Source: cases/42usc2000e-2/f3d-919-199-spencer-v-virginia-state-univ.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_919/0199_01/index.html
Though Spencer establishes a pay disparity, she fails to present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that Shackleford and Dial are appropriate comparators.
Where, as here, the prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than men in similar jobs.
For the same reasons we discussed above, Spencer's broad generalizations cannot even show sufficient similarity to meet her burden under Title VII.
Here, the University satisfies this requirement through its practice of paying administrators 9/12ths of their previous salary.
Spencer cannot supply any evidence of this.
casedsl 1.2
# author: Flash2 (gemini-3.8-flash-high)
# triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10)
case /f3d/919/0199-01
name Spencer v. VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY
cite 919 F.3d 199 (2019)
court United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
date 2019-03-18
url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_919/0199_01/index.html
source ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl sha1=648bd57c27f8d4a0d184db56578e0acaac9bf083 chars=23143
opinion maj : majority by Richardson @0..23143 controlling
law 42usc2000e-2 (a)
role applied
posture civil; Title VII sex wage discrimination and Equal Pay Act; summary judgment for university affirmed by CA4
result claimant-lost
element protected-class : satisfied [conceded]
route sex
pattern female-professor
fact @27..233 [supports] | Dr. Zoe Spencer, a sociology professor at Virginia State University, sued the University under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII for paying her less than two male professors, allegedly because she is a woman.
element adverse-action : satisfied [conceded]
route compensation
pattern professor-paid-less-than-two-former-administrators
fact @234..410 [supports] | Spencer earned about $ 70,000 per year-a median salary when compared to the men who were also full professors in the Department of Sociology, Social Work, and Criminal Justice.
fact @411..626 [supports] | But Spencer's lawsuit proposes comparing her pay to that of two former University administrators, Drs. Michael Shackleford and Cortez Dial, who each earned over $ 100,000 per year as professors in other departments.
held @1035..1209 | Though Spencer establishes a pay disparity, she fails to present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that Shackleford and Dial are appropriate comparators.
? basis: the court says the pay disparity is "establishe[d]" (expressly so for the Equal Pay Act's first element); the Title VII section never separately discusses the adverse-action prong, so [conceded] = undisputed is an inference
element because-of : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
route comparator
pattern professors-in-other-departments-who-were-former-administrators
rule @15432..15588 | Where, as here, the prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than men in similar jobs.
fact @7374..7451 [cuts-against] | First, Shackleford and Dial taught in different departments than Spencer did.
fact @8543..8644 [cuts-against] | Spencer taught mainly undergraduate courses, while Shackleford and Dial taught more graduate courses.
fact @8970..9099 [cuts-against] | Nor did the professors work equal hours, as the record shows that Shackleford and Dial worked more than Spencer did week to week.
fact @22978..23143 [cuts-against absent] | While a plaintiff may use statistics to suggest a discriminatory motive, Spencer's expert found no statistical evidence that the University paid women less than men.
held @16926..17073 | For the same reasons we discussed above, Spencer's broad generalizations cannot even show sufficient similarity to meet her burden under Title VII.
gloss The comparator facts are found in the Equal Pay Act section; the Title VII section adopts them by reference ("for the same reasons we discussed above").
element employer-reason : satisfied [conceded]
scope alternative
route neutral-policy
pattern nine-twelfths-of-prior-salary-for-former-administrators
fact @12128..12255 [supports] | In practice, the University generally paid former administrators who became professors "9/12ths" of their administrator salary.
fact @12388..12530 [supports] | Indeed, Spencer admits that her comparators' pay during their short stints as University professors was set according to the 9/12ths practice.
held @17535..17662 | Here, the University satisfies this requirement through its practice of paying administrators 9/12ths of their previous salary.
gloss Alternative ground: "Even if we concluded that Spencer had established a prima facie case".
element pretext : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
scope alternative
route falsity-of-reason
pattern claimed-misapplication-of-salary-policy-without-evidence-of-sex-based-use
rule @18648..18784 [quoted] | But again, even if the University "erroneously or even purposely misapplied the ... policy, it is not proof of unlawful discrimination."
fact @18542..18647 [cuts-against absent] | Instead, Spencer merely argues that the University misapplied the 9/12ths policy to Shackleford and Dial.
fact @22335..22630 [cuts-against] | And there is another flaw, though immaterial given the report's other shortcomings: Rosenberg's expert report does not account for Spencer's comparators' prior work in the administration, even though everyone appears to agree that their prior administrative experience determined their salaries.
held @18259..18302 | Spencer cannot supply any evidence of this.
misfit The opinion also disposes of a Title VII retaliation claim (§ 2000e-3) in one paragraph (no prima facie case: actions neither shown material nor caused by the pay complaints); not recorded here as peripheral to § 2000e-2.