What is clear is that this particular remark may raise a reasonable inference that the abortion was a factor in terminating Doe’s employment.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
Here, Doe was fired on the day her baby was buried, just three working days after she notified Kohl that she would have to undergo an abortion.
5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) satisfied triable
The temporal proximity, however, is sufficient here to meet Doe’s minimal prima facie case burden as to the causal connection element.
6 Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) satisfied triable
Specifically, CARS asserts that Doe was fired because neither she nor her husband called to request Friday, August 11th or the week of August 14th off from work.
6 Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) satisfied triable
Unexcused absence from work is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment.
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
This statement contradicted Kohl’s statements to the EEOC wherein he testified to the EEOC investigator that employees “needed to call off every day.”
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
Doe’s husband further testified that he talked to Kohl on Thursday, August 10th and got Kohl’s permission for his wife to take a vacation the following week.
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
She further testified that, after that call, Kohl asked her to make sure she had the receptionist station covered by other employees during the lunch hour for the week in question (a task for which Doe was usually responsible).
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
This testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CARS’ proffered reasons for terminating Doe’s employment were a pretext.
7 Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) satisfied triable
The conversation between Kohl and Babich, in which Kohl remarked that Doe had not taken responsibility for her abortion indicates that Kohl may have had other reasons for terminating Doe’s employment than her “abandonment” of her job.