Source: cases/42usc2000e-2/f-supp-962-1447-breech-v-alabama-power.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f-supp/volume_962/1447_01/index.html
Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.
(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.
Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.
the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
APC has produced ample evidence that it terminated Breech solely because of his four unexcused absences.
Breech never (1) came forth with evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment action was motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent or (2) attempted to show that APC’s proffered explanation was pretextual.
To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.
In this case, APC has demonstrated as a matter of law that it reasonably accommodated Breech’s religious beliefs.
(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.
where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.
he has not demonstrated a causal link between his filing of the affidavit and his discharge.
In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.
Thus, defendants’ contention that Beech has waived his right to sue under Title VII is without merit.
casedsl 1
case /f-supp/962/1447-01
name Breech v. Alabama Power Co.
cite 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997)
court United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
date 1997-04-15
url catalog/cases/f-supp/volume_962/1447_01/index.html
source ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl sha1=207c481ef86cd521f3721153829990d4d0a0d891 chars=51652
law 42usc2000e-2 (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a)
role applied
posture civil; religious-discrimination discharge (disparate treatment + failure to accommodate) and retaliation against employer and union; defendants' motions for summary judgment granted
result claimant-lost
element employer : satisfied [conceded]
party Alabama Power Co. (APC)
variant private-employer/private-utility-long-term-employee
fact @1070..1209 [supports] | APC employed Breech in various positions from January, 1977 until July, 1991 when he was terminated in response to four unexcused absences.
element employer : not-satisfied [law]
party IBEW System Council U-19 (Union)
variant labor-organization/union-sued-for-employers-discharge
fact @570..818 [cuts-against] | This action was brought by plaintiff Alan Breech (“Breech”) against his former employer, APC, and the union of which he was a member during his employment with APC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19 (“Union”).
fact @21381..21528 [cuts-against absent] | Breech has presented absolutely no evidence on this point; nor has he made specific arguments in his brief that the Union violated § 2000e-2(c)(3).
held @20836..21002 | Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.
gloss A union can be reached only under (c)(3) (causing the employer to discriminate); that theory was neither argued nor supported, so the discharge claim against the union fails at the threshold.
element protected-class : satisfied [conceded]
variant religion/sabbath-observer-converted-during-employment
fact @1210..1415 [supports] | Breech has been a praetieing member of the Worldwide Church of God since the Fall of 1990; he maintains that he did not attend work on these four occasions because it was contrary to his religious beliefs.
fact @1416..1508 [supports] | One tenant of Breech’s faith is that he cannot work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.
rule @25400..25677 | (1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.
held @31799..31895 | Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
element qualified : satisfied [conceded]
variant qualified/long-tenure-in-position
fact @4848..5012 [supports] | he became a Plant Control Operator in May, 1982. He remained a Plant Control Operator, a part of the Operations Department, until he was terminated on July 24,1991.
held @31799..31895 | Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
element adverse-action : satisfied [conceded]
variant discharge/progressive-discipline-for-absences
fact @9092..9278 [supports] | Breech received a written warning for his failure to report to work on November 24 and was advised that future failure to report to work would be met with increasingly severe discipline.
fact @12635..12738 [supports] | Breech failed to report on June 15th; subsequently, he received a reprimand and a three-day suspension.
fact @15294..15480 [supports] | Breech met with Shelby Walker, Ron Campbell, and Wayne Sheffield (Vice President of Local 345) on July 24, 1991 at which time he was notified that his employment with APC was terminated.
element because-of : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
party APC
theory disparate treatment
variant comparator/conclusory-claim-of-unequal-discipline
fact @32347..32588 [supports] | In his affidavit, Breech states: “There have been many employees over the years who have had many more than four days absent [sic] for personal reasons who were not terminated. Religious reasons are no different than other personal reasons.”
fact @32654..32804 [cuts-against absent] | First, Breech does not state who the other employees are or the circumstances of them absences, i.e., whether the absences were irregular or cyclical.
fact @33439..33628 [cuts-against] | This evidence does not support Breech’s contention that he was subjected to differential application of work or disciplinary rules: every one of the four employees mentioned was discharged.
rule @26020..26286 | Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
rule @23883..24048 | To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
held @33629..33744 | Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.
gloss Fourth prima facie prong (differential application of discipline) fails: unnamed comparators in plaintiff's own affidavit, and the only identified absentee employees were all fired too. No direct evidence.
element employer-reason : satisfied [triable]
scope alternative
variant attendance/unexcused-absences-under-progressive-discipline
fact @15509..15590 [supports] | The stated reason for his discharge was his continued failure to report for work.
fact @34130..34287 [supports] | Breech had also informed APC that he intended to miss each and every shift overlapping with his sabbath if he could not arrange a shift swap or vacation day.
rule @27358..27555 | the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
held @34025..34129 | APC has produced ample evidence that it terminated Breech solely because of his four unexcused absences.
gloss Second ground, assuming a prima facie case. Note the "neutral" reason is itself the religiously motivated absence; the court treats that tension under the accommodation theory, not under pretext.
element pretext : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
scope alternative
variant no-evidence-of-pretext/plaintiff-offered-none
rule @31044..31304 [quoted] | a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.
held @34288..34500 | Breech never (1) came forth with evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment action was motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent or (2) attempted to show that APC’s proffered explanation was pretextual.
element motivating-factor : not-reached
gloss (m) is quoted in the standards and pleaded in the complaint, but the court analyses only single-motive McDonnell Douglas; the 1991 Act claims against APC had been dismissed as pre-enactment conduct.
element x-failure-to-accommodate : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
party APC
theory failure to accommodate under 2000e(j)
variant reasonable-accommodation-offered/shift-swaps-vacation-days-and-declined-lower-paid-transfer
fact @7612..7820 [supports] | Breech met with Shelby Walker on November 26, 1990, at which time Breech informed Walker that he was no longer going to work between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday in observance of his religious beliefs.
fact @8379..8525 [cuts-against] | As a result of the December 7th meeting, APC accommodated Breech by allowing him to make shift swaps which would result in the doubling of shifts.
fact @6648..6791 [supports] | None of the Plant Control Operators who were scheduled with Fridays and Saturdays as their off days were willing to swap schedules with Breech.
fact @37897..38135 [cuts-against] | Finally, APC offered Breech a reasonable accommodation — which Breech declined because he did not want to take a pay cut — when it repeatedly offered to allow him to take a different position, such as Helper or Assistant Control Operator.
rule @35041..35420 | To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
rule @37277..37384 | Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.
held @37034..37147 | In this case, APC has demonstrated as a matter of law that it reasonably accommodated Breech’s religious beliefs.
gloss The court skips the accommodation prima facie case and decides on the employer's burden: once any reasonable accommodation is offered the inquiry ends (Philbrook); undue hardship not reached; employee has a duty to cooperate with offered means.
element retaliation : not-satisfied [no-evidence]
party APC only
count 2000e-3(a) retaliatory discharge
variant causal-link/year-long-gap-and-decisionmaker-unaware
fact @16892..16995 [supports] | In June of 1990, Breech submitted an affidavit with the EEOC on behalf of another employee, Eric Young.
fact @17068..17188 [cuts-against] | Upper management, which was responsible for Breech’s discharge, did not know about Breech’s submission of the affidavit.
fact @40267..40361 [cuts-against] | In the present case, more than a year passed between the protected activity and the discharge.
rule @38762..38968 | (1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.
rule @40009..40266 | where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.
held @39692..39784 | he has not demonstrated a causal link between his filing of the affidavit and his discharge.
defense x-prior-arbitration : not-satisfied [law]
scope procedural
variant arbitration-preclusion/cba-grievance-award-does-not-bar-statutory-suit
fact @16702..16837 [supports] | The Board of Arbitration rendered a decision dated June 17,1994; it determined that Breech’s discharge was not in violation of the CBA.
rule @19929..20158 | In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.
held @18980..19081 | Thus, defendants’ contention that Beech has waived his right to sue under Title VII is without merit.
gloss Gardner-Denver controls over Gilmer: union-negotiated CBA arbitration of contract claims is not a waiver of the individual's Title VII forum.
misfit Religious failure-to-accommodate (2000e(j)) is a distinct liability theory with its own prima facie case and an employer burden (reasonable accommodation OR undue hardship). Recorded as x-failure-to-accommodate, but it is really a 3-part claim plus a 2-branch defense, and the court decided only the defense branch. Its basis [no-evidence] follows the rule "summary judgment against the claimant" yet misdescribes the ruling: the claimant did not lack evidence; the EMPLOYER established its accommodation showing "as a matter of law" on undisputed facts. No basis says "defeated at summary judgment by the opponent's affirmative showing".
misfit because-of is decided via the fourth prima facie prong (comparators); `scope alternative` marks employer-reason/pretext as the "even assuming" ground, but the notation cannot express that these blocks are sequential steps of one burden-shifting proof of a single statutory element. employer-reason [triable] means only "burden of production met on the summary-judgment record".
misfit The employer's "legitimate" reason (Sabbath absences) is causally identical to the protected trait; disparate-treatment framing calls it nondiscriminatory while the accommodation framing treats it as the conflict. Same facts, opposite roles under two theories; `theory` separates the blocks but cannot relate them.
misfit Subsection (c)(3) (union causing employer to discriminate) has no element id and was found unpleaded; it shows only as an [absent] fact under the union's `employer` block.
misfit protected-class/qualified/adverse-action are disposed of in one sentence ("satisfied the first three elements"); the same held quote is reused across blocks.