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cases/42usc1983/us-502-21-hafer-v-melo.case

Source: cases/42usc1983/us-502-21-hafer-v-melo.case

Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_502/0021_01/index.html

Verbatim annotated passages

the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.
By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term “person.”
We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.
As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.
Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.
The requirement of action under color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as auditor general.
That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose “individual and personal liability” on state officials under § 1983.
Insofar as respondents seek damages against Hafer personally, the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to sue in federal court.
State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.
officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.

Exact source text

casedsl 1

case /us/502/0021-01
  name    Hafer v. Melo
  cite    502 U.S. 21 (1991)
  court   Supreme Court of the United States
  date    1991-11-05
  url     catalog/cases/us/volume_502/0021_01/index.html
  source  ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl sha1=94435701f22d602931c58f9adf7e27a567d68d02 chars=17407

law 42usc1983
  role    applied
  posture civil; discharged state employees sue state auditor general for damages and reinstatement; district court dismissed under Will; CA3 reversed; certiorari on whether state officers are personally liable for official acts; affirmed
  result  remanded

element person : satisfied [law]
  variant individual/state-official-sued-in-personal-capacity-for-official-acts
  party   Hafer
  count   damages claims
  theory  personal-capacity suit
  fact @1031..1186 [supports] | Shortly after becoming auditor general, she dismissed 18 employees, including named respondent James Melo, Jr., on the basis that they “bought” their jobs.
  fact @1508..1660 [supports] | These respondents allege that Hafer discharged them because of their Democratic political affiliation and support for her opponent in the 1988 election.
  fact @2469..2628 [supports] | Turning to respondents’ monetary claims, the court found that six members of the Gurley group had expressly sought damages from Hafer in her personal capacity.
  rule @7140..7341 | the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.
  rule @7778..7984 | By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term “person.”
  held @15867..15977 | We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.
  gloss  Personhood turns on the capacity in which the officer is SUED (who pays), not the capacity in which she ACTED; exercising official hire/fire authority does not convert a personal-capacity damages suit into a suit against the State.

element person : satisfied [law]
  scope   lower-court
  variant official-capacity/state-official-sued-for-prospective-relief
  party   Hafer
  count   reinstatement claims
  theory  official-capacity suit for prospective relief
  fact @1681..1772 [supports] | They too filed suit against Hafer, seeking monetary damages and reinstatement under § 1983.
  rule @2191..2437 | As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.
  gloss  Court of Appeals' holding, reported and endorsed by citation (Will n. 10) but not the question on certiorari.

element color-of-law : satisfied [pleaded]
  variant public-official/exercise-of-official-authority
  fact @2760..2967 [supports] | While Hafer’s power to hire and fire derived from her position as auditor general, it said, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in her personal capacity.
  rule @10623..10820 | Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.
  held @9307..9471 | The requirement of action under color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as auditor general.
  gloss  Acts within lawful authority and "necessary to governmental functions" are still under color of law; no carve-out for authorized official acts.

element policy : not-reached
  gloss  Stated only as a contrast: personal-capacity plaintiffs need not show an entity policy or custom; official-capacity plaintiffs must.

defense x-eleventh-amendment : not-satisfied [law]
  variant sovereign-immunity/personal-capacity-damages-not-against-treasury
  rule @15323..15472 | That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose “individual and personal liability” on state officials under § 1983.
  held @15725..15866 | Insofar as respondents seek damages against Hafer personally, the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to sue in federal court.

defense x-absolute-immunity : not-satisfied [law]
  variant absolute-immunity/state-executive-employment-decision
  rule @12127..12218 | State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.
  rule @11580..11696 | officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue
  held @15978..16160 | The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.
  gloss  Qualified (personal) immunity remains available on remand and was not decided.

element deprivation : not-reached
  gloss  Underlying claims (patronage dismissal / First Amendment; due process) never examined; only whether the suit may proceed.
element causation : not-reached
element damages : not-reached

misfit The `person` element here is not a property of the defendant alone but of the (defendant, capacity sued, relief sought) triple: same human is a person for personal-capacity damages, a person for official-capacity injunctive relief, and NOT a person for official-capacity damages. v1 splits this over `party` / `theory` / `count`, still as free text; the law model needs capacity and relief as typed parameters of `person`.
misfit The holding is a relation between elements: the official authority that satisfies color-of-law cannot simultaneously negate person. No construct for "satisfying element A does not defeat element B".
misfit Pure question of law about who can be sued; the merits facts (patronage firings) are background allegations that bear on no element actually decided, so `fact` lines under `person` are context rather than facts the court "relied on" -- their [supports] tag is nominal (v1 has no neutral/context polarity).
misfit Qualified immunity is mentioned as available but undecided -- no way to record "defense preserved for remand" except a gloss.
misfit `result`: claimants won the only issue decided (suit may proceed) but nothing on the merits; "remanded" understates a clean claimant win on the question presented. A per-issue result would be more accurate.
misfit How capacity is determined (pleading vs. course of proceedings) is flagged in a footnote as a circuit split not before the Court; nowhere to put an expressly-reserved question.