Source: cases/42usc2000e-2/f3d-41-1073-eeoc-v-francis-w-parker-school.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_41/1073_01/index.html
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.”
As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability.
casedsl 1 case /f3d/41/1073-01 name Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School cite 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) court United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit date 1994-10-21 url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_41/1073_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl sha1=22e9ff527b6b7e385dc6c127ed582c28917204da chars=24659 law 42usc2000e-2 (a)(2) role comparator posture civil; ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623) refusal-to-hire suit by EEOC; summary judgment for employer on disparate impact affirmed by CA7; Title VII cited only by analogy/contrast result not-decided element impact : not-reached theory ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick variant cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii fact @4451..4721 [supports] | The EEOC claims that due to the statistically significant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a low maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate percentage of applicants over the age of forty from consideration for the teaching position. fact @1671..1752 [supports] | Johnson was sixty-three years old and claimed to have thirty years of experience. fact @1833..1947 [supports] | One of the reasons given for the decision was that Johnson qualified for a salary higher than Parker could afford. rule @4123..4313 | Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another. rule @10810..10898 | The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.” held @12504..12622 | As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability. gloss No Title VII claim. The court reads 2000e-2(a)(2) (which covers "applicants for employment") as the textual home of Griggs impact liability and uses the ADEA's omission of applicants, plus the RFOA clause and Hazen Paper, to refuse to carry Title VII impact theory over to an age claim by an applicant. The held line decides the ADEA claim, not this statute. gloss The fact lines are ADEA facts (age, not a 2000e-2 trait); their polarity is stated relative to the ANALOGOUS impact showing (a neutral salary cap falling more harshly on older applicants), not relative to any Title VII element. element protected-class : not-reached gloss The trait is age, which is not a 2000e-2 trait. element adverse-action : not-reached element because-of : not-reached misfit `role comparator` now keeps this file out of the 2000e-2 instances, but the valuable datum is still unexpressed: a cross-statute link (this case is an INSTANCE of 29usc623; for 2000e-2 it is interpretive gloss on (a)(2) -- "same words, different result" because the ADEA mirror provision omits applicants). The comparator block therefore still carries fact/held quotes that belong to the sibling statute; v1 has no pointer to the law they are really facts of. misfit Dissent (Cudahy, J.) argues Title VII impact doctrine carries over wholesale and that business necessity already plays the role of the RFOA clause. v1 has `scope dissent`, but no quote from the dissent was captured and a dissent block would be about the ADEA, not this statute; left unrecorded.