Kitchen v. BASF
civil; ADEA age discrimination; magistrate judge recommends granting employer's motion for summary judgment (ADA, ADEA, ยง 1981) and denying plaintiff's cross-motion (result: claimant-lost)
Facts
- 2 Age forty or older satisfied conceded
At the time of his termination, Kitchen was over the age of 55.
- 3 Hiring discharge or employment terms satisfied conceded
Because Damron believed Kitchen had turned up at work under the influence of alcohol in violation of company policy and his Return to Work Agreement and Final Warning, Kitchen's employment was terminated effective October 2, 2015.
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
Kitchen presents absolutely no evidence whatsoever to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA that "he was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age."
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
Kitchen's ADEA claim is based entirely on his subjective belief that he was terminated, in part, because of his age.
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
As a legal matter, Kitchen's subjective belief that age played a role in his termination is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA.
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
Kitchen provides zero evidence that he was treated differently than any other BASF employees under similar circumstances.
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
Although Kitchen dismisses the fact that Damron, the individual who fired him, is also in his 50s and thus a member of the same protected class as Kitchen, the law is clear:
- 4 Judicial but-for standard for age-based treatment not no-evidence
In short, Kitchen's ADEA claim falls flat. Summary judgment is appropriate in favor of BASF on the ADEA cause of action.