Breech v. Alabama Power Co.

962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 1997-04-15

civil; religious-discrimination discharge (disparate treatment + failure to accommodate) and retaliation against employer and union; defendants' motions for summary judgment granted (result: claimant-lost)

Facts

  1. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization not law
    This action was brought by plaintiff Alan Breech (“Breech”) against his former employer, APC, and the union of which he was a member during his employment with APC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19 (“Union”).
  2. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization satisfied conceded
    APC employed Breech in various positions from January, 1977 until July, 1991 when he was terminated in response to four unexcused absences.
  3. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization not law
    Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.
  4. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization not law
    Breech has presented absolutely no evidence on this point; nor has he made specific arguments in his brief that the Union violated § 2000e-2(c)(3).
  5. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    Breech has been a praetieing member of the Worldwide Church of God since the Fall of 1990; he maintains that he did not attend work on these four occasions because it was contrary to his religious beliefs.
  6. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    One tenant of Breech’s faith is that he cannot work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.
  7. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    (1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.
  8. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
  9. 3 Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations satisfied conceded
    he became a Plant Control Operator in May, 1982. He remained a Plant Control Operator, a part of the Operations Department, until he was terminated on July 24,1991.
  10. 3 Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations satisfied conceded
    Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
  11. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    Breech received a written warning for his failure to report to work on November 24 and was advised that future failure to report to work would be met with increasingly severe discipline.
  12. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    Breech failed to report on June 15th; subsequently, he received a reprimand and a three-day suspension.
  13. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    Breech met with Shelby Walker, Ron Campbell, and Wayne Sheffield (Vice President of Local 345) on July 24, 1991 at which time he was notified that his employment with APC was terminated.
  14. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
  15. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
  16. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    In his affidavit, Breech states: “There have been many employees over the years who have had many more than four days absent [sic] for personal reasons who were not terminated. Religious reasons are no different than other personal reasons.”
  17. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    First, Breech does not state who the other employees are or the circumstances of them absences, i.e., whether the absences were irregular or cyclical.
  18. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    This evidence does not support Breech’s contention that he was subjected to differential application of work or disciplinary rules: every one of the four employees mentioned was discharged.
  19. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.
  20. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    In June of 1990, Breech submitted an affidavit with the EEOC on behalf of another employee, Eric Young.
  21. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    Upper management, which was responsible for Breech’s discharge, did not know about Breech’s submission of the affidavit.
  22. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    (1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.
  23. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    he has not demonstrated a causal link between his filing of the affidavit and his discharge.
  24. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.
  25. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    In the present case, more than a year passed between the protected activity and the discharge.
  26. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    None of the Plant Control Operators who were scheduled with Fridays and Saturdays as their off days were willing to swap schedules with Breech.
  27. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    Breech met with Shelby Walker on November 26, 1990, at which time Breech informed Walker that he was no longer going to work between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday in observance of his religious beliefs.
  28. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    As a result of the December 7th meeting, APC accommodated Breech by allowing him to make shift swaps which would result in the doubling of shifts.
  29. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
  30. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    In this case, APC has demonstrated as a matter of law that it reasonably accommodated Breech’s religious beliefs.
  31. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.
  32. 12 Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) not no-evidence
    Finally, APC offered Breech a reasonable accommodation — which Breech declined because he did not want to take a pay cut — when it repeatedly offered to allow him to take a different position, such as Helper or Assistant Control Operator.