Martinelli v. Bancroft Chophouse, LLC

357 F. Supp. 3d 95 (2019) United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 2019-02-22

civil; Title VII (and M.G.L. c. 151B) sexual harassment: hostile work environment, quid pro quo, retaliation and constructive discharge; employer's motion for summary judgment allowed on all claims (D. Mass.) (result: claimant-lost)

Facts

  1. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied assumed
    Assuming arguendo that Martinelli is a member of a protected class and was subjected to sexual harassment, he has failed to demonstrate that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to prevail on his claim for hostile work environment.
  2. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status not no-evidence
    On October, 10, 2014, Martinelli interviewed with another restaurant and was hired that same day.
  3. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status not no-evidence
    He resigned his employment with The Bancroft the following day, approximately two weeks after he had submitted his complaint about Seznec.
  4. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status not no-evidence
    To establish a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was subjected to conditions "so severe and oppressive" that a reasonable person in that position would have been compelled to resign.
  5. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status not no-evidence
    A reasonable person in Martinelli's position would not have felt that the alleged ostracism and general uncomfortable environment was so severe and oppressive as to compel him or her to resign.
  6. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status not no-evidence
    Indeed, Martinelli had an opportunity to address his perceived ostracism by submitting complaints to Human Resources or speaking to the managers directly.
  7. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    Plaintiff concedes that no member of management, other than Seznec, ever said anything sexually offensive to him and that after his complaint Seznec never made any other sexual comments to him.
  8. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    A single, isolated incident of harassment, however, is ordinarily insufficient to establish a claim for hostile work environment unless the incident was particularly egregious and the employee must demonstrate how his or her ability to work was negatively affected.
  9. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    With respect to the alleged comment by Seznec, that single, isolated remark was not sufficiently egregious to constitute severe sexual harassment and plaintiff concedes that it was the only instance of alleged sexual harassment by Seznec.
  10. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    Moreover, Martinelli admits that he did not find Seznec's remark to be offensive nor does he allege that it interfered in any way with his work performance.
  11. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    He testified that he was subjected to a generally uncomfortable atmosphere at the restaurant and that he felt as though the managers were ignoring or avoiding him.
  12. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    When asked about specific instances of harassment, however, Martinelli could only recall one time when a few of the managers seemed to be annoyed with him when he asked them where the wine was located.
  13. 9 Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment not no-evidence
    That single instance of alleged harassment or a general discomfort falls far short of conduct that is normally required to establish a hostile work environment claim.
  14. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    Mere temporal proximity, however, is insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection.
  15. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    Martinelli has no specific evidence that the managers other than Brackett even knew about his complaint against Seznec.
  16. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    First, it was apparently another manager who decided to suspend Martinelli, not Seznec, and that decision was made before the manager even knew about the comment Seznec made to plaintiff.
  17. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    Second, both plaintiff and Michaels received the same suspension as a result of their failure to perform their closing duties on September 13, 2014, which suggests that Martinelli was not suspended for an improper purpose.
  18. 11 Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) not no-evidence
    In summary, because Martinelli cannot establish a hostile work environment or that any of the alleged misconduct of Seznec or the other managers was causally linked to his protected activity, defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims will be allowed.