Source: cases/42usc2000e-2/us-539-90-desert-palace-v-costa.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_539/0090_01/index.html
Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”
In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”
Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury.
casedsl 1 case /us/539/0090-01 name Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa cite 539 U.S. 90 (2003) court Supreme Court of the United States date 2003-06-09 url catalog/cases/us/volume_539/0090_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl sha1=eb03242a84eb17f2dfca92ed79b5f8705cec6841 chars=19953 law 42usc2000e-2 (a)(1),(m) role rule-announced posture civil; jury verdict for employee after mixed-motive instruction, reinstated by CA9 en banc; certiorari by employer on whether direct evidence is required for a (m) instruction result claimant-won element motivating-factor : not-reached variant circumstantial-evidence/harsher-discipline-than-male-coworker fact @8047..8285 [cuts-against absent] | Petitioner unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, claiming that respondent had failed to adduce “direct evidence” that sex was a motivating factor in her dismissal or in any of the other adverse employment actions taken against her. rule @11483..11655 | Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.” rule @17217..17497 | In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” held @17498..17722 | Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury. gloss Pure construction of (m): "demonstrates" carries no heightened/direct-evidence requirement, so a mixed-motive instruction may rest on circumstantial evidence. The Court approves the instruction and affirms; it does not itself review whether the evidence was sufficient (the en banc CA9 had so held). element motivating-factor : satisfied [proved] role applied scope lower-court variant circumstantial-evidence/harsher-discipline-than-male-coworker fact @5703..5883 [supports] | Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a clean disciplinary record, received only a 5-day suspension. fact @6212..6607 [supports] | At trial, respondent presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for “intense ‘stalking’ ” by one- of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly “stack[ed]” her disciplinary record and “frequently used or tolerated” sex-based slurs against her. gloss Jury verdict for the employee on comparative-discipline and slur evidence, reinstated by the en banc Court of Appeals; left standing, not re-weighed, by the Supreme Court. element adverse-action : satisfied [proved] role applied scope lower-court variant discharge/termination-after-escalating-discipline fact @5337..5543 [supports] | Respondent experienced a number of problems with management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of privileges, and suspension. fact @5544..5702 [supports] | Petitioner finally terminated respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert Gerber. gloss Not contested in the Supreme Court; jury was instructed it must find she "suffered adverse work conditions" and found for her. element protected-class : satisfied [conceded] role applied variant sex/only-woman-in-job-classification fact @5251..5336 [supports] | Respondent was the only woman in this job and in her local Teamsters bargaining unit. element because-of : not-reached gloss Case tried and decided under the (m) motivating-factor route; but-for "because of" under (a)(1) and Price Waterhouse burden-shifting are discussed only as background. element pretext : not-reached defense x-same-decision : not-reached gloss 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limited-remedies defense: jury was instructed on it and awarded damages, but the Court only describes the defense and uses its wording as a textual argument. misfit The holding is about the KIND OF EVIDENCE that may satisfy an element (direct vs circumstantial) and about entitlement to a jury instruction. The split into a rule-announced block and a lower-court verdict block separates the two layers, but "evidence type E is admissible/sufficient in kind for element X" has no construct; it lives in the variant genus and gloss. misfit The `fact` lines are the Court's summary of trial EVIDENCE presented (quoting the CA9 opinion's characterisation), not findings; the notation does not distinguish evidence-adduced from facts-found. misfit The same-decision defense lives in a different section (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) and limits REMEDIES rather than liability; `defense` with satisfied/not-satisfied cannot express a partial (remedy-limiting) defense. Used ad-hoc id x-same-decision. misfit motivating-factor (m) is an alternative route to because-of (a)(1), not an additional element; the element vocabulary has no way to mark elements as alternatives. The sexual-harassment claim was dismissed in the district court and is outside this opinion.