Source: cases/42usc2000e-2/f3d-858-1307-hiatt-v-colorado-seminary.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_858/1307_01/index.html
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex.”
We assume without deciding that Dr. Hiatt could make a prima facie McDonnell Douglas showing of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Title IX.
A reasonable person in Dr. Hiatt’s position would view her demotion to Outreach Coordinator, coupled with a salary decrease of $2,000, as an adverse employment action.
For the foregoing reasons, the only actions that qualify as adverse employment actions against Dr. Hiatt were (1) the demotion and (2) the failure to reinstate her supervisory duties.
The working conditions she describes—such as being required to work two extra hours per week, turn in timely case notes, and justify non-FMLA sick time—do not amount to an objectively intolerable working environment.
An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.
Dr. Hiatt has failed to identify any other similarly situated employees who allegedly received differential treatment.
DU’s proffered reasons satisfy its burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons for the demotion.
Once again, Dr. Hiatt does not contest these were legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons.
Dr. Hiatt has not shown that DU’s reasons for removing her from her position as Training Director and demoting her to Outreach Coordinator were dishonest or made in bad faith, Swackhammer, 498 F.3d at 1169-70, or were “so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief,” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211 (brackets and quotations omitted).
Dr. Hiatt has not shown DU’s reasons for refusing to reinstate her supervisory duties were pretextual for retaliation or discrimination.
DU could not retaliate for Dr. Hiatt’s protected activity until she had engaged in such activity.
Dr. Hiatt cannot, therefore, create a triable issue that DU’s reasons for any adverse employment actions were pretextual for sex discrimination or retaliation.
casedsl 1 case /f3d/858/1307-01 name Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary cite 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) court United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit date 2017-06-02 url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_858/1307_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl sha1=228c7f52f2d00aaa3648490c7b87afc6df34b3ac chars=47285 law 42usc2000e-2 (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) role applied posture civil; sex-discrimination and retaliation claims (Title VII and Title IX) by demoted university psychologist; summary judgment for employer affirmed by CA10 on lack of pretext (alternative ground as to discrimination) result claimant-lost element employer : satisfied [conceded] variant private-employer/private-university fact @571..766 [supports] | Colorado Seminary owns and operates the University of Denver (“DU”), including DU’s Health and Counseling Center (“HCC”), which provides wellness services such as counseling to DU’s student body. fact @767..868 [supports] | In November 2011, DU hired Dr. Hiatt to be a Staff Psychologist and the Training Director at the HCC. element protected-class : satisfied [assumed] variant sex/unspecified-theory rule @16142..16285 | Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex.” held @20393..20553 | We assume without deciding that Dr. Hiatt could make a prima facie McDonnell Douglas showing of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Title IX. gloss The opinion never says how the demotion is claimed to be sex-based (the trigger was a romantic relationship with a former private supervisee); the whole prima facie case is assumed. element qualified : not-reached element adverse-action : satisfied [law] count demotion (Feb.-Mar. 2013); failure to reinstate supervisory duties (Aug. 2013) variant demotion/removal-of-supervisory-role-with-small-pay-cut fact @5863..6097 [supports] | Dr. Kent presented Dr. Hiatt with three options: (1) resign; (2) be demoted and undergo six months of outside counseling about her supervisory style; or (3) remain in her position and allow Human Resources (“HR”) to handle the matter. fact @6946..7091 [supports] | In her new position as Staff Psychologist/Outreach Coordinator, Dr. Hiatt was paid $58,000— a $2,000 reduction in pay from her previous position. rule @18344..18609 [quoted] | For discrimination claims, “[a]n adverse employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” held @21957..22124 | A reasonable person in Dr. Hiatt’s position would view her demotion to Outreach Coordinator, coupled with a salary decrease of $2,000, as an adverse employment action. held @25940..26123 | For the foregoing reasons, the only actions that qualify as adverse employment actions against Dr. Hiatt were (1) the demotion and (2) the failure to reinstate her supervisory duties. element adverse-action : not-satisfied [no-evidence] count resignation (May 2014) theory constructive discharge variant constructive-discharge/conditions-not-objectively-intolerable fact @11679..11775 [supports] | Upon her return, Dr. Palma-teer increased Dr. Hiatt’s weekly clinical hours from 22 to 24 hours. fact @11776..12069 [supports] | She also required Dr. Hiatt to provide a doctor’s note to justify non-Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) sick leave, obtain permission before “blocking her schedule” (i.e., make certain blocks of time in her calendar unavailable for clinical appointments), and make up for missed clinical time. fact @13033..13182 [supports] | On May 30, 2014, Dr. Hiatt submitted a letter of resignation, in which she complained of retaliation for filing her internal EEO and EEOC complaints. rule @23022..23124 [quoted] | “To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that she had no other choice but to quit.” held @23477..23693 | The working conditions she describes—such as being required to work two extra hours per week, turn in timely case notes, and justify non-FMLA sick time—do not amount to an objectively intolerable working environment. element adverse-action : not-satisfied [no-evidence] count differential workplace requirements after return from leave (2014) variant differential-treatment/no-similarly-situated-comparator-identified fact @25415..25539 [supports] | She suggests Ross Artwohl and Kimberly Mercer as relevant comparators because, like she did, they reported to Dr. Palmateer. fact @25673..25831 [supports] | Dr. Hiatt also proposes Dr. Fogle and Dr. Mathewson because Dr. Palmateer supervised them and the same professional standards applied to them as to Dr. Hiatt. fact @25832..25939 [cuts-against] | But because Dr. Hiatt supervised these two individuals, they were not in positions comparable to Dr. Hiatt. rule @25042..25291 | An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history. held @25296..25414 | Dr. Hiatt has failed to identify any other similarly situated employees who allegedly received differential treatment. gloss Plaintiff recast "differential treatment" (normally because-of/pretext evidence) as a free-standing adverse action; the court rejects it for want of comparators either way. element because-of : not-reached gloss Prima facie case assumed without deciding; the district court had held it failed for lack of comparators, and the panel affirms on the alternative pretext ground instead. element employer-reason : satisfied [conceded] count demotion variant performance/loss-of-trainee-confidence-ethics-concern-and-supervisory-style fact @3772..3863 [supports] | First, Dr. Fogle, Dr. Mathewson, and Dr. Shanley elected to end supervision with Dr. Hiatt. fact @4616..4706 [supports] | Based on those conversations, Dr. Kent determined Dr. Hiatt was in an “ethical grey area.” fact @5277..5496 [supports] | Further, rather than take personal responsibility for the supervisees’ reactions, Dr. Hiatt blamed the supervi-sees’ pathologies as causing their strong reactions, including their decisions to stop supervision with her. held @27136..27267 | DU’s proffered reasons satisfy its burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons for the demotion. element employer-reason : satisfied [conceded] count failure to reinstate supervisory duties variant performance/unchanged-supervisory-style-and-negative-trainee-feedback fact @7207..7393 [supports] | Based on her sessions with Dr. Hiatt, Dr. Asher opined that Dr. Hiatt “likely could return” to a supervisory role, but also noted that she was not likely to change her supervisory style. fact @39169..39382 [supports] | In their exit interviews after she was demoted, several supervisees described “troubling interactions” with Dr. Hiatt during supervision that gave DU further reason to believe Dr. Hiatt had “very poor boundaries.” held @36990..37098 | Once again, Dr. Hiatt does not contest these were legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons. element pretext : not-satisfied [no-evidence] count demotion variant honest-belief/consistent-contemporaneous-reasons-after-fair-investigation fact @28380..28579 [cuts-against] | When Dr. Kent and Dr. Palmateer met with Dr. Hiatt on February 22, 2013, and presented the three options to her, the reasons they stated then are the same reasons that DU provides in this litigation. fact @32876..33134 [cuts-against] | Dr. Kent presented both Dr. Hiatt’s and Dr. Fogle’s timelines of events to Dr. Philinda Hutchings—the Dean of the Midwestern School of Professional Psychology—and Dr. Bill Bracker—the former Director of the Nova Southeastern University Consortium Internship. fact @33947..34047 [cuts-against] | Consistent with Smothers, DU gave Dr. Hiatt multiple opportunities to explain her version of events. fact @35306..35410 [cuts-against] | Indeed, Dr. Hiatt admitted in her deposition that supervisees even had a name for it—getting “Tawny-ed.” rule @20165..20354 [quoted] | “The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.” held @35699..36102 | Dr. Hiatt has not shown that DU’s reasons for removing her from her position as Training Director and demoting her to Outreach Coordinator were dishonest or made in bad faith, Swackhammer, 498 F.3d at 1169-70, or were “so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief,” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211 (brackets and quotations omitted). gloss Even a mistaken ethics assessment is not pretext if reached honestly after hearing both sides and consulting outside experts; reasons given at the time match the litigation reasons. element pretext : not-satisfied [no-evidence] count failure to reinstate supervisory duties variant honest-belief/employer-may-disagree-with-outside-consultant-and-use-subjective-criteria fact @38266..38327 [cuts-against] | In Dr. Kent’s view, Dr. Asher’s recommendation was equivocal. fact @40226..40509 [supports] | She pointed to the October 2013 email from Associate Provost for Student Life Patricia Helton, which called on Dr. Hiatt to have “better awareness about the power she holds” and “demonstrate[ ] appropriate professional boundaries in all contexts” before she could resume supervision. rule @19839..20083 [quoted] | “Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.” held @40976..41112 | Dr. Hiatt has not shown DU’s reasons for refusing to reinstate her supervisory duties were pretextual for retaliation or discrimination. gloss The second fact is the plaintiff's own pretext evidence (subjective reinstatement criteria in the provost's email), held insufficient. element retaliation : not-satisfied [no-evidence] count 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim (demotion; failure to reinstate) variant pretext/adverse-decision-communicated-before-protected-activity fact @6684..6880 [supports] | On February 27, 2013, before Dr. Hiatt chose an option, her attorney sent DU a letter claiming DU’s request for Dr. Hiatt to leave her position as Training Director amounted to sex discrimination. fact @30590..30706 [cuts-against] | Dr. Kent and Dr. Palmateer initially gave Dr. Hiatt the reasons for her demotion in their February 22, 2013 meeting. rule @18900..19165 [quoted] | For retaliation claims, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would .have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” rule @31017..31114 | DU could not retaliate for Dr. Hiatt’s protected activity until she had engaged in such activity. held @41719..41878 | Dr. Hiatt cannot, therefore, create a triable issue that DU’s reasons for any adverse employment actions were pretextual for sex discrimination or retaliation. gloss Retaliation prima facie case also assumed; resolved on the same pretext analysis as discrimination, with timing (reasons given five days before the first protected activity) as an extra point. element motivating-factor : not-reached misfit The court ASSUMES the prima facie case (protected-class, qualified, because-of) and decides only steps 2-3. [assumed] is available per element, but the notation cannot say "prima facie case as a bundle assumed", and it is odd that a claim can be lost with because-of never reached: the dispositive element is `pretext`, which in statutory terms is just the because-of inquiry at a later procedural step. The district court's contrary ground (prima facie case failed for lack of comparators) is a true `scope lower-court` because-of ruling, but no quote was captured for it, so it lives only in a gloss. misfit adverse-action is decided per alleged action with different outcomes (demotion yes; constructive discharge no; "differential treatment" no) and is shared between two claims with different legal standards (discrimination "significant change in status" vs retaliation "materially adverse" under Burlington Northern). `count` holds the action, but the claim-specific standard cannot be separated. misfit employer-reason and pretext are likewise per adverse action (demotion vs non-reinstatement); element x action x claim is a 3-D grid, and a single `count` qualifier has to carry both the action and the claim. misfit Title IX claims are decided together with Title VII under the same framework; one opinion is simultaneously an instance of two statutes (20 U.S.C. 1681 and 2000e-2/2000e-3) with identical element holdings; no way to say "same instance, sibling statute". misfit Individual supervisor defendants (Kent, Palmateer) are named but the opinion never addresses individual liability / employer status separately.