Glenn v. Raymour

832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 2011-12-22

civil; race disparate-treatment discharge claim (with abandoned hostile-environment and retaliation claims; parallel 1981 and PHRA claims); employer's motion for summary judgment granted (result: claimant-lost)

Facts

  1. 1 Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization satisfied conceded
    On July 24, 2007, Raymour and Flanigan, a furniture company, hired Glenn, an African-American male, as a Facility Technician in its Frazer, Pennsylvania service center (“Frazer Service Center”).
  2. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    On July 24, 2007, Raymour and Flanigan, a furniture company, hired Glenn, an African-American male, as a Facility Technician in its Frazer, Pennsylvania service center (“Frazer Service Center”).
  3. 2 Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin satisfied conceded
    For purposes of the summary judgment motion, Glenn has satisfied the first three steps of his prima facie case — he is a member of a protected class, is qualified for his Customer Delivery Inspector position, and was discharged from that position by Raymours.
  4. 3 Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations satisfied conceded
    Mirth subsequently recommended Glenn for a CDI position, and Hazeldine promoted Glenn to the position effective January 21, 2008.
  5. 3 Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations satisfied conceded
    For purposes of the summary judgment motion, Glenn has satisfied the first three steps of his prima facie case — he is a member of a protected class, is qualified for his Customer Delivery Inspector position, and was discharged from that position by Raymours.
  6. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    Mirth returned to Glenn and told him to punch out for the day because he was terminated.
  7. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    In establishing the third element of his prima facie case, Glenn need only show that he was discharged from a position for which he was qualified.
  8. 4 Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status satisfied conceded
    In this case, the fact that Glenn was discharged is undisputed.
  9. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    According to Glenn, while he and Faust were pushing the trash box back and forth from their respective work areas, Faust said to him, “Boy, don’t put your box back on this line.”
  10. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    He did not see any punches thrown, but observed from a distance some individuals “separating the two of them,” with Adams trying to “pursue” Copperthwaite and saying “if you ever do that again, I’ll snap your F’ing [sic] neck.”
  11. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”
  12. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    In the March 20 altercation, Glenn admitted that he repeatedly told Faust to “step outside.” Faust did not make a similar threat to Glenn.
  13. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Furthermore, Faust retreated from the altercation to report it to management.
  14. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Yet at no point during that discussion did Glenn alert Mirth to Faust allegedly calling him a “boy” or goading him to “go ahead, do it.”
  15. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    In sum, Raymours’ treatment of Faust cannot raise an inference of unlawful discrimination regarding Glenn’s termination because there are differentiating and mitigating circumstances that significantly distinguish both their conduct and Raymours’ treatment of them.
  16. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Regarding the same supervisor argument, Adams and Copperthwaite were employed in the Delivery Department, while Glenn worked in the Operations Department.
  17. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Critically, the underlying misconduct in Glenn’s case was reported to Glenn’s direct supervisors, confirmed by more than one witness, and admitted to by Glenn himself.
  18. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Dye’s allegations notwithstanding, Adams’ alleged misconduct was not witnessed by Adams’ direct supervisors, was not reported to those supervisors, and was not admitted to by Adams or Copperthwaite.
  19. 5 Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) not no-evidence
    Therefore, the record is without sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Adams or Copperthwaite are “similarly situated” to Glenn for purposes of establishing the fourth element of his prima facie case.